United States v. Collins ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 27, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 06-5221
v. (D.C. No. 06-CR-33-01-JHP)
(Northern District of Oklahoma)
ANTHONY JOHN COLLINS, a/k/a
“Tony,”
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY, and GORSUCH Circuit Judges.
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 13, 2006, Defendant—Appellant, Anthony John Collins, along
with six other defendants, was charged with one count of conspiracy to possess
controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(A)(viii), and (c)(2), and five counts of possession with intent to distribute,
and distribution, of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(C).
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P.32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
On July 7, 2006, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Collins pled guilty to
the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances charge.
The plea agreement reserved Mr. Collins’s right to appeal the sentence. On
November 17, 2006, the district court, after hearing evidence on the matter of the
amount of the controlled substance, sentenced Mr. Collins to imprisonment for a
term of 168 months, five years’ supervised release, a fine of $1500.00, and a
$100.00 special assessment. Mr. Collins filed a timely notice of appeal. This
court exercises jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. BACKGROUND
Mr. Collins plead guilty to the conspiracy to possess with the intent to
distribute a controlled substance on July 7, 2006. This was Count 1 in the
original indictment. The Probation Office prepared a Pre-Sentence Report which
stated that Mr. Collins possessed a total of 8.115 kilograms of methamphetamine,
3.82 kilograms of an ephedrine and pseudoephedrine mixture, and 17 milliliters of
Phenylacetone, resulting in a base offense level of 38. Appellant’s Counsel
objected and stated that the evidence of drug quantity warranted only a base
offense level of 34. The court subsequently scheduled an evidentiary hearing.
On September 29, 2006, the government presented a single witness, Angela
Sue Ensminger (formerly Angela Sue Nolen), the former wife of co-conspirator
Gary Nolen, and a co-conspirator herself. Ms. Ensminger testified that Mr.
Collins began making methamphetamine with Gary Nolen in 1999. She also
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testified that she found a rural residence where Nolen and Collins would
manufacture the methamphetamine. Ms. Ensminger aided further in the process
of making methamphetamine by purchasing packages of pseudoephedrine pills
and then retrieving the finished methamphetamine after its completion. At the
evidentiary hearing, Ms. Ensminger also testified that she picked up the finished
methamphetamine in bags containing “a pound or two” of the product every week
beginning in January of 2001 and ending in June of that year.
Ms. Ensminger further testified that the methamphetamine manufacturing
continued in 2002 although at a different residence. She also stated that Mr.
Collins manufactured methamphetamine with another co-conspirator, Paul Davis.
Additionally, Ms. Ensminger stated that Mr. Collins described an incident in
Boynton, Oklahoma where he was present at the time of a police raid on a
methamphetamine operation. Mr. Collins had a conversation with his attorney,
with Ms. Ensminger present, where Mr. Collins claimed that the materials seized
by the police belonged to him.
Appellant’s Counsel cross examined Ms. Ensminger whereupon she
admitted being a daily methamphetamine user. Appellant’s counsel did not
present any witnesses but did enter into evidence the grand jury transcript of Gary
Nolen. Closing arguments were then made and the court did not make a ruling at
that time.
On October 5, 2006, the court held a proceeding in which it stated that at
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that point in time, “the Court has absolutely no evidence on which to accurately
estimate the drug quantities involved in this conspiracy.” Oct. 5 Tr. p. 2-3. The
court did not sentence Mr. Collins to a term of imprisonment commensurate with
a base offense level of 31, for which Appellant’s Counsel initially argued. The
court announced that it would hold another evidentiary hearing on the matter of
drug weight. Appellant’s Counsel objected to the “re-do” of the evidentiary
hearing and to the court raising the issue sua sponte.
On October 24, 2006, the court held the next evidentiary hearing. The
government called Detective John Singer, a member of the Claremore, Oklahoma,
Police Department, who was a case officer on this matter. Detective Singer
testified that he was familiar with the facts of the conspiracy to which Mr. Collins
pled guilty. Detective Singer indicated that in his various opportunities to debrief
Ms. Ensminger, “she picked up one to two packages weighing approximately one
to two pounds” of methamphetamine. Oct. 24 Tr. at 7. Detective Singer also
testified that based on the conversion that one kilogram is equal to 2.2 pounds, a
conservative estimate put the total drug weight at one kilogram per week for eight
weeks–or eight kilograms over that period of time in 2001. Id. Next, Detective
Singer discussed the incident on October 17, 2002 where a search was conducted
at a home in Boynton, Muskogee County, Oklahoma. Detective Singer stated that
over 60 substances were found and submitted for a lab analysis. Id. at 8.
