United States v. Flores-Ocampo ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                          F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    April 4, 2006
    TENTH CIRCUIT                       Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                   No. 05-3257
    ANTONIO FLORES-OCAMPO,                      (D.C. No. 04-CR-40120-JAR)
    (D. Kansas)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, and BRISCOE and LUCERO, Circuit
    Judges.
    Antonio Flores-Ocampo entered a conditional guilty plea to possession with
    intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable quantity of
    cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1). He appeals the
    district court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result
    of a traffic stop and search of his vehicle. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    I.
    On September 7, 2004, Clint Epperly, a trooper with the Kansas Highway
    Patrol, was monitoring north-bound traffic along Interstate 35 in Lyon County,
    Kansas, as part of a drug interdiction program. Trooper Epperly was looking for
    new, rented, and out-of-state vehicles, in addition to motorists that committed
    traffic violations or failed to pay the required interstate toll. That day, at around
    nine in the morning, Trooper Epperly noticed Flores-Ocampo, a young, Hispanic
    male, driving a “nice looking” 2001 Nissan Maxima with an Indiana license plate.
    Trooper Epperly contacted dispatch and learned that the vehicle’s registration was
    current and that the vehicle had not been reported stolen. Trooper Epperly
    followed Flores-Ocampo for almost three miles. He stopped Flores-Ocampo after
    observing the right wheels of Flores-Ocampo’s vehicle fully cross the white fog
    line. The stop of Flores-Ocampo and the conversation that ensued between him
    and Trooper Epperly were recorded on video tape.
    As he approached the car, Trooper Epperly observed Flores-Ocampo in the
    driver’s seat and a woman and a child in the backseat. Trooper Epperly told
    Flores-Ocampo why he had stopped him, and he asked Flores-Ocampo whether he
    was sleepy. He also requested Flores-Ocampo’s driver’s license and proof of
    insurance. In response, Flores-Ocampo handed him a Mexican driver’s license
    and documentation that named Gilberto Garcia as the insured. Trooper Epperly
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    continued to engage Flores-Ocampo in conversation, inquiring as to who owned
    the vehicle, where Flores-Ocampo was coming from, and where Flores-Ocampo
    was going. Flores-Ocampo responded that his friend Garcia owned the vehicle,
    he was returning from Oklahoma after visiting friends, and that he lived in
    Columbus, Indiana. Flores-Ocampo also informed Trooper Epperly that he was
    not a citizen, but Trooper Epperly never followed up on Flores-Ocampo’s
    immigration status. 1
    Trooper Epperly told Flores-Ocampo to come back to his patrol car with
    him. Once they were inside the patrol car, dispatch advised Trooper Epperly that
    the vehicle’s Indiana license plate had been issued to Delia Lopez of Columbus,
    Indiana. Trooper Epperly then asked dispatch to check on whether the vehicle
    had made any recent border crossings. Meanwhile, Trooper Epperly conversed
    with Flores-Ocampo, asking him how many days he had stayed in Oklahoma,
    where he had traveled from in Oklahoma, what his address was in Indiana,
    whether he worked in Indiana, how much money Flores-Ocampo was carrying in
    his wallet, and whether he could look inside Flores-Ocampo’s wallet. In
    answering where he had traveled from in Oklahoma, Flores-Ocampo used an atlas
    1
    The videotape of the traffic stop reflects that Flores-Ocampo responded
    “Si” to Trooper Epperly’s compound question, “Do you have passport . . . green
    card, illegal?” Thus, it is unclear what part of the question Flores-Ocampo
    answered.
    -3-
    and circled at least a 100-mile radius around Oklahoma City. Subsequently,
    dispatch advised Trooper Epperly that the vehicle had made no border crossings.
    Trooper Epperly then asked Flores-Ocampo if he knew Delia Lopez, and Flores-
    Ocampo responded that she was his friend.
    Immediately after this conversation, Trooper Epperly issued Flores-Ocampo
    a warning for the traffic violation. Specifically, he said: “There’s your warning.
    That’s all I got. You’re free to go. Do you have any questions?” The videotape
    of the conversation does not clearly indicate what Flores-Ocampo answered.
