United States v. Craighead ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 12, 2006
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-6227
(D.C. No. CIV-96-1150-C)
ALVIN D. CRAIGHEAD, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant,
and
LEAH CRAIGHEAD; AMERICAN
NATIONAL BANK OF
WOODWARD; JEWELL
IMPLEMENT COMPANY, INC.; JI
CASE COMPANY; WOODWARD
COUNTY TREASURER;
WOODWARD COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;
WAYNE RICHARD GUNWALL, as
Trustee of Blue Sage Trust,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
(continued...)
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Appellant, Alvin D. Craighead, appeals the district court’s denial of his
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) motion seeking to vacate a default
judgment entered against him on the grounds that it was void for lack of
jurisdiction. We exercise our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
On July 18, 1996, the United States filed a complaint against Mr. Craighead
(1) alleging that he defaulted on certain promissory notes, and (2) seeking
foreclosure and judicial sale of property securing the notes. Attached to the
complaint were copies of the notes and security documents in question. On
May 2, 1997, the district court, in light of Mr. Craighead’s failure to answer the
complaint, took the factual allegations of the complaint as true and entered
default judgment against Mr. Craighead.
Five years later, in response to a motion by the United States for production
of documents by a third party in aid of the judgment, Mr. Craighead moved for
the default judgment to be vacated for lack of jurisdiction because “there were no
facts before the court in support of the United States’ claims.” R., Doc. 97 at 5.
Mr. Craighead argued that “proof of claim requires at least one competent fact
*
(...continued)
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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witness testifying to documentary evidence properly authenticated” and that “the
United States of America, in obtaining judgment in CIV-96-1150 [did not]
proffer[] any authenticated evidence to which a competent fact witness testified to
under oath . . . .” Id. The district court denied Mr. Craighead’s motion and
Mr. Craighead appealed.
On appeal, Mr. Craighead’s main argument is that the United States did not
properly show that it had standing to bring the case because “[f]or the lower court
to have had standing, counsel purporting to represent the United States would
have had to produce the original promissory note or notes upon which the claim
was based.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 5. He also argues that the failure to attach the
original documents to the complaint showed that the security interests were not
properly perfected. Mr. Craighead argues that:
the record contains only the theories and conclusions of counsel
purporting to represent the United States–no notes and no
authenticated documents. This being the case, this court has actual
knowledge that no judicial proceeding took place as judicial
proceedings must first examine the question of standing. Clearly,
counsel purporting to represent the United States failed to establish
standing (WHICH CANNOT BE WAIVED AND IS PERHAPS THE
MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION) bearing on this court the nondiscretionary duty to
vacate all the judgments as facially void.
Aplt. Opening Br. at 7-8.
Analysis
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Under Rule 60(b)(4), a court may grant relief from a default judgment on
the ground that the judgment was void. “A judgment is void . . . if the court
which rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or
acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” United States v. Buck,
281 F.3d 1336, 1344 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). “[C]onstitutional
standing is necessary to the court’s jurisdiction.” Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos &
Cejda, L.L.C., 434 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Constitutional standing exists if the plaintiff: show[s] [that] (1) it
has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;
and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Id. at 1210-11 (quotation omitted) (alterations in original).
The fatal flaw in Mr. Craighead’s argument is that it rests on the faulty
premise that the district court could not enter default judgment unless the
government proved the factual allegations contained in its complaint. On the
contrary, Mr. Craighead relieved the government of the burden of proving its
factual allegations, including the allegations supporting constitutional standing,
by failing to answer the complaint. “The defendant, by his default, admits the
plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the
judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.”
Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.
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1975); see also Olcott v. Delaware Flood Co., 327 F.3d 1115, 1125 (10th Cir.
2003) (quoting Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F.3d 515, 525 (5th Cir. 2002), for the
same proposition); Lundahl v. Zimmer, 296 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987), for the same
proposition).
In Nishimatsu Construction Co., the Fifth Circuit relied partly on the
Supreme Court’s holding in Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104 (1885). 515 F.2d
at 1206. As stated in a different case, this time out of the Second Circuit:
The applicable principles are clearly implied from Thomson v.
Wooster . . . where the court held that defendants who had defaulted
in a patent infringement suit would not be permitted to show that the
patent sued upon was invalid. Defendants had sought to introduce
the original patent to show it differed from a reissued patent, which
was the patent the plaintiffs sought to enforce. The court ruled that
neither this proof nor evidence that defendants had delayed 14 years
in seeking reissue were sufficient to defeat the contrary allegation of
the validity of the patent contained in the complaint[ . . . .] We are
instructed by Wooster that so long as the facts as painted by the
complaint “might * * * have been the case” they may not now be
successfully controverted . . . .
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 64 (2d Cir. 1971) (quoting
Thomson, 114 U.S. at 114) (overruled on other grounds by Hughes Tool Co. v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973)). In short, the time has passed
for Mr. Craighead to claim that the facts were other than those alleged in the
complaint.
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Mr. Craighead argues in his reply brief that “[e]ven in a default judgment,
damages must be proved.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 5. As support for his argument he
cites to American Red Cross v. Community Blood Center Of The Ozarks, 257 F.3d
859 (8th Cir. 2001). In that case the Eighth Circuit held that “when a default
judgment is entered on a claim for an indefinite or uncertain amount of damages,
facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true, except facts relating to the
amount of damages, which must be proven in a supplemental hearing or
proceeding.” Id. at 864 (quotation omitted). The government, however, is correct
in its concise and well-reasoned brief, where it notes that the claim for damages
in this case was not indefinite or uncertain. Instead, once the facts regarding
Mr. Craighead’s liability on the notes were taken as true, all the court was
required to do was calculate the amounts owed on the promissory notes and the
interest. “‘If defendant does not contest the amount prayed for in the complaint
[by failing to answer] and the claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made
certain by computation, the judgment generally will be entered for that amount
without any further hearing.’” Resp. Br. at 13 (quoting 10A Charles A. Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2688 (3d
ed. 1998)).
Mr. Craighead’s remaining arguments on appeal are premised on
Mr. Craighead’s misconception that the district court granted summary judgment
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against him and not default judgment. He argues that “the court below butchered
the summary judgment standard.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 8. As summary judgment
is not an issue in this case, and as his remaining arguments are rife with personal
attacks on government counsel and the district court judge, they neither require
nor will receive further attention.
Consequently, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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