United States v. N.J.Y., (Juvenile) , 180 F. App'x 1 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
May 3, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-8064
v. (D. Wyoming)
N.J.Y. (a juvenile), (D.C. No. 05-CR-35-02-D)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit
Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
N.J.Y., a juvenile, was adjudged delinquent under 18 U.S.C. §§ 5032 and
5037 by having committed sexual abuse and aiding and abetting sexual abuse,
which acts would have been crimes in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1153, and
2242(2)(A). He was sentenced to probation until his twenty-first birthday and
ordered to remain at a juvenile residential treatment facility where he would
undergo sexual offender and substance abuse treatment for an indefinite term not
to exceed his twenty-first birthday. He appeals his adjudication. For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
N.J.Y. was charged by information in February 2005 under the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act (“FJDA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042, based on conduct
that had allegedly occurred in September 2003, when N.J.Y. was fourteen years
old. He filed a motion to suppress oral and written statements that he had given
to Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and local law enforcement agents two
days after the incident, when the agents visited the residence where N.J.Y. was
living with his aunt. He argued in this motion that the statements were obtained
in violation of the Fifth Amendment because he had not received the warnings
dictated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), prior to being questioned
and because the statements were not voluntary. He also filed a demand for a jury
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trial, arguing that the rule that the right to a jury trial does not apply to juvenile
delinquency proceedings is no longer valid in light of the Supreme Court’s
renewed emphasis on the Sixth Amendment as evidenced in the line of cases
culminating in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Following a hearing on the suppression issue, the district court made the
following oral findings of fact:
[T]he two officers arrived at the residence where [N.J.Y.] was
located, unannounced. The . . . officers did speak with [N.J.Y.’s
aunt] who called [N.J.Y.] to the front door. Officers indicate[d] that
they c[ould] interview inside the house or inside the[ir] vehicle but
expressed their preference to do the interview in the vehicle because
the officers’ experience is that juveniles can often speak more freely
outside the hearing of an adult and their family. [The aunt]
indicate[d] it’s okay to interview him in the vehicle, and [N.J.Y.]
agreed to be interviewed.
[N.J.Y.] sat in the front seat with [the FBI agent] in the
driver’s seat, and [the local agent] at some point got in behind him
after speaking with [the aunt]. [The FBI agent] tells [N.J.Y.] he does
not have to answer questions; he can open the car door from the
inside and leave; he can stop the interview at any time; he’s not
under arrest and won’t be arrested at the end of the interview and
that the agents only want to hear the truth. The agents’ weapons are
not visible, although a rifle is hung in the back of the SUV.
At some point in time, [the aunt] came out of the house, got in
her car and left, apparently to go to the post office.
[The FBI agent] asked [N.J.Y.] to tell his side of the story
regarding the incident. [The FBI agent] tells [N.J.Y.], after he gives
his story, that he doesn’t believe him. [N.J.Y.] admits he knows
more, and the agent asks him to tell his story again. Again, he tells a
story, and again the officer tells him he doesn’t believe it to be
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truthful. The agent discusses telling the truth, and he tells [N.J.Y.]
that he thinks he’s doing himself more harm by not telling the truth.
[N.J.Y.] gets out of the vehicle, leaves the door open, goes
back to his own house, leaves the front door of the house open. [The
FBI agent] follows him to the house threshold and yells into the
home, telling him his view that [N.J.Y.]’s story is inconsistent with
the medical evidence that indicates that [the alleged victim] was
involved in a sexual activity, and it may have been non-consensual
and that he again expressed his view that [N.J.Y.] was not being
truthful.
[N.J.Y.] exited the house and got back into the [agents’]
vehicle. At some point in time during the interview, he admitted
having sexual intercourse with [the alleged victim]. [The FBI agent]
asks if they can take a written statement; and he, during the course of
the interview of [N.J.Y.], created [the] [e]xhibit . . . which was the
statement written in the hand of [the FBI agent]. At the end of the
statement in print are the words “I have R-E-D-I-N-G that,”
something crossed out and the initials “NJY,” then the word
“statement,” and “I G-E-I-N W-E-N-T it.” And in parentheses [the
FBI agent] writes underneath those words “agree with.” And there is
again the initials of “NJY” underneath “agree with” and to the right
of it. The statement is witnessed by both [the FBI agent] and [the
local agent], a two-page statement.
The testimony in this case . . . has indicated that [N.J.Y.]
currently operates at a sixth- or seventh- grade level. Earlier testing
had him operating at the reading level of a second-grader.