Detective Singer stated that a number of them tested positive for
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methamphetamine, pseudoephedrine, and both substances. Id. Detective Singer
noted in particular two weights; first, one substance weighing 2.9 kilograms
tested positive for pseudoephedrine and second, another substance weighing .9
kilograms tested positive for pseudoephedrine. Id. In total, Mr. Collins was
allegedly responsible for 3.8 kilograms of pseudoephedrine in these two incidents.
The Government then asked Detective Singer if he was aware of a purchase
of pseudoephedrine made by Mr. Collins and Ms. Ensminger in Oklahoma City in
2001. Detective Singer answered affirmatively and testified that the purchase was
for $17,000 and involved ten cases of pseudoephedrine. Oct. 24 Tr. at 9. The
weight of those cases, Detective Singer stated, was 31 kilograms once separated
from the packaging holding the pseudoephedrine. Id. at 10. When asked for the
total weight of the October 2002 search and the 2001 Oklahoma City purchase,
Detective Singer testified that the amount would be more than six kilograms of
pseudoephedrine. Id.As the hearing progressed, the district court and Mr. Collins’s counsel had
a dialogue in which counsel stated that the Boynton conduct created 2.72
kilograms of methamphetamine and was a “verifiable amount” for which Mr.
Collins would take responsibility. Oct. 24 Tr. at 26-27. The district court
construed that as a minimum amount. Id. at 27. The government then provided
closing remarks and summarized that a preponderance of the evidence shows that
Mr. Collins was responsible for the manufacture of eight kilograms of
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methamphetamine from the Boynton residence, and approximately six kilograms
of pseudoephedrine from the combination of the 2001 Oklahoma City purchase
and the October 17, 2002 seizure.
On November 7, 2006, the court held the last sentencing hearing in this
case. The court found that the drug quantities alleged were “an extremely
conservative estimate of the drug quantities actually involved in the conspiracy.”
Nov. 7 Tr. p. 7. The court also stated that if it were to disregard the amount of
methamphetamine produced, Mr. Collins’s base offense level would still be 38
based solely on the pseudoephedrine amount. Id. at 5. The court stated that this
was in part due to Mr. Collins’s admission in the plea agreement that he
purchased ten cases of pseudoephedrine. Id. at 5-6; See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, note
10; U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. The court then sentenced Mr. Collins to a term of
incarceration totaling 228 months or 19 years.
III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Collins presents three arguments for remanding his sentence. First, Mr.
Collins argues that the district court abused its discretion and violated his due
process rights by allowing the government to “re-do” their case against him.
Second, Mr. Collins argues that even considering the evidence presented at both
sentencing hearings, there was an insufficient basis to show the requisite drug
weight warranting a base offense level of 38. Finally, Mr. Collins argues that the
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sentence handed down by the district court is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable and therefore in violation of United States v. Booker and its
progeny.
1. Issue Concerning Abuse of Discretion at the Sentencing Hearing
Mr. Collins argues that the district court violated his due process rights by
allowing the government to “re-do” their case and re-present additional witnesses.
Mr. Collins claims that the court’s conduct improperly provided the government
the proverbial “second bite at the apple.” Essentially, Appellant’s argument
amounts to a claim that the district court abused its discretion by continuing the
sentencing hearing in order to hear more evidence. Mr. Collins adequately
objected to the continuation of the September 29th sentencing hearing thereby
warranting our review for alleged abuse of discretion. See United States v. Gines,
964 F.2d 972, 977 (10th Cir. 1992); Dever v. Kansas State Penitentiary, 36 F.3d
1531, 1535(10th Cir. 1991) (holding that when an evidentiary hearing is not
mandatory, such a hearing is within its discretion and is reviewable for abuse of
discretion); United States v. Meyer, 157 F.3d 1067 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that
challenges to a district court’s reopening an evidentiary hearing are reviewed for
abuse of discretion).