    Trooper Epperly then asked: “Can I ask you a couple of questions before you
    go?” Again, Flores-Ocampo said something inaudible. Trooper Epperly again
    asked: “Can I talk to you for a minute? Is that okay? Can I talk to you is that
    okay?” The videotape shows the following colloquy occurred between the two
    individuals:
    Epperly: We have muchos drogas on highway. Any muchos drogas
    en su carro?
    Flores-Ocampo: No.
    Epperly: Nada?
    Flores-Ocampo: No.
    Epperly: Any marijuana?
    Flores-Ocampo: No.
    Epperly: Any cocaine?
    -4-
    Flores-Ocampo: No.
    Epperly: Nada? Me buscar por drogas en su carro? Is okay?
    Gracias.
    At the suppression hearing, Trooper Epperly testified about his attempt to
    obtain Flores-Ocampo’s consent to search the vehicle in light of the language
    barrier:
    Q. And did you have any difficulty in communicating with him when
    you asked for consent to search his automobile?
    A. No. I did have to ask him in Spanish. I asked him first in
    English. He kind of gave me a puzzled look, so I asked him if it was
    okay if I could look in his car for drugs. Which in my broken
    Spanish is: Is it okay if I buscar su carro for druggos? Can I look in
    your car for drugs.
    ...
    Q. And did he think about that, or did he respond immediately?
    A. He responded. He shook his head and replied yes. He shook his
    head and replied yes.
    Q. Did you have any indication during the time that you were
    with him that you and he were not able to communicate
    reasonably ?
    A. No, I didn’t believe so.
    Q. Did you think that between your use of Spanish and his use of
    English that the messages were being communicated appropriately
    between you and he?
    A. Yes.
    App. at 154-55.
    -5-
    Trooper Epperly and Flores-Ocampo then stepped out of the patrol car. In
    the meantime, another officer had arrived on the scene. During Trooper Epperly’s
    search of the vehicle, he opened the trunk and found a single suitcase. He
    believed that one suitcase was inadequate for a family traveling with a baby on a
    three-day trip to Oklahoma City. Trooper Epperly also searched the door on the
    driver’s side and noticed a pouch of tools, including a flat-blade screwdriver.
    Trooper Epperly thought the presence of these tools was unusual. He later found
    some tool marks in the gas tank area underneath the backseat of the car. Based on
    his observation of the tools and the location of the tool marks, he suspected there
    might be contraband hidden in the gas tank. As a result, Trooper Epperly
    informed Flores-Ocampo that he wanted to search the gas tank for drugs and he
    asked Flores-Ocampo to follow him to Williams Automotive in nearby Emporia,
    Kansas.
    Once they arrived at Williams Automotive, Trooper Epperly invited Flores-
    Ocampo to stay in the waiting area. During his attempt to search the gas tank,
    Trooper Epperly pulled up the backseat hatch, but he did not notice any tool
    marks on the actual access to the gas tank. Finding no signs of tampering,
    Trooper Epperly put the hatch back on. At this point, Trooper Epperly was not
    completely satisfied due to Flores-Ocampo’s story and nervous demeanor.
    Immediately after his search of the gas tank, and while he was getting out of the
    -6-
    vehicle, Trooper Epperly looked up and saw “a slight sag” around the sunroof.
    He tried to open the cover to the sunroof, but it would not move. Using his pen
    light to see what was causing the cover to remain in place, Trooper Epperly
    discovered several bundles of cocaine.
    II.
    This court reviews de novo a district court’s determination of the
    reasonableness of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. United
    States v. Abdenbi, 
    361 F.3d 1282
    , 1287 (10th Cir. 2004). When reviewing a
    denial of a motion to suppress, we look at the totality of the circumstances and
    view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v.
    Gay, 
    240 F.3d 1222
    , 1225 (10th Cir. 2001). Further, we accept the factual
    findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v.
    Williams, 
    271 F.3d 1262
    , 1266 (10th Cir. 2001). “A finding of fact is ‘clearly
    erroneous’ if it is without factual support in the record or if the appellate court,
    after reviewing all the evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
    mistake has been made.” Manning v. United States, 
    146 F.3d 808
    , 812 (10th Cir.