Tr. of Bench Trial at 891-93, R. Vol. VIII (sealed). After issuing these findings,
the district court denied N.J.Y.’s motion to suppress, holding that Miranda did not
apply because N.J.Y. was not in custody at the time he made the statements and
that N.J.Y. made the statements voluntarily. The district court also denied
N.J.Y.’s demand for a jury trial.
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Following a bench trial, the district court adjudged N.J.Y. to be a juvenile
delinquent, as indicated above. On appeal, N.J.Y. challenges the district court’s
rulings on the suppression and jury trial issues.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Suppress
In asserting that the statements described above should have been
suppressed, N.J.Y. renews the arguments he made below concerning the agents’
failure to give Miranda warnings and the involuntariness of the statements. In our
review of these issues, “this court accepts the district court’s factual findings
unless clearly erroneous and views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party.” United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir.
1998).
A. Miranda warnings
It is undisputed in this case that the agents did not give N.J.Y. Miranda
warnings before they questioned him. However, Miranda warnings are only
required “when an individual is subject to ‘custodial interrogation.’” United
States v. Hudson, 210 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Miranda, 384
U.S. at 444). The district court’s conclusion that N.J.Y. was not “in custody” for
purposes of Miranda is reviewed de novo. Erving L., 147 F.3d at 1246. In
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performing this review, we must determine whether a reasonable person in
N.J.Y.’s position “‘would have understood his situation . . . as the functional
equivalent of formal arrest.’” Hudson, 210 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)); see Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,
662 (2004) (“[C]ustody must be determined based on how a reasonable person in
the suspect’s situation would perceive his circumstances.”); see also Erving L.,
147 F.3d at 1248 (applying standard of “a reasonable juvenile”).
N.J.Y. does not argue that he was “in custody” during the agents’ initial
questioning but asserts that the questioning became custodial after he left the
agents’ vehicle, was followed to his home by the FBI agent, was told by the agent
that his story so far was inconsistent with the medical evidence, and returned to
the vehicle. According to N.J.Y., these circumstances “would have caused a
‘reasonable’ fourteen[-]year-old to believe that he was not free to leave and that
he was required to answer further questions.” Appellant’s Br. at 29 (sealed).
N.J.Y. also points to expert testimony of a psychologist that was offered during
the evidentiary hearing below. The expert stated that based on his examination of
N.J.Y., he “believe[d] that [N.J.Y.] didn’t perceive a realistic choice” in regard to
whether he had to return to the agents’ vehicle because “the mechanism that [the
FBI agent] had given [N.J.Y.] to interrupt the interview was to leave the vehicle,
which [N.J.Y.] exercised; and at that point the interview was not terminated, but
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instead [the FBI agent] followed [N.J.Y.] to the home.” Tr. of Bench Trial at
773, R. Vol. VII (sealed).
Based on our careful review of the record, we do not agree that a
reasonable juvenile in N.J.Y.’s position would have believed himself to be in the
functional equivalent of a formal arrest at the point he returned to the agents’
vehicle. Although the agents did not leave when N.J.Y. exited the vehicle the
first time, the FBI agent’s further statements to N.J.Y. at the threshold of his
home were in the manner of attempting to persuade N.J.Y. that it was in his best
interests to return to the car and tell the truth and did not appear to change the
environment in which the interrogation was taking place. Specifically, the FBI
agent testified that
[b]asically my message at that point in time was that I had crystal
clear evidence from a doctor that [the alleged victim] had been
involved in sexual activity the previous Saturday night and that it
was very likely that that sexual activity may have been non-
consensual or even rise to the level of a sexual assault and that I felt
that [N.J.Y.] had . . . not helped himself any by telling me the stories
he had told me.
Id. at 608, R. Vol. VI. According to the agent, after he “continued to relate that
same message,” N.J.Y. “agreed to come back and continue the interview.” Id. at
609. Moreover, as indicated by the district court’s findings, which are not clearly
erroneous, the agents clearly stated to N.J.Y. at the outset that he was free to
leave and would not be arrested. The FBI agent further testified that he told
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N.J.Y. that these “ground rules” still applied when they returned to the vehicle.
Id. at 697, 701, R. Vol. VII. We therefore conclude that N.J.Y. was not in
custody for purposes of Miranda and that the agents therefore were not required
to give him Miranda warnings.
