Giove v. United States Department of Transportation ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
May 4, 2006
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SALVATORE GIOVE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-1469
(D.C. No. 04-CV-1567-WYD-CBS)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT (D. Colo.)
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION,
Defendant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Salvatore Giove appeals from the order of the district court
granting summary judgment to defendant United States Department of
Transportation on his claims of harassment, hostile work environment, disparate
treatment, and termination on the basis of national origin. 1 Our jurisdiction arises
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and, after applying the same legal standard as the district
court when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, Simms v. Okla. ex rel.
Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir.
1999), we affirm.
Background
Mr. Giove is a naturalized American citizen of Italian heritage. After
several years as an employee of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
Mr. Giove was fired from his job as an air traffic controller on the grounds that he
had lied to an FAA investigator, created a disturbance to FAA personnel and
operations, and misused government property, information, and records.
Mr. Giove’s conduct occurred in connection with his decision to provide certain
documents and information to the plaintiffs’ counsel in a pending lawsuit arising
out of the crash of a charter flight near Grand Junction, Colorado. That suit and
the present matter were both heard by the same federal district court judge.
1
Defendant National Air Traffic Controllers Association was dismissed from
the district court action early on and did not participate in this appeal.
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Mr. Giove’s termination became final on September 4, 1998. Later that
month, on September 29, 1998, Mr. Giove filed a grievance through his union, the
National Air Traffic Controllers Association, pursuant to the applicable collective
bargaining agreement (CBA). The CBA specifically provided that, in matters
relating to alleged discriminatory practices, an aggrieved employee had the option
to proceed through the established grievance procedure or to utilize any other
procedure available in law or regulation, but not both. This provision of the CBA
mirrors a similar provision in 5 U.S.C. § 7172(d), which requires an employee in
Mr. Giove’s position to elect between pursuing a grievance or filing an EEO
complaint.
Mr. Giove’s grievance was denied by an arbitrator, and that denial was
affirmed in Giove v. Department of Transportation, 230 F.3d 1333, 1343-44
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding arbitrator’s rejection of Giove’s claims under the
Whistleblower Protection Act to be in accordance with law and supported by
substantial evidence and “affirm[ing] the arbitrator’s decision to uphold the
removal of Giove”).
On November 18, 1998, while his grievance was proceeding, Mr. Giove
filed a written EEO complaint with the FAA. The complaint stated that
Mr. Giove’s termination had been the result of illegal discrimination against him
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on the basis of his Italian origin. R. Doc. 94, Attach. A2. An attached statement
described various occurrences which Mr. Giove viewed as discriminatory.
The FAA dismissed the EEO complaint, finding that Mr. Giove had elected
to proceed via the grievance procedure on his discriminatory termination claim,
and that any claims based on other acts were untimely. The EEOC denied both
Mr. Giove’s appeal and his motion for reconsideration. Mr. Giove then filed his
complaint in federal district court.
District Court Proceeding
When Mr. Giove realized that the same district judge who had presided
over the suit regarding the Grand Junction charter crash would preside in this
matter, he filed a motion to recuse. In that motion, he alleged that he had
corresponded with the judge relative to the disposition in the previous case and
that the judge “ha[d] knowledge of issues indirectly related to my removal from
the Federal Aviation Administration concerning alleged misconduct.” Id.Doc. 11. Mr. Giove expressed the opinion that it was inconceivable the judge
“could remain objective and impartial throughout the trial and eventually express
an unbiased Order and Opinion.” Id. In response to this motion, the judge
ordered Mr. Giove to submit evidence to support it, which Mr. Giove refused to
do. The court then denied the motion to recuse. Id. Doc. 37.
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On September 16, 2005, the district court granted defendant’s motion for
summary judgment finding that (1) all claims except the discriminatory
termination claim were unexhausted; (2) the discriminatory termination claim was
barred because Mr. Giove had previously elected to proceed via the CBA
grievance process; and (3) Mr. Giove’s claim of pretext was moot. Mr. Giove
takes exception to all of these conclusions and the court’s refusal to recuse.
Analysis
Recusal
As mentioned above, Mr. Giove’s basis for his motion to recuse was his
belief that, because of correspondence between him and the judge relative to a
former lawsuit, the judge would be unable to preside fairly over his employment
action. Mr. Giove, however, refused to provide the court with copies of the
alleged correspondence, arguing that the court should already have access to those
documents from the previous suit.
The court, however, had no obligation to retain this extra-judicial
correspondence. Furthermore, Mr. Giove’s refusal to provide the relevant
documents left his motion for recusal unsupported. 2 But even if the relevant
2
In his reply brief, Mr. Giove relies on his pro se status to excuse his
shortcomings with regard to the recusal motion. Mr. Giove’s pro se status,
however, does not exempt him from complying with the applicable rules of
procedure. Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994).
