United States v. Brewer , 263 F. App'x 718 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
February 5, 2008
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
No. 07-4125
v.
(D.C. No. 2:06-CR-408-TS)
(D. Utah)
BARRY LEE BREWER,
Defendant–Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Barry Lee Brewer appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless stop of a vehicle in which he was
riding. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM denial
of his motion and DISMISS the appeal.
On May 17, 2006, Cory Frampton, a drug enforcement officer for the City
of Nephi and Juab County, Utah, was on patrol when a fellow officer contacted
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
him regarding a light blue Ford Taurus headed towards Nephi. Drug enforcement
officers in a nearby county had received a tip that this vehicle was possibly
carrying narcotics. Frampton was told by his fellow officer that he would need to
establish independent probable cause to stop the vehicle.
Frampton observed a car matching the officer’s description traveling at a
high rate of speed toward Nephi. He followed the car in order to determine if it
was speeding. While Frampton was following the car, the driver braked, and
Frampton noticed that one of the brake lights in the tail of the vehicle was not
functioning. Believing that the nonfunctional brake light constituted a traffic
violation, Frampton stopped the vehicle. Brewer was one of the passengers in the
car. Shortly after he stopped the car, two other officers joined Frampton. During
the course of the stop, an officer discovered live ammunition on Brewer’s person. 1
Brewer was charged with possession of ammunition as a felon in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on June 7, 2006. He filed a motion to suppress evidence
from the stop, arguing, among other things, that the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion of a traffic violation to initiate the stop. According to Brewer, Utah law
only requires that a vehicle have two working brake lights, or “stop lamps.” He
asked the court to take judicial notice of the fact that most cars have three stop
lamps (two by the turn signals and one in the rear windshield), and conclude that
1
Brewer only contests the legality of the initial stop, and not that of the
subsequent search of his person.
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Frampton’s testimony that one stop lamp was out did not preclude the possibility
of two functioning lamps on the vehicle. The district court denied the motion to
suppress, concluding that, under Utah law, even one defective stop lamp
constitutes an equipment violation sufficient to justify a traffic stop. Following
the court’s ruling, Brewer pleaded conditionally guilty to the one count
indictment, but reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). The matter is now before us.
In reviewing denials of motions to suppress, we view the evidence in light
most favorable to the government and accept the trial court’s factual findings
unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Trotter, 483 F.3d 694, 698 (10th Cir.
2007). We consider questions of law de novo, including the reasonableness of the
stop and any issues of statutory interpretation. Id. (Fourth Amendment
reasonableness); United States v. Almaraz, 306 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2002)
(statutory interpretation).
“[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based
on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable
suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.”
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). It is
“irrelevant that the officer may have had other subjective motives for stopping the
vehicle.” Id. “Our sole inquiry is whether this particular officer had reasonable
suspicion that this particular motorist violated any one of the multitude of
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applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Brewer argues that Utah law requires only that a vehicle have two working
stop lamps. Although Officer Frampton’s testimony establishes that one stop
lamp on the vehicle was not functioning, Brewer contends that it is possible that
two other lamps on the car were functional. Based on his particularized
interpretation of Utah law, Brewer claims that the government failed to carry its
burden of proving that the officer had a reasonable suspicion of an equipment
violation. We disagree.
The Utah vehicle equipment laws at issue provide:
A person may not operate or move . . . on a highway a vehicle . . .
which: . . . (ii) does not contain those parts or is not at all times
equipped with lamps and other equipment in proper condition and
adjustment as required in this chapter[,]
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1601(1)(a), and:
(a) A motor vehicle . . . shall be equipped with two or more stop
lamps and flashing turn signals.
(b) A supplemental stop lamp may be mounted on the rear of a
vehicle,
§ 41-6a-1604(3). Utah law adopts federal standards regarding vehicle equipment,
which mandate that passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985,
be equipped with two stop lamps and one high-mounted stop lamp. See § 41-6a-
1601(2)(c)(iv) (incorporating “49 C.F.R. 571 Standard 108 related to lights and
illuminating devices”); 49 C.F.R. § 571.108 at S5.1.1, S5.1.1.27 & Table III.
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These regulations also require that the stop lamps and the high-mounted stop lamp
on each vehicle “shall be activated upon application of the service brakes.” 49
C.F.R. § 571.108 at S5.5.4.
Reading the Utah statutes and federal regulations in conjunction, it is clear
that all stop lamps on a vehicle must be operational. Section 41-6a-1601(3)’s
reference to “two or more stop lamps” reflects the fact that, under federal
regulations, vehicles manufactured prior to September 1, 1985, are not required to
have a third, high-mounted stop lamp. Irrespective of when the Ford Taurus was
manufactured, all rear stop lamp must activate on use of brakes. See 49 C.F.R. §
571.108 at S5.5.4. Because the vehicle’s equipment was not in “proper
condition” as required by Utah law, the officer had reasonable suspicion of a
traffic violation to effect the stop. Cf. State v. Chevre, 994 P.2d 1278, 1280
(Utah Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a defective brake light on a truck violated an
earlier version of Utah’s equipment regulation, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120 &
-121.10 (1998)).
Denial of the motion to suppress is AFFIRMED. Appeal DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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