United States v. Ruiz , 182 F. App'x 752 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
May 16, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AM ERICA
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-6190
v. (W . D. Oklahoma)
TOM M Y R UIZ, (D.C. No. 04-CR -208-F)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. **
Tommy Ruiz was convicted after a jury trial of one count of possessing a
firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10 TH C IR . R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34( A )(2); 10 TH C IR . R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
sentenced him to 92 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised
release.
In this appeal, M r. Ruiz argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
the § 922(g)(1) charge. W e disagree and therefore affirm his conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 2, 2004, Sergeant Jim Lilly, an investigator with the Oklahoma
County Sheriff’s office, attempted to serve an arrest warrant on a fugitive named
Tiffany Forester. Sergeant Lilly had received information indicating that M s.
Forester might be found at a house in Oklahoma City where M r. Ruiz was living.
Sergeant Lilly and several other officers arrived at the house around 7:30 or 8:00
p.m. Bonnie Howard, who was M r. Ruiz’s former sister-in-law, answered the
door. She told Sergeant Lilly that no one else was there, and she gave him
permission to look for the fugitive.
W hile conducting a protective sweep, Reserve Deputy Jason Ruegge
found a locked room in the northeast part of the house. Deputy Ruegge heard
voices inside the room, but he could not determine whether they came from a
television set or from other people.
According to Sergeant Lilly, M s. Howard told him that she did not have a
key to the locked room and did not have access to it. She added that M r. Ruiz
was the only person with access to the room.
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W hile the officers were continuing the protective sweep, M r. Ruiz arrived
at the house. He gave Sergeant Lilly a key to the locked room, and Sergeant Lilly
opened the door. Inside a cabinet above a closet, Sergeant Lilly found the firearm
that is the subject of this prosecution— a Glock pistol with .40 caliber ammunition
loaded in the magazine. According to Sergeant Lilly, M r. Ruiz told him that a
friend had left the pistol there. Sergeant Lilly responded that he did not intend to
arrest M r. Ruiz, but he did seize the pistol. Officers obtained a latent fingerprint
from the pistol, but later discovered that it did not belong to M r. Ruiz.
Several other witnesses testified at trial about M r. Ruiz’s connection to the
pistol. Jeff Reed, a detective with the Oklahoma City Police Department, stated
that in the course of investigating a drive-by shooting on the following day
(August 3, 2004), he interviewed M r. Ruiz. M r. Ruiz told him that officers had
seized a Glock .40 caliber pistol and that he had obtained it from an ex-gun dealer
in Norman, Oklahoma. Detective Reed interviewed M r. Ruiz again on September
9, 2004. This time, M r. Ruiz stated that a friend had obtained the pistol and that
the bedroom where it had been found belonged to his father, not him.
Karen Hess, a special agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms testified that she interviewed M r. Ruiz on October 24, 2004, after he had
been arrested for this firearm offense. She stated that M r. Ruiz told her that it
was M s. How ard who had obtained the pistol but that he did not know that M s.
Howard had it. He added that the bedroom where the pistol had been found
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belonged to his father. However, M r. Ruiz said, his father would give him the
key when his father went to work.
At trial, M s. Howard testified in M r. Ruiz’s defense. She told the jury that
the room in which the pistol was found belonged to M r. Ruiz’s father and that
she, M r. Ruiz, and M r. Ruiz’s father all had keys to it. She explained that she had
obtained the pistol from Andre W illiams, the father of her baby. She had put it in
the cabinet but did not tell M r. Ruiz that she had done so. She only told M r. Ruiz
about the pistol as the officers were searching the room.
II. D ISC USSIO N
M r. Ruiz now argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He maintains that the evidence raises
only a suspicion of guilt.
W e engage in de novo review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
a conviction. United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 1009, 1014 (10th Cir. 2006).
W e consider whether, “taking the evidence–both direct and
circumstantial–together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom–in the
light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find [M r. Ruiz]
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Allen, 235 F.3d 482, 492
(10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). “W e do not question the jury’s
credibility determinations or its conclusions about the weight of the evidence.”
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Id. “The evidence necessary to support a verdict need not conclusively exclude
every other reasonable hypothesis and need not negate all possibilities except
guilt. Instead, the evidence only has to reasonably support the jury’s finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Pulido-Jacobo, 377 F.3d 1124,
1129 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To prove a violation of § 922(g)(1), the government must establish the
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant was
previously convicted of a felony; (2) that the defendant thereafter knowingly
possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (3) that the possession was in or affecting
interstate commerce. United States. v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir.
2004). Here, M r. Ruiz’s has disputed only the second element— knowing
possession.
“Possession” under § 922(g)(1) may be actual or constructive. See United
States v. M ills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1994). “[C]onstructive possession
exists where the defendant has the power to exercise control or dominion over the
item.” United States v. Lopez, 307 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2004). In most
cases, “[d]ominion, control, and knowledge . . . may be inferred when a defendant
has exclusive possession of the premises” where the object is found. M ills, 29
F.3d at 549.
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In cases of joint occupancy, the government “must present evidence to
show some connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm or other
contraband.” Id. “W hile caution must be taken that the conviction not be
obtained by piling inference on inference, an inference of constructive possession
is reasonable if the conclusion flows from logical and probabilistic reasoning.”
United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 843 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted). To sustain a conviction for constructive possession,
the government must present “evidence supporting at least a plausible inference
that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon.” United States v.
Hien Van Tieu, 279 F.3d 917, 922 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also M ills, 29 F.3d at 549-50.
Applying these standards, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to
permit the jury to infer that M r. Ruiz had knowledge and access to the Glock
pistol and therefore constructively possessed it. The jury heard evidence that M r.
Ruiz had admitted that he had obtained the pistol from a N orman gun dealer.
Although the jury heard contrary statements–both from M s. Howard and from M r.
Ruiz himself–we may not second-guess its decision about the weight of this
evidence. M oreover, even if it did not believe that M r. Ruiz owned the pistol, it
could still reasonably conclude, from testimony about his having a key to the
room and knowing where the pistol was located, that he had “knowledge of and
access to the weapon.” Hien Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 922.
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III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM M r. Ruiz’s conviction.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
United States Circuit Judge
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