Endlich v. Yellow Corporation , 182 F. App'x 825 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 26, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
R ALPH EN D LIC H,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 05-2215
v.
Y ELLO W C O RPO RA TIO N ,
aka Yellow Transportation Inc.,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR DER
Before KELLY, BR ISC OE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on M r. Endlich’s petition for panel
rehearing. Upon consideration, the panel grants the petition for rehearing in part.
A copy of an amended decision is attached to this order, which reflects a change
to one sentence. The petition is granted as to that one change. In all other
respects, the petition for rehearing is denied.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUM AKER, Clerk
By:
Deputy Clerk
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 26, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
R ALPH EN D LIC H,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-2215
(D.C. No. CIV-04-265-LCS-KBM )
Y ELLO W C O RPO RA TIO N , (D . N.M .)
aka Yellow Transportation Inc.,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, BR ISC OE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Ralph Endlich appeals the dismissal of his suit on summary judgment
against his former employer, Yellow Corporation, aka Yellow Transportation Inc.
(“Yellow”), for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213. W e exercise jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and A FFIR M .
W hen Endlich applied for a linehaul driver position with Yellow, he stated
that he had not been involved in any work-related incidents causing damage to
facilities, equipment, property, or other persons in the ten years prior to the
application date. This was incorrect. Endlich had been injured in a truck
accident two years before his application while working for his previous
employer, Consolidated Freightways. After the accident, he underw ent surgery
for injuries he sustained to his shoulder, and he sought and received workers’
compensation benefits from the Texas W orkers’ Compensation Commission
(“TW CC”).
Yellow hired Endlich, and he underwent a pre-employment physical
examination. He also participated in a physical performance test, which he
passed. Endlich claims that he informed Yellow’s examining physician about his
shoulder injury during his physical and that the physician indicated that the injury
w ould not prohibit Endlich from performing services for Yellow.
Soon after Endlich started, Yellow’s labor and employment counsel, M att
Brazeal, received a letter from Todd Richards, an attorney representing Endlich’s
previous employer, that requested copies of Endlich’s application documents,
particularly those dealing with any physical performance tests. Richards’ letter
indicated that Endlich had filed a workers’ compensation claim as a result of his
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shoulder injury. After receiving the letter, Brazeal contacted Richards to inform
him that he would need to send a subpoena before Brazeal could produce the
requested documents. During the conversation, Richards told Brazeal that
Endlich had been involved in a rollover accident.
Brazeal later determined that the information on Endlich’s application for
employment was false because Endlich had failed to disclose the rollover
accident. He further determined that Endlich had made false representations to
the TW CC because he had passed his physical performance test and had been
working for Yellow with no apparent difficulty. Yellow contends that Brazeal
communicated these concerns to M att Oglesby, Yellow’s labor manager, who in
turn contacted Dennis Deck, Endlich’s linehaul manager, to inform him that
Endlich had an “unfavorable background.” D eck then terminated Endlich’s
employment because of Endlich’s job performance problems and the information
he had received from Oglesby. 1
1
This case is thus unlike M arx v. Schnuck M arkets, Inc., 76 F.3d 324(10th Cir. 1996), in which the plaintiff’s wife, an employee of defendant Schnuck
M arkets, attempted to circumvent Schnuck’s informal policy of not hiring the
spouse of a current employee by pretending that she had never met her husband at
the time he applied for a job. From its humble beginnings, this charade
progressed from a feigned courtship between two employees to a bachelor party
arranged ostensibly to celebrate the poseur-husband’s “last hours of freedom.”
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff’s w ife, the tem porarily then not-so tem porarily
M rs. M arx, notified Schnuck that she believed it was failing to pay overtime in
accordance with federal law . Schnuck promptly undertook an investigation into
its overtime policies, and then two weeks later fired M rs. M arx citing
falsifications on her application for employment. M r. M arx responded by filing a
(continued...)
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Endlich sued Yellow under the ADA and wrongful discharge under state
law claiming that he was terminated because Yellow regarded him as disabled and
that Yellow asked impermissible questions about his medical history. Yellow
moved for summary judgment on the ADA claim arguing that Endlich was
terminated for making false statements on his employment application and for
unsatisfactory job performance. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Yellow on Endlich’s ADA claims, but denied summary judgment on the
state law claim. The state law claim was tried to a jury and a verdict was entered
in Yellow’s favor. Endlich now appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Yellow on his ADA claims. He does not appeal from the
jury verdict.
W e review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
applying the same standard as the district court. Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of
M ental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999).
1
(...continued)
class action Age Discrimination in Employment and Fair Labor Standards Act
suit. During the course of depositions taken to defend this litigation, Schnuck
learned of plaintiff’s misrepresentations concerning his marital status, and
subjected him to examination concerning his previous fabrications. The district
court granted summary judgment on both claims. W e affirmed the dismissal of
the AD EA claim, but reversed the district court’s dismissal of the FSLA
retaliation claim concluding, inter alia, that Schnuck could not rebut M arx’s
showing of pretext by invoking the “unrelated wrongdoing” of his
misrepresentations concerning his marital status. Id. at 329. The timing is thus
crucially different from this case in which Endlich misrepresented his accident
history on his employment application, and Yellow learned of this
misrepresentation before termination.