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evidence had been submitted, recusal was still inappropriate. Any knowledge the
judge presumably acquired through prior judicial proceedings cannot be the basis
for recusal absent a showing of “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
make fair judgment impossible,” which Mr. Giove does not make. Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
Exhaustion
In the district court, Mr. Giove addressed this issue in one paragraph
entitled, “Plaintiff May Maintain His Title VII Claim Based on His Termination.”
R. Doc. 98 at 3. The ensuing argument laid out the legal requirements for
administrative exhaustion and concluded, “[d]efendant therefore contends that
plaintiff’s claim of discriminatory termination is not barred . . . .” Id. at 4.
On appeal, Mr. Giove advances arguments ranging from evidence establishing the
date he first contacted an EEO counselor, to arguments presumably added to
bolster some unarticulated claim for estoppel or for equitable tolling. See
Opening Br. at 9-14. Because Mr. Giove failed to advance any of these
arguments to the district court, we will not consider them for the first time on
appeal. See Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel of Kan., Inc.,
100 F.3d 792, 798-99 (10th Cir.) amended on other grounds, 103 F.3d 80(10th Cir. 1996).
5 U.S.C. § 7121(d)
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As an employee of the FAA, Mr. Giove was covered under both the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 and the agency’s CBA with his union, the latter of
which permitted covered employees to file grievances alleging unlawful
discrimination. Mr. Giove’s appeal rights, therefore, are governed by 5 U.S.C.
§ 7121(d), which provides, inter alia, that “[a]n aggrieved employee affected by a
prohibited personnel practice [including discrimination based on national origin]
which also falls under the coverage of the negotiated grievance procedure may
raise the matter under a statutory procedure or the negotiated procedure, but not
both.” (emphasis added). In other words, while Mr. Giove could technically file a
grievance with his union and also file an EEO complaint, as he did here, he could
not expect to be successful in pursuing both remedies.
The district court determined that Mr. Giove was barred from bringing this
discriminatory termination action because he had previously filed a grievance
involving the same matter under the CBA. Mr. Giove insists this suit does not
involve the same “matter” that had been considered in his grievance proceeding.
We disagree and affirm the district court.
As mentioned above, in his grievance proceeding, Mr. Giove did not base
his challenge on illegal discrimination, arguing instead that the actions he took
which eventually led to his termination were protected under the Whistleblower
Protection Act. Mr. Giove argues that, because the present action alleges illegal
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termination as a result of national-origin bias, it involves a different “matter” than
the grievance proceeding and should be allowed to go forward unhindered by
§ 7121(d).
Mr. Giove construes the term “matter” too narrowly. Because both the
grievance proceeding and this case involve the termination of his employment
with the FAA, they both involve the same “matter” for purposes of the statute.
In Bonner v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 781 F.2d 202, 204-05 (Fed. Cir.
1986), the court interpreted the term “matter” to refer to the underlying
government action which precipitated the complaint. Bonner was followed in
Macy v. Dalton, 853 F. Supp. 350, 353 (E.D. Cal. 1994), where the court
concluded that “the ‘matter’ to which § 7121(d) refers is not plaintiffs’
discrimination claim, but rather is plaintiffs’ termination . . . .” The fact that
Mr. Giove advanced a different legal theory in his EEO complaint from the one
relied upon in his grievance does not insulate him from the operation of
§ 7121(d). See Rosell v. Wood, 357 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (D.D.C. 2004).
This reading is supported by the relevant regulation, which provides:
An aggrieved employee who files a grievance with an agency whose
negotiated agreement permits the acceptance of grievances which allege
discrimination may not thereafter file a complaint on the same matter . . .
irrespective of whether the agency has informed the individual of the need
to elect or of whether the grievance has raised an issue of discrimination.
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29 C.F.R. § 1614.301(a) (emphasis added). This regulation also disposes of
Mr. Giove’s contention that, because he contacted an EEO counselor well before
he filed his formal complaint, the EEO complaint came first and should be
allowed to proceed. “An election to proceed [with the statutory EEO procedure]
is indicated only by the filing of a written complaint.” Id.; see also Rosell,
357 F. Supp. 2d at 130. Mr. Giove does not dispute that his formal written EEO
complaint was not filed until after the initiation of his grievance procedure.
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Other matters
Mr. Giove makes no argument in support of his claim that the district court
erroneously denied his motion to amend his complaint. We therefore do not
address this point. See Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir.
1992) (holding that a party must support its argument with legal authority).
Additionally, the motion to amend was denied by the magistrate judge, and
Mr. Giove filed no objections to that determination in the district court, thereby
waiving further consideration on appeal. See Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d
1342, 1352 (10th Cir. 1992). Because Mr. Giove’s complaint was properly
dismissed, it is unnecessary to address his arguments regarding pretext and an
increase in the amount of damages. The motion to this court relative to that latter
matter is DENIED.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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