    1998).
    III.
    A. Scope of Consent to Search
    Flores-Ocampo contends that Trooper Epperly exceeded the scope of his
    -7-
    consent when he searched the vehicle’s sunroof at Williams Automotive.
    According to Flores-Ocampo, a reasonable person would not have understood his
    roadside conversation with Trooper Epperly as granting consent to search any
    areas of the vehicle beyond the gas tank.
    “Whether a search exceeds the scope and duration of consent is a question
    of fact, reviewable for clear error. . . .” United States v. Rosborough, 
    366 F.3d 1145
    , 1150 (10th Cir. 2004). “The scope of a search is generally defined by its
    expressed object,” Florida v. Jimeno, 
    500 U.S. 248
    , 251 (1991), and “is limited by
    the breadth of the consent given,” United States v. McRae, 
    81 F.3d 1528
    , 1537
    (10th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). “The standard for measuring the scope of a
    suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’
    reasonableness–what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the
    exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Jimeno, 
    500 U.S. at 251
    .
    The district court rejected Flores-Ocampo’s arguments concerning the
    scope of his consent, concluding that the search of the sunroof at Williams
    Automotive was permissible because Flores-Ocampo never withdrew or limited
    his consent to search the car for drugs either at the roadside, or Williams
    Automotive. We conclude that the district court’s ruling is not clearly erroneous.
    On appeal, Flores-Ocampo does not dispute that: (1) he gave consent,
    without limitation, to the roadside search of his vehicle; (2) he failed to object to
    -8-
    the scope of the search at Williams Automotive; (3) he voluntarily waited in the
    customer area at Williams Automotive; and (4) he did not attempt to withdraw his
    consent at any time. Aplt. Br. at 11-12. We have repeatedly held that a
    defendant’s failure to limit the scope of a general authorization to search, and
    failure to object when the search exceeds the scope of what he later claims was a
    more limited consent, is an indication the search was within the scope of consent.
    See United States v. Pena, 
    143 F.3d 1363
    , 1368 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v.
    Sanchez, 
    89 F.3d 715
    , 719 (10th Cir. 1996); McRae, 
    81 F.3d at 1538
    ; United
    States v. Wacker, 
    72 F.3d 1453
    , 1470 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Santurio,
    
    29 F.3d 550
    , 553 (10th Cir. 1994).
    Contrary to Flores-Ocampo’s suggestion, we do not view the search at
    Williams Automotive as a “second search” which had a limited purpose of
    opening the vehicle’s gas tank. Admittedly, after finding tools in the door on the
    driver’s side and tool marks around the access to the gas tank, Trooper Epperly
    focused his attention on the gas tank. Due to the lack of proper tools, along with
    safety concerns arising from the possibility of decoy vehicles on the road, Trooper
    Epperly elected to have Flores-Ocampo follow him to Williams Automotive to
    check the gas tank for contraband. However, Trooper Epperly’s roadside
    statements do not indicate that his search of the vehicle was otherwise completed.
    Trooper Epperly’s stated desire to continue his search at another location did not
    -9-
    nullify Flores-Ocampo’s initial, unlimited consent to search the vehicle for drugs.
    Further, Flores-Ocampo was not restricted from watching the search of the
    vehicle at Williams Automotive and availing himself of a better opportunity to
    withdraw or revoke his consent. Flores-Ocampo concedes that he voluntarily
    stayed in the waiting room while the search was conducted. We conclude that
    Flores-Ocampo’s unrestricted roadside consent to search the vehicle for drugs
    continued after he drove the vehicle to Williams Automotive. This consent
    authorized Trooper Epperly to search the vehicle’s sunroof after he failed to find
    any drugs in the gas tank.
    B. Knowing and Voluntary Consent to Search
    Flores-Ocampo argues that he did not give unequivocal consent to search
    his vehicle at Williams Automotive. Specifically, he contends that throughout the
    traffic stop, Trooper Epperly phrased commands as questions, and that Trooper
    Epperly’s “request” to follow him to Emporia was also a command phrased as a
    question. Flores-Ocampo also emphasizes the difficulty he and Trooper Epperly
    had in communicating due to Flores-Ocampo’s limited ability to speak English.
