United States v. Cervantes ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 27, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 07-2167
(D.C. No. CIV-05-974-LH-LAM)
DANNY RAY CERVANTES,
(D.N.M.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before O’BRIEN, EBEL, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Danny Ray Cervantes, a federal prisoner proceeding with retained counsel,
seeks to challenge his imprisonment in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition. The
district court dismissed the petition, concluding that three of the four claims had
already been litigated on direct appeal and any ineffective assistance of counsel
claim failed because the attorney’s performance was not deficient. Mr. Cervantes
now seeks before us a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
court’s order, and for substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court,
we deny the application for a COA. 1
* * *
In October 2001, a federal grand jury in the District of New Mexico
indicted Mr. Cervantes on the charge of possession with intent to distribute 100
kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B). His trial counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence, but because of
plea negotiations with the government, did not file a supporting brief. The
district court denied the motion without a hearing, and in January 2002 Mr.
Cervantes changed his plea to guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the
government.
Mr. Cervantes later filed a motion to withdraw his plea, claiming that he
was induced into the plea agreement by the opportunity to cooperate and receive a
downward departure, and that this opportunity and concomitant departure
recommendation did not materialize. The district court denied the motion as well
as Mr. Cervantes’s motion for a downward departure and sentenced Mr. Cervantes
to 188 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release.
Mr. Cervantes appealed to this court, arguing that (1) the government
breached the plea agreement, (2) the district court abused its discretion in denying
1
Mr. Cervantes did not file a separate application for a COA, but his
notice of appeal is deemed a renewed application for a COA pursuant to Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b)(2).
-2-
his motion to withdraw his plea, and (3) the district court abused its discretion by
not considering his cooperation when imposing his sentence. United States v.
Cervantes, 115 F. App’x 1, 2-3 (10th Cir. 2004). This court affirmed the
judgment of the district court.
In his current Section 2255 petition, Mr. Cervantes charges that (1) he was
coerced and forced into pleading guilty under the terms of his plea agreement
because he was not given the opportunity to cooperate, (2) the government
breached the plea agreement, (3) the district court improperly denied his motion
to withdraw his plea, and (4) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by
pursuing the plea agreement instead of filing a brief in support of his motion to
suppress. The district court dismissed Mr. Cervantes’s Section 2255 petition,
concluding that the first three issues were raised on direct appeal and trial
counsel’s performance was not deficient. The court denied the petition for a COA
and granted Mr. Cervantes leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.
We may issue a COA only if the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), such that “reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003). Based on
our independent review of the record in this case, we agree with the district court
that Mr. Cervantes has not met this threshold.
-3-
Section 2255 motions are not available to review issues “previously
considered and disposed of” on direct appeal or “to test the legality of matters
which should have been raised on direct appeal.” United States v. Warner, 23
F.3d 287, 291 (10th Cir. 1994). This court has reviewed and denied three of Mr.
Cervantes’s four Section 2255 claims on direct appeal. Regarding his claim of
coercion, we have already found that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.
See Cervantes, 115 F. App’x at 10. We have also found, in response to Mr.
Cervantes’s arguments, that the government did not breach the plea agreement, id.
at 6-8, and that the district court did not err in denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, id. at 10. Because we have already considered and disposed of these
claims, we will not consider them again in a Section 2255 motion.
In order to succeed on his remaining ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, Mr. Cervantes must show that his attorney’s advocacy fell below an
“objective standard of reasonableness,” and that, but for counsel’s deficient
representation, the result in his case would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). To overcome the presumption of
objective reasonableness, “the defendant [has] the burden of showing that
counsel’s action or inaction was not based on a valid strategic choice.” Bullock v.
Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1047 (10th Cir. 2002).
Mr. Cervantes implies that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
file a brief in support of his motion to suppress and instead pursuing a plea
-4-
agreement. Counsel’s affidavit indicates that he did not support the motion to
suppress with a brief because he was, at the time, negotiating a plea agreement for
Mr. Cervantes and the government indicated that they would not support a
downward departure for cooperation if Mr. Cervantes pursued the suppression
issue. See Klipstine Aff. Counsel asserts that, based on this representation, he
made the decision to focus on a motion for downward departure based on
cooperation. Although the opportunity to cooperate did not ultimately
materialize, and counsel might’ve, with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, made a
different decision, Mr. Cervantes has not provided any evidence that counsel’s
decision was anything other than a strategic choice that was reasonable, even
apparently wise, “from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and
in light of all the circumstances.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381
(1986) (emphasis added). Because Mr. Cervantes has not satisfied the first prong
of the Strickland standard, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. 2
* * *
2
Mr. Cervantes also agues that the district court should not have denied
his request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. However, the court
dismissed the motion without prejudice, with leave to renew the request, because
Mr. Cervantes did not articulate reasons in support of his discovery request or
requests for specific documents, and because his evidentiary hearing motion was
premature. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); Rules Governing § 2255 Cases in the U.S.
Dist. Cts. 6(b). Mr. Cervantes never renewed his motion, so the responsibility for
this outcome lies with him, and reasonable jurists could not disagree that the
district court was correct to deny the original motion without prejudice.
-5-
Mr. Cervantes has failed to show that the district court’s disposition of his
Section 2255 petition is debatable or incorrect, therefore his request for a COA is
denied and this appeal is dismissed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
-6-