A sentencing court must fashion a sentence that is both procedurally and
substantively reasonable by properly calculating the base offense level and
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adequately explaining its reasoning for handing down a particular sentence. See
Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (“It is also clear that a district judge
must give serious consideration to the extent of any departure from the Guidelines
and must explain his conclusion that an unusually lenient or an unusually harsh
sentence is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient justifications.”); United
States v. Verdin-Garcia, --- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 435495, *8 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding that reasonableness in sentencing has two components–procedural and
substantive–which require an investigation into the process resulting in the
sentence and consideration of the factors contained in § 3553(a)); United States v.
Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir.2007) (holding that § 3553(c)
requires a court to provide only a general statement of the reasons for giving a
within guidelines sentence); Id. at 1200 (holding that § 3553(c)(2) requires a
court to provide the specific reason for a sentence falling outside the guidelines
range).
A sentencing court is tasked with properly calculating the base offense
level because the sentence handed down must be procedurally reasonable. See
United States v. Todd, --- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 363738, *5 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing
Gall v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 128 S.Ct. 586 (2007); see also United
States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054-55 (10th Cir.2006). As in the instant case,
when a defendant objects to a portion of the PSR, the court may hold an
evidentiary hearing to rule on the dispute in order to ascertain the appropriate
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base offense level and fashion a procedurally reasonable sentence. Fed. Crim. R.
Proc. 32(i)(3)(B).
In the instant case, the sentencing court heard testimony from Ms.
Ensminger, which it found to be credible, but in the end not very helpful in
determining the amount of drugs involved. The sentencing court noted in its
October 5th proceeding that it was left with a dilemma because it did not have
enough information in order to determine the facts of the case and rule on the
issue. This epistemological void led the court to conclude that the sentencing
hearing should be continued in order for more evidence to be presented. The
court explicitly stated at the same October 5th hearing that Mr. Collins was also
welcome to present any additional testimony or evidence in support of his case.
Although Mr. Collins couches this argument as one involving his due
process rights, the crux of this issue is whether the district court abused its
discretion in deciding to hear more evidence on the issue of drug weight. In the
instant case, the sentencing court stated in the October 5th hearing that it did not
have the information necessary to make a ruling on the issue of drug weight. It
did not say that the evidence was conclusive that the particular drug weight did
not exist; rather it stated that the information presented was in the end not very
clear. The continuation of the evidentiary hearing focused on clarifying the
evidence and providing the district court with a better view of the facts and
circumstances of Mr. Collins’s case. A district court is entitled to re-open an
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evidentiary hearing in order to ascertain the proper facts in a given case. See
United States v. James, 78 F.3d 851, 859 (3rd Cir. 1996) (Stapleton, J.,
concurring) (stating that a district court has discretion to reopen an evidentiary
hearing).
The instant case could be confused with a very different circumstance
where reopening the evidentiary hearing could be precluded. In a case where a
sentence was appealed and remanded back to the district court, this court has
ruled that an appellate court has the authority to prevent the district court from re-
opening the hearing thereby requiring the district court to sentence the defendant
based on the original hearing and evidence contained therein. United States v.
Campbell, 372 F.3d 1179, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2004); see United States v. Keifer,
198 F.3c 798, 801 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the general rule is that upon
remand, the sentencing hearing at the district court proceeds de novo). The
authority of the appellate court to limit supplementation of the sentencing hearing
in certain circumstances highlights the notion of finality that exists after the
district court has fashioned a sentence. However, the instant case is readily
distinguishable. The additional evidence proffered in the instant case came
before a sentence was handed down and before an appeal to this court. Thus,
there are no factors here that would urge us to remand this sentence back to the
district court with an instruction to limit sentencing to the record from the first
hearing alone. It is more accurate to look at the various proceedings below as all
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part of a single sentencing hearing that focused on determining the correct drug
weight involved. We feel there was no improper supplementation of the record,
particularly since both parties were allowed to present further evidence.
Furthermore, there was no finality to the proceeding until the close of the
November 7, 2006 hearing where the district court defined the sentence for Mr.
Collins.
Mr. Collins argues that Eason v. United States, 281 F.2d 818 (9th Cir.
