United States v. Davis , 260 F. App'x 31 ( 2007 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 27, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-6219
(D.C. No. 07-cr-00061-HE-1)
DAMON JERMAINE DAVIS, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, LUCERO, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Damon Jermaine Davis pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to a charge of possessing a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(j). The district court sentenced Mr. Davis to 120 months’ imprisonment
and three years’ supervised release. This sentence was at the statutory maximum
of 10 years’ imprisonment and one month below the bottom of the 121-to-151
*
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
month advisory guideline range determined by the district court. Mr. Davis
agreed in his plea agreement to waive his right to appeal “his sentence as imposed
by the Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined,” if his sentence
was “within or below the advisory guideline range determined by the Court to
apply to this case.” Mot. to Enforce, Ex. 2 (Plea Agrmt.) at 5. Nevertheless,
Mr. Davis filed an appeal, seeking to appeal his sentence and the manner in which
it was determined by the court. The government has moved to enforce the plea
agreement under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(per curiam). We grant the government’s motion and dismiss the appeal.
In Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325, this court held that “in reviewing appeals
brought after a defendant has entered into an appeal waiver,” this court will
determine “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of
appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a
miscarriage of justice.” A miscarriage of justice will result if (1) “the district
court relied on an impermissible factor such as race”; (2) “ineffective assistance
of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver
invalid”; (3) “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the waiver is
otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 1327 (quotations omitted).
Mr. Davis seeks to claim on appeal that the district court placed undue
emphasis on the advisory sentencing guidelines. He contends that (1) the motion
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to enforce should be denied because he did not contemplate the possibility the
court would give undue influence to the sentencing guidelines and, therefore, his
appeal is outside the scope of the appeal waiver, and (2) his appeal waiver was
not knowing and voluntary. He further contends enforcing the waiver would
result in a miscarriage of justice, arguing the waiver is otherwise unlawful
because (1) the district court accorded more weight to the guidelines than is
procedurally or substantively reasonable, and (2) no defendant can be aware of
district court error until the sentence is imposed.
This court has previously rejected these same types of attacks on appeal
waivers. Mr. Davis’s plea agreement clearly precludes any appeal of his sentence
“and the manner in which the sentence is determined,” if the sentence imposed is
“within or below the advisory guideline range determined by the Court.” Plea
Agrmt. at 5 (emphasis added). Thus, Mr. Davis’s appeal is precluded by the plain
language of his appeal waiver. See United States v. Sandoval, 477 F.3d 1204,
1206-07 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding claim within scope of appeal waiver and noting
that this court will not hesitate to hold a defendant to the terms of a lawful plea
agreement). Further, we rejected in Hahn, the same knowing-and-voluntary
argument Mr. Davis makes; namely, that a defendant does not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his appellate rights because he does not know in advance what
sentencing errors the court might make. 359 F.3d at 1326; see also Sandoval,
477 F.3d at 1208 (noting that this court has “rejected the notion that a defendant
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must know with specificity the result he forfeits before his waiver is valid”
(quotation omitted)). And in Sandoval, we reiterated our prior holdings that
sentencing errors do not establish that enforcement of the appeal waiver would
be unlawful, under the miscarriage-of-justice inquiry. 477 F.3d at 1208 (“Our
inquiry is not whether the sentence is unlawful, but whether the waiver itself is
unlawful . . . .”).
Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion to enforce the appeal
waiver in the plea agreement and DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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