Samora v. Kerr , 259 F. App'x 126 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                       FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    December 19, 2007
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    MICHAEL ANTHONY SAMORA,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,                   No. 07-2110
    v.                                         (D. New Mexico)
    LIANE E. KERR,                               (D.C. No. CIV-07-200-JB-RHS)
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
    Michael Anthony Samora, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brought claims
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1343
    (a)(3) and 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
    , 1985, 1988, and 2000a-2 in
    the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico against his former
    criminal defense attorney, Liane Kerr. The district court granted Mr. Samora’s
    motion to proceed in forma pauperis under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (b)(1) and dismissed
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
    not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
    and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
    consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    his claims sua sponte under § 1915(e)(2) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6).
    On appeal Mr. Samora argues only that he was denied his Sixth
    Amendment right to a speedy trial. Because he did not allege in his complaint or
    argue in his brief that the violation was the product of a conspiracy, see 
    42 U.S.C. § 1985
    , or of discrimination or segregation, see 
    id.
     at § 2000a-2, we presume that
    he challenges the district court’s decision with respect to his claims against Kerr
    under §§ 1343(a)(3) and 1983. See Gaines v. Stenseng, 
    292 F.3d 1222
    , 1224
    (10th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e must construe a pro se appellant’s complaint liberally.”).
    To state a claim under §§ 1343(a)(3) and 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a
    constitutional violation “was committed by a person acting under color of state
    law.” West v. Atkins, 
    487 U.S. 42
    , 48 (1988). Private actors ordinarily cannot be
    said to act under color of state law. In particular, “[t]he conduct of an attorney
    acting in his professional capacity while representing his client does not
    constitute action under color of state law . . . .” Beedle v. Wilson, 
    422 F.3d 1059
    ,
    1073 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Samora does not
    allege that Kerr committed the violation under color of state law. Thus, the
    district court ruled correctly.
    -2-
    We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Samora’s complaint. We
    DENY Mr. Samora’s application to proceed in forma pauperis.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Harris L Hartz
    Circuit Judge
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-2110

Citation Numbers: 259 F. App'x 126

Judges: Lucero, Hartz, Gorsuch

Filed Date: 12/19/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024