McDonald v. Coyle , 175 F. App'x 947 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 6, 2006
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
WILLIAM D. McDONALD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-6313
(D.C. No. 05-CV-866-HE)
JOHN W. COYLE, III, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
William D. McDonald appeals the dismissal of his claims against John W.
Coyle, III, his wife’s former criminal defense attorney. In June 2002,
McDonald’s wife, Caren McDonald, was arrested for shooting him. Coyle
represented her on the ensuing criminal charges. She pled guilty and was
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. McDonald filed the underlying suit alleging
legal malpractice, fraud, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice. He maintains that
his wife is innocent of the charges and was falsely accused. The district court
determined that McDonald did not have standing to bring these claims, and
dismissed the action. We AFFIRM. 1
On appeal, McDonald asserts that Coyle (1) committed legal malpractice in
his representation of Caren McDonald, resulting in her serving a prison term even
though she is innocent of the charges to which she pled guilty, (2) conspired with
state actors to obtain the guilty plea, thus giving rise to a cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, (3) committed fraud and obstructed justice in arranging for Caren
McDonald to enter a guilty plea, and (4) Coyle’s actions caused him to suffer loss
of consortium and emotional distress. He also complains that the district judge
was biased against him and that the judgment constituted a fraud on the court.
We first address McDonald’s challenge to the district court’s holding that
he does not have standing to bring legal malpractice claims on behalf of his wife.
We review de novo a district court’s ruling that a litigant lacks standing.
Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006). “The
1
McDonald filed an earlier, similar appeal in which he attempted to bring a
lawsuit on his wife’s behalf arising from the same facts, but naming different
defendants. McDonald v. Van Houtte, No. 05-6132, 2005 WL 3307432 (10th Cir.
Dec. 7, 2005). There, as here, McDonald lacked standing. Id. at *1.
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doctrine of standing asks whether a litigant is entitled to have a federal court
resolve his grievance.” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128 (2004).
Generally, a litigant “must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot
rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Id. at 129(quotation omitted). In limited circumstances, a next friend may be granted
standing to assert the rights of another. Id. at 129-30. To invoke this limited
exception, however, the party seeking next-friend status bears the burden of
showing that he has a close relationship with the person possessing the right at
issue, and “there is a ‘hindrance’ to the possessor’s ability to protect [her] own
interests.” Id. at 130; accord Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164-65
(1990). Third-party standing similarly requires “a hindrance or inability of the
third party to pursue his or her own claims.” Terrell v. INS, 157 F.3d 806, 809
(10th Cir. 1998).
McDonald has not identified any hindrance to his wife’s ability to bring
legal malpractice claims against Coyle. Accordingly, we hold that he does not
have standing to bring those claims on her behalf. This holding applies with
equal force to McDonald’s claims that Coyle obtained the guilty plea by fraud and
that he conspired with state actors to deprive his wife of her constitutional rights.
Moreover, McDonald presents no facts to support his conspiracy allegations.
Thus, they cannot survive dismissal because “the pleadings [in a conspiracy
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claim] must specifically present facts tending to show agreement and concerted
action.” Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 907 (10th Cir. 2000).
McDonald has not established individual, next friend, or third-party
standing. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of
standing.
McDonald is not entitled to relief on his claims that Coyle should be
charged and found guilty of violating federal criminal statutes pertaining to fraud,
conspiracy, and obstruction of justice. “[A] private citizen lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986) (quotation omitted); accord Doyle v. Okla. Bar
Ass’n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1566-67 (10th Cir. 1993).
We do not consider McDonald’s claims for emotional distress and loss of
consortium resulting from his wife’s imprisonment because he did not present
these claims to the district court. See Tele-Communications, Inc. v. Comm’r,
104 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1997) (issues not raised before the district
court are waived).
McDonald also maintains that the district judge was biased against him.
Because he did not file a motion for recusal, we “employ[] a plain error standard
to decide whether the impartiality of the district court was so suspect as to require
a new trial.” United States v. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286, 1297-98 (10th Cir. 2005)
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(footnote omitted). McDonald’s argument that the district judge was biased is
apparently based solely on unfavorable rulings in the case. Adverse rulings alone
cannot provide grounds for disqualification. Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433,
1449 (10th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we find no error. Similarly, the district
court’s adverse rulings do not support McDonald’s claim that the judgment
against him constituted a fraud on the court. See United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d
1336, 1342 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating fraud on the court “requires a showing that
one has acted with an intent to deceive or defraud the court”) (quotation omitted).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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