United States v. Madriz-Castillo ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 8, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 10-1577
v. (D. Colorado)
ALVARO MADRIZ-CASTILLO, a/k/a (D.C. No. 1:09-CR-00473-WYD-1)
Ramon Sandoval-Vidal, a/k/a Javier
Conzales-Madrino, a/k/a Ramon
Castillo,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Alvaro Madriz-Castillo appeals his 57-month sentence for
unlawful reentry of a previously deported alien. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2).
He contends that the sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. The district court
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
adequately explained the sentence. And Defendant has not overcome the
presumption that his within-guidelines sentence was not unreasonably long.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 9, 2010, Defendant pleaded guilty in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado to unlawful reentry of an alien who had
been deported after conviction of an aggravated felony. His presentence report
(PSR) stated that his base offense level was 8, and that it was subject to a 16-level
increase because of a 2001 child-molestation conviction, and a 3-level reduction
for acceptance of responsibility, yielding a total offense level of 21. It also
calculated a criminal-history category of IV, producing an advisory guidelines
sentencing range of 57 to 71 months. The probation office recommended a 57-
month sentence.
At sentencing, Defendant’s lawyer stated that she and Defendant had
received the PSR and did not have any objections or corrections. The district
court then imposed the recommended 57-month sentence, at the bottom of the
sentencing range, plus three years of supervised release. It explained:
[T]he factual statements and guideline applications in the [PSR] are
adopted without objection as the Court’s findings of fact concerning
sentencing.
The Court finds the Total Offense Level is 21, and the
defendant’s Criminal History Category is IV, which results in an
imprisonment range of 57 to 71 months under the advisory
guidelines and a fine range of [$]7,500 to $75,000. Supervised
release range is 2 to 3 years. The Court finds no reason to depart
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from the advisory guideline range and will impose a sentence within
that range.
R., Vol. 2 pt. 3 at 37.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant claims that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because
the district court (1) failed to consider any of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing
factors other than the advisory guidelines range and (2) failed to explain the
sentence imposed. He also argues that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable because the district court gave too much weight to the advisory
guidelines range and not enough weight to the other statutory sentencing factors.
We reject both arguments.
As we have stated, “When the defendant has not raised any substantial
contentions concerning non-Guidelines § 3553(a) factors and the district court
imposes a sentence within the Guidelines range, our post-Booker precedents do
not require the court to explain on the record how the § 3553(a) factors justify the
sentence.” United States v. Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006).
The Supreme Court has expressed a similar view. See Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 356–57 (2007). It said that lengthy explanations are not ordinarily
required for a within-guidelines sentence:
[W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular
case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.
Circumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision
upon the Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence
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is a proper sentence (in terms of § 3553(a) and other congressional
mandates) in the typical case, and that the judge has found that the
case before him is typical. Unless a party contests the Guidelines
sentence generally under § 3553(a)—that is argues that the
Guidelines reflect an unsound judgment, or, for example, that they do
not generally treat certain defendant characteristics in the proper
way—or argues for departure, the judge normally need say no more.
Id.
Here, Defendant’s sentence was at the low end of the guidelines range and
neither he nor his counsel raised any substantial contentions concerning the
§ 3553(a) factors. The district court clearly thought this case was typical;
Defendant and his counsel made no attempt to disabuse it of that view. The court
did not need to say more than it did.
Turning to Defendant’s substantive-reasonableness argument, our review is
for abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
“When evaluating the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we afford
substantial deference to the district court, and determine whether the length of the
sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Alvarez-Bernabe, 626
F.3d 1161, 1167 (10th Cir. 2010) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
A sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumed to be reasonable.
See id.Defendant has not overcome the presumption. Although his briefs on
appeal contend that the district court did not give enough weight to the § 3553(a)
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factors other than the guidelines range, they fail to explain how any of those
factors would require a more lenient sentence. In light of his four convictions
between 1998 and 2009 and his three prior deportations, we cannot say that 57
months’ imprisonment was an unreasonably harsh sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM Defendant’s sentence.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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