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Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answ ers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The ADA provides that no covered employer “shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual
in regard to . . . the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case under the A DA, a plaintiff must
show: (1) he has a disability; (2) he is a qualified individual who, with or without
reasonable accommodation can perform the essential functions of the job he
desires; and (3) his employer discriminated against him because of his disability.
M cKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 2001). Disability means:
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within
[§ 12102(2)(C)]: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a
person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes
that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or
more major life activities. In both cases, it is necessary that a
covered entity entertain misperceptions about the individual – it must
believe either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that
one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment
when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting.
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Doebele v. Sprint/United M gmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1132-33 (10th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999)).
In his complaint, Endlich asserted that Yellow discriminated against him
because of his perceived disability by terminating his employment in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Yellow on this claim because Endlich failed to show that Yellow perceived him to
be disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Specifically, the district court found
that “[Endlich] has presented no evidence that [Yellow] believed he had a
substantially limiting impairment or ‘regarded’ him as having a disability.”
To reach this conclusion, the district court assumed that Endlich was asserting
that Yellow regarded him as having a physical impairment that substantially
limited him in the major life activity of working, a so-called “regarded as” claim.
See, e.g., Doebele, 342 F.3d at 1132.
On appeal, Endlich argues that the district court erred in concluding that he
needed to present evidence demonstrating that Yellow regarded him as
substantially limited in a major life activity. Endlich argues alternatively that
even if this evidence was necessary, the district court erroneously rejected
evidence that Endlich was limited in major life activities other than working.
On this basis, he claims sufficient evidence was introduced to survive summary
judgment.
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In its motion for summary judgment, Yellow asserted that it terminated
Endlich for being dishonest in his employment application and for unsatisfactory
job performance. Yellow also presented evidence that it did not regard Endlich as
having any substantially limiting physical impairments. For example, Yellow
provided testimony from Deck, Endlich’s linehaul manager, in which he stated
that he had no reason to believe that Endlich was not physically qualified to
operate a motor vehicle and that Endlich had passed the physical examination by
the company doctor, as well as the driving test. Yellow also provided testimony
from Endlich himself in which he stated that he did not believe that anyone who
was involved in testing him and interacting with him during the hiring process
perceived him to be disabled.
Endlich argues that under Doebele v. Sprint/United M gmt. Co. a “regarded
as” plaintiff need only show that the employer entertains “myths, fears, and
stereotypes” about an employee without identifying how she is perceived to be
substantially limited in a major life activity. Doebele, however, stands for no
such proposition. Reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
the “regarded as” claim, we held “M s. Doebele presented a fact issue on whether
[her employer’s] adverse employment actions were motivated by the fact that her
supervisors regarded her as substantially limited from a broad class of jobs by her
mental impairments. Her coworkers and supervisors knew she had mental
problems even before she was diagnosed as bipolar by Dr. Urdaneta.” Id. at
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1135. Thus, Endlich is mistaken when he asserts that Doebele simply requires a
showing that the employer entertain myths, fears, and stereotypes about an
employee, or that the requirements for a plaintiff bringing a regarded as claim
have changed.
In order to survive summary judgment, Endlich needed to produce evidence
that created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 1) Yellow believed he
was substantially limited in a major life activity when he was not so limited, or
2) that he had a limitation that Yellow considered to be substantial limitation in a
major life activity when in fact it was not so limiting. See Doebele, 342 F.3d
at 1132. In his response to summary judgment, Endlich failed to identify how
Yellow perceived him to be substantially limited in any major life activity, and
summary judgment was proper.
Endlich has not cited any record evidence to support his assertion that
Yellow regarded him as being substantially limited in the major life activities of
reaching, throwing, lifting or driving. Neither does he offer any record evidence
in support of his position that Yellow regarded him as substantially limited in the
major life activity of working. The only record citation he provides is for the fact
that Endlich won his contested workers’ compensation hearings. That
information simply does not provide any support for his claim that Yellow
regarded him as substantially limited in the major life activity of working.
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Because Endlich failed to provide any evidence of how Yellow regarded
him as being substantially limited in any major life activity, he cannot establish
one of the necessary elements for his prima facie case of discrimination under the
ADA. The district court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of
Yellow. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (explaining that
summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,
and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial”).
Endlich also asserts that his termination had also resulted from an
impermissible inquiry about his medical history in violation of the ADA. Endlich
argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this claim
because Y ellow interpreted certain of its pre-employment questions to require
disclosure of workers’ compensation claims, and deliberately sought and obtained
information about those claims from the lawyer opposing Endlich’s workers’
compensation claim. Having reviewed the record, we affirm the district court’s
decision on Endlich’s impermissible inquiry claim for substantially the reasons
set forth in the district court’s orders entered April 19 and M ay 11, 2005.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRM ED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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