    As an example, Flores-Ocampo cites the following exchange from the videotape:
    Epperly: Okay, um, will you, will you follow me?
    Flores-Ocampo: [Inaudible.]
    Epperly: Huh? I want to look in your gas tank.
    -10-
    Flores-Ocampo: Okay.
    Epperly: Is there anything in your gas tank?
    Flores-Ocampo: No.
    Epperly: No drogas? No . . .
    Flores-Ocampo: No. . . [Inaudible].
    Epperly: Nada?
    Flores-Ocampo: [Inaudible].
    Epperly: Okay. You follow me?
    Flores-Ocampo: Okay.
    Epperly: We go up here, turn around . . . , and go into Emporia, and
    me look.
    Flores-Ocampo: Okay.
    Epperly: Okay?
    Flores-Ocampo: Okay, no problem.
    Epperly: Gracias.
    Focusing on the beginning of the conversation, Flores-Ocampo maintains
    that he never provided an affirmative response to the question “will you follow
    me?” and that he answered “OK” to the statement “I want to look in your gas
    tank.” As to the remainder of the dialogue, Flores-Ocampo believes that whether
    Trooper Epperly’s words were demands, requests, or polite instructions is
    ambiguous. Even assuming that he responded affirmatively to Trooper Epperly’s
    -11-
    “requests,” Flores-Ocampo characterizes his responses as a voluntary submission
    to authority. In short, Flores-Ocampo posits that there is no indication that he
    understood that he had a right to say “no.”
    “Whether a party has voluntarily consented to a search is a question of fact
    that the district court must evaluate in view of the totality of the circumstances.”
    United States v. West, 
    219 F.3d 1171
    , 1177 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Schneckloth
    v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 227 (1973)). “Because voluntariness is a question
    of fact, the court must accept the district court’s finding unless it is clearly
    erroneous. 
    Id.
     (citing United States v. Davis, 
    197 F.3d 1048
    , 1050 (10th Cir.
    1999)).
    The government bears the burden of establishing that Flores-Ocampo’s
    consent was freely and voluntarily given to validate a search based on consent.
    United States v. Sandoval, 
    29 F.3d 537
    , 539 (10th Cir. 1994). “First, the
    government must proffer clear and positive testimony that consent was
    unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given.” McRae, 
    81 F.3d at 1537
     (internal quotations marks omitted). Second, the government must establish
    that consent was given without duress or coercion. 
    Id.
     Here, the existence of a
    language barrier between Trooper Epperly and Flores-Ocampo is also relevant to
    whether Flores consented. See United States v. Hernandez, 
    913 F.2d 1506
    , 1510
    (10th Cir. 1996).
    -12-
    The district court concluded that Flores-Ocampo knowingly and voluntarily
    consented to follow Trooper Epperly to Williams Automotive. The court
    reasoned that Flores-Ocampo’s verbal and non-verbal conduct demonstrated
    sufficient understanding of the English language. Further, the court refused to
    construe Trooper Epperly’s request as an instruction or command. Rather, the
    court noted that Trooper Epperly phrased his request as a question, using the word
    “will,” and communicated to Flores-Ocampo in a non-threatening manner. The
    district court also determined that the record lacked any other signs of a coercive
    show of authority. Again, we conclude that the district court’s ruling was not
    clearly erroneous.