B. Voluntariness
As stated, N.J.Y. also asserts that, regardless of Miranda’s applicability, his
statements to the agents should have been suppressed as involuntary. In
reviewing the district court’s conclusion to the contrary, we must “examine the
entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of
voluntariness.” Erving L., 147 F.3d at 1248 (internal quotation omitted). This
determination rests on “whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the
government obtained the statements by physical or psychological coercion or by
improper inducement so that the suspect’s will was overborne.” Id. at 1248-49;
see also United States v. Toles, 297 F.3d 959, 965 (10th Cir. 2002).
In particular, we examine “both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation,” including “(1) the age, intelligence, and education of
the defendant; (2) the length of detention; (3) the length and nature of the
questioning; (4) whether the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights;
and (5) whether the defendant was subject to physical punishment.” United States
v. Lopez, 437 F.3d 1059, 1063-64 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).
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The government bears the burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance of
the evidence. Id. at 1063 (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 n.1
(2004)). However, in order for suppression of statements to be appropriate, there
must be some evidence of coercion, either through physical force or through some
other form of manipulation. See Erving L., 147 F.3d at 1251 (holding confession
by thirteen-year-old voluntary where “none of the actions of the officers were
coercive”); United States v. Guerro, 983 F.2d 1001, 1004 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[T]o
find a statement involuntary, the police must somehow overreach by exploiting a
weakness or condition known to exist.”).
N.J.Y. points to the following in support of his claim that his statements
were involuntary: that he was fourteen years old at the time of the interrogation;
that he had a “reduced intellectual ability”; that the questioning occurred in the
agents’ car; that his parents or legal guardian were not present; that “the
questioning took approximately two hours and N.J.Y. was never fully advised of
his constitutional rights”; that the FBI agent followed him after he left the vehicle
“and induced him to reenter”; and that the FBI agent accused N.J.Y. of not telling
the truth. Appellant’s Br. at 25-26.
We recognize that “admissions and confessions of juveniles require special
caution.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967); see also A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d
787, 800 (7th Cir. 2004). However, as stated above, N.J.Y. was not in custody
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during his questioning. Although no parent or guardian was present, the
questioning took place in a vehicle a short distance away from his home, and he
was told he was free to leave at any time and at one point did so. While the FBI
agent testified that the entire interrogation lasted between one and one-half to two
hours, he stated that most of this time was spent composing N.J.Y.’s written
statement after he had admitted having sexual contact with the alleged victim. Tr.
of Bench Trial at 890, R. Vol. VIII (sealed). The record does not indicate that the
agents pressed for a particular story from N.J.Y. but that they repeatedly told him
they wanted the truth. Under these circumstances, the agents’ assertions at
several points during the initial interview that N.J.Y. was not telling the truth, and
that his story was inconsistent with medical evidence, did not amount to coercion.
Moreover, though the FBI agent wrote N.J.Y.’s written statement after N.J.Y.
indicated he could not write well, there is no indication that the agents were
aware that N.J.Y. had a “reduced intellectual ability” or made efforts to exploit
any such reduced ability.
Thus, based on our review of the totality of the circumstances as indicated
by the record and the district court’s findings, we cannot conclude that the agents
engaged in any form of coercion, either through force or through manipulation of
N.J.Y.’s youth or other personal characteristics. We therefore affirm the district
court’s ruling that N.J.Y.’s statements were voluntary.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of N.J.Y.’s motion to
suppress.
II. Jury Trial
In regard to N.J.Y.’s demand for a jury trial, N.J.Y. acknowledges that it is
established law in this circuit that juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial in
delinquency proceedings conducted pursuant to the FJDA. See McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (rejecting right to jury trial in state court
juvenile proceedings); United States v. Duboise, 604 F.2d 648, 652 (10th Cir.
1979) (rejecting right to jury trial in FJDA proceedings); see also United States v.
Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining that FJDA proceedings
“result[] in an adjudication of status—not a criminal conviction” and that the
purpose of such proceedings “is to remove juveniles from the ordinary criminal
process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction and to
encourage treatment and rehabilitation”). However, N.J.Y. contends that “[t]he
continuing validity of [these cases] is questionable given the U.S. Supreme
Court’s recent emphasis on a defendant’s right to a jury” in Booker and the line of
cases preceding it. Appellant’s Br. at 34.
The cases to which N.J.Y. refers concern the requirement that a jury make
all factual findings that serve to increase a criminal defendant’s sentence under a
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mandatory sentencing scheme. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 244. We do not
perceive a direct connection between the Supreme Court’s rulings in those cases
and the right to a jury trial in noncriminal juvenile delinquency proceedings. We
must therefore adhere to this circuit’s precedent on the issue. See United States
v. Brothers, 438 F.3d 1068, 1074 (10th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s denial of a jury trial in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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