Colbert v. Ward ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    May 23, 2006
    UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    TENTH CIRCUIT                         Clerk of Court
    HEZEK IAH JOEL COLB ERT,
    Petitioner-A ppellant,
    v.                                                       No. 05-6314
    (D.C. No. 04-CV-141-R)
    R ON W A R D ; STA TE O F                                (W .D. Okla.)
    O K LA H OMA ,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    OR DER *
    Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
    Hezekiah J. Colbert, a state prisoner appealing pro se, requests a certificate
    of appealabiltiy (“COA”) to appeal the denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     habeas
    petition. For substantially the same reasons as set forth by the district court, w e
    D EN Y a COA and DISM ISS.
    Colbert, who was represented by counsel, pled guilty to one felony offense
    of carrying a weapon with unlawful intent after former conviction of a felony, and
    *
    The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
    pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
    judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
    res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
    orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
    terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    one misdemeanor offense of unlawfully carrying a weapon. The state district
    court sentenced him to 126 months in prison. Ten days later, Colbert filed a
    motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that his plea was not “knowing
    and voluntary” and that entry of the plea was “contrary to applicable law.” The
    state district court denied this motion.
    Colbert then filed two applications for post-conviction relief, each
    attempting to withdraw his guilty plea. Both applications were construed by the
    Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) as seeking an out-of-time appeal
    with respect to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and thus the OCCA
    declined to exercise jurisdiction over his appeals.
    Following these denials, Colbert filed another motion with the state district
    court to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding that Colbert knowingly and voluntarily
    entered into his pleas, the state district court denied this motion. New counsel
    from the O klahoma Indigent Defense system appealed the state district court’s
    denial of Colbert’s motion to the OCCA, asserting that (1) the trial court erred by
    denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, (2) reversible error occurred
    when the trial court accepted his plea without informing him of the elements of
    each offense charged, and (3) his plea was invalid because the trial court failed to
    establish an adequate factual basis for his plea. OCCA affirmed the denial of his
    motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and found that because he failed to raise his
    second or third arguments at the trial court level those claims were waived.
    -2-
    After the OCCA affirmed the state district court’s denial of his motion to
    withdraw his plea, Colbert filed a habeas petition in federal district court raising
    five arguments. He argued that (1) he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter
    into his guilty plea; (2) the evidence against him was obtained as a result of an
    unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) he
    received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel; (4) he was denied the right
    to an appeal and to a fair and speedy trial, and (5) the prosecutor engaged in
    misconduct during sentencing. This petition was denied by the district court.
    Having failed to obtain a COA from that court, Colbert now seeks a COA from
    this court. 1
    On appeal, Colbert raises four arguments. First, he argues that he received
    ineffective assistance of counsel because he told his counsel he thought he wanted
    to go to trial, but that his counsel never discussed preparation for trial with him,
    1
    Colbert’s petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the
    Antiterrorism and Effective D eath Penalty Act (“AEDPA”); as a result, AEDPA’s
    provisions apply to this case. See Rogers v. Gibson, 
    173 F.3d 1278
    , 1282 n.1
    (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Lindh v. M urphy, 
    521 U.S. 320
     (1997)). AED PA
    conditions a petitioner's right to appeal a denial of habeas relief under § 2254
    upon a grant of a COA. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(2). A COA may be issued “only if
    the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
    right.” § 2253(c)(2). This requires Colbert to show “that reasonable jurists could
    debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
    resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
    deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    ,
    484 (2000) (quotations omitted). Because the district court denied Colbert a C OA ,
    he may not appeal the district court’s decision absent a grant of COA by this
    court.
    -3-
    insisted that Colbert plead guilty, and informed Colbert that in exchange for
    pleading guilty he would receive probation. Because the state court addressed
    this issue on the merits, Colbert can only prevail if its ruling denying his
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim was “contrary to, or involved an
    unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
    Supreme Court of the United States,” or was based on an unreasonable
    determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
    proceeding. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), (2).
    In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
    defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that such
    deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. W ashington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984). W ith respect to the prejudice prong of the analysis, the
    defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability, but for counsel’s
    errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
    trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 58-59 (1985).
    The OCCA’s holding that Colbert did not receive ineffective assistance of
    counsel was not contrary to, and did not involve the unreasonable application of,
    clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Colbert’s
    conclusory and vague allegations regarding his trial counsel’s professionally
    unreasonable conduct during the plea process are insufficient to show that his
    counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. Additionally, Colbert has
    -4-
    presented no evidence that would demonstrate there is a reasonable probability he
    would not have entered into the guilty plea but for the alleged errors of his
    counsel. As such there is no prejudice.
    Colbert’s three remaining arguments on appeal are that (1) the prosecutor
    comm itted misconduct during the sentencing process, (2) he is factually innocent
    of the charges to which he pleaded guilty, and (3) the district court erred in
    failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty
    plea during the required 30-day period. W e do not need to reach the merits of
    these claims because they are procedurally defaulted.
    Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (b)(1), habeas corpus relief may not be granted
    unless the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the state courts. If a
    petitioner has failed to “exhaust state remedies and the court to which the
    petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion
    requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred the claims are
    considered exhausted and procedurally defaulted for purposes of habeas relief.”
    Thomas v. Gibson, 
    218 F.3d 1213
    , 1221 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations
    omitted). Colbert never raised these claims in his petitions for post-conviction,
    and thus these claims would be procedurally barred in Oklahoma courts. See
    Smith v. State, 
    546 P.2d 1351
    , 1354 (O kla. Crim. App. 1976) (holding that all
    issues known to a petitioner must be raised in the first application for post
    conviction relief in the trial court or they will be deemed to have been waived).
    -5-
    Additionally, Colbert has not presented any evidence that our failure to review
    these claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Ballinger v.
    Kerby, 
    3 F.3d 1371
    , 1375 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that in certain “extraordinary
    circumstances” it would be a miscarriage of justice to fail to review an actual
    innocence claim because the petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted).
    Accordingly, Colbert’s application for a COA is DENIED, and his appeal
    is DISM ISSED. The motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GR ANTED .
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-6314

Judges: Kelly, McKay, Lucero

Filed Date: 5/23/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024