    Flores-Ocampo places too much emphasis on the beginning of his exchange
    with Trooper Epperly. As the government points out, any ambiguity resulting
    from Flores-Ocampo’s response to Trooper Epperly’s first question is cleared up
    by the remainder of the conversation. Viewing the conversation as a whole, we
    agree with the district court’s determination that Flores-Ocampo understood
    Trooper Epperly’s request to follow him to Williams Automotive and voluntarily
    consented to that course of action. Indeed, Flores-Ocampo exhibited his
    understanding of Trooper Epperly’s request by his actions of turning his vehicle
    around and following the trooper to Williams Automotive. Trooper Epperly’s
    -13-
    non-coercive manner throughout the exchange also supports this outcome. 2
    C. Scope of Questioning
    Finally, Flores-Ocampo maintains that Trooper Epperly exceeded the
    permissible scope of a traffic stop by asking him questions unrelated to the stop. 3
    We have repeatedly held that routine traffic stops are analyzed “under the
    principles pertaining to investigatory detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
     (1968).” United States v. Tibbetts, 
    396 F.3d 1132
    , 1136 (10th Cir. 2005)
    (citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 
    71 F.3d 783
    , 786 (10th Cir. 1995) (en
    banc)). “We conduct a two-step inquiry when determining the constitutionality of
    a traffic stop, considering first whether the officer’s action was justified at its
    inception, and second, whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
    circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.” 
    Id.
    On appeal, Flores-Ocampo does not contest the validity of the initial traffic
    stop, but instead focuses on Terry’s scope requirement. He maintains that
    Trooper Epperly posed several questions about his travel plans, employment, and
    2
    We note that the district court stated that one indicator to demonstrate
    coercion–the existence of more than one officer–was not present. The video,
    however, shows another officer walking by the car after Flores-Ocampo had
    already agreed to the initial roadside search. In any event, Flores-Ocampo fails to
    argue that the presence of this second officer affected his consent to follow
    Trooper Epperly to Williams Automotive.
    3
    As to this issue, Flores-Ocampo does not contest any of the district court’s
    factual findings. Aplt. Br. at 21.
    -14-
    the amount of money he was carrying on his person–which had nothing to do with
    the initial stop for a lane violation–all in an effort to fish for evidence of other
    possible crimes. Flores-Ocampo argues that Trooper Epperly turned a routine
    traffic stop into an unconstitutional roadside interrogation because he asked these
    questions without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. As a result, Flores-
    Ocampo contends that the district court should have suppressed the drugs
    subsequently discovered as fruit of the poisonous tree. 4
    In United States v. Wallace, 
    429 F.3d 969
     (10th Cir. 2005), we addressed a
    similar challenge to the scope of an officer’s questions during a routine traffic
    stop. While the officer and Wallace waited in the officer’s patrol car for a
    confirmation of Wallace’s driver’s license, the officer asked him about his travel
    plans, employment, and the contents of a trailer which he was hauling (the trailer
    was later discovered to contain contraband). 
    Id. at 971-73
    . On appeal, Wallace
    argued that several of the trooper’s questions were intrusive and beyond the scope
    of a traffic stop. 
    Id. at 974
    . Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Muehler
    v. Mena, 
    125 S.Ct. 1456
     (2005), for the proposition that “mere police questioning
    does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment,” we stated: “As long
    4
    In his brief, Flores-Ocampo argues that his subsequent consent to the
    roadside search was not a sufficient act of free will to purge the primary taint of
    Trooper Epperly’s alleged illegal questions. Aplt. Br. at 35-36. The government
    concedes the point, stating that if we conclude that Trooper Epperly’s questions
    violated the Fourth Amendment, then the evidence obtained against Flores-
    Ocampo is tainted and should be suppressed. Applee. Br. at 36 n.13.
    -15-
    as the trooper’s questioning did not extend the length of the detention, which has
    not been challenged by Defendant in this case, there is no Fourth Amendment
    issue with respect to the content of the questions.” 
    Id.
     (citing United States v.
    Santos, 
    403 F.3d 1120
    , 1132 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005)); see also United States v.
    Alcaraz-Arellano, --F.3d--, 
    2006 WL 805323
    , at *3-4 (10th Cir. Mar. 30, 2006)
    (reaffirming that under Muehler and Wallace, as long as an officer’s questions do
    not appreciably extend the detention, the content of the questions is not subject to
    challenge under the Fourth Amendment). As in Wallace, Flores-Ocampo does not
    contend that Trooper Epperly’s questions extended the length of his detention.
    Accordingly, Flores-Ocampo’s challenge to the scope of Trooper Epperly’s
    questions raises no Fourth Amendment concerns.
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Mary Beck Briscoe
    Circuit Judge
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