1960), requires a remand in this case. Eason involved a jury trial in the district
court where the defendant moved to reopen the case so that he might testify on a
point concerning a question presented by the jury after the case had been
submitted. 281 F.2d at 822. The court denied the defendant’s request to reopen
the case for him to testify. Id. Appellant argues that this case is on point for the
instant appeal. We disagree. This case is readily distinguishable on the basis that
the proceeding in Eason was a jury trial where the defendant’s guilt or innocence
was at issue, as opposed to a sentence hearing where the defendant has already
pled guilty. There are tangible concerns regarding prejudice to other parties, jury
confusion, and the potential for the new evidence to be overemphasized. Id.Appellant argues that fundamental fairness requires a reversal of the district
court’s procedure. However, it is clear from the October 5th transcript that the
court not only did not preclude Appellant from presenting additional evidence,
but encouraged him to do so. Thus, there was no prejudice to either party–both
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were allowed to present evidence on the matter at issue. Furthermore, the district
court continued the sentencing hearing in an effort to achieve the goal of handing
down a procedurally reasonable sentence by arriving at the proper base offense
level. The district court, in pursuit of its obligation to provide a procedurally
reasonable sentence, has an obligation to the process of finding facts by a
preponderance of the evidence and being correct upon handing down the
particular sentence. If, as it was in the instant case, it appears to the district court
that the information presented at the hearing so far was unhelpful in illuminating
the issue, then a continuance may be justified. See United States v. Gill, --- F.3d
----, 2008 WL 190789, * 16 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Davis, 194
Fed.Appx. 716, 717 (11th Cir. 2006). Here it was within the district court’s
discretion to continue the sentencing hearing with the hope of ascertaining a
better understanding of the circumstances of the case so as to appropriately rule
on the disputed portion of the PSR and properly calculate the appropriate base
offense level. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in the
instant case by allowing another hearing where both parties could present
additional evidence.
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Mr. Collins argues that the evidence presented at the sentencing hearings
was insufficient for the sentencing court to find the drug amount warranting a
base offense level of 38. “We review a sentencing court’s determination of the
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quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant for clear error.” United States v.
Morales, 108 F.3d 1213, 1225 (10th Cir.1997). “In a controlled substances case,
a defendant is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he was
directly involved and, in the case of [a conspiracy], all reasonably foreseeable
quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he
jointly undertook.” United States v. Lauder, 409 F.3d 1254, 1267 (10th Cir.2005)
(citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n. 2). It should also be noted that a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence is also one that challenges the procedural
reasonableness of the sentence. See United States v. Galaz-Felix, 221 Fed. Appx.
790, 795 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1166 (10th Cir.
2006) (per curiam). The procedural reasonableness claim will be addressed in
more detail below.
As noted above, Mr. Collins pled guilty to a conspiracy charge and under
Lauder, he is responsible for the reasonablely foreseeable amounts of drugs
produced within the scope of the criminal activity in which he jointly
participated. Lauder, 409 F.3d 1254, 1267. In the November 7th hearing, the
district court stated that regardless of the amount of methamphetamine at issue,
the marijuana equivalency table would require a base offense level of 38 based
solely on the pseudoephedrine from either the Oklahoma City purchase in 2001 or
the October, 17th seizure. This is because one gram of pseudoephedrine is treated
as ten kilograms of marijuana. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). A three kilogram amount of
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pseudoephedrine would be the equivalent of 30,000 kilograms of marijuana which
results in a base offense level of 38. Id. In the instant case, the district court
found that there was a preponderance of evidence that Mr. Collins was
responsible for the pseudoephedrine seized in the October 17, 2002 search of the
Boynton residence. This amount totaled approximately 3.8 kilograms of
pseudoephedrine. Furthermore, Mr. Collins admitted in his plea agreement that
he, along with Ms. Ensminger, purchased ten cases of pseudoephedrine in
Oklahoma City in 2001 which was estimated by Detective Singer to constitute 3.1
kilograms of pseudoephedrine. Together, these incidents justify a finding that
Mr. Collins was responsible for 6.9 kilograms of pseudoephedrine whereas only
three kilograms would be necessary to warrant a base offense level of 38.
In reviewing the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing and the
admission in the plea agreement, we find that the evidence resulting in a base
offense level of 38 was sufficient.
3. Procedural Reasonableness
Mr. Collins argues that his sentence is unreasonable in violation of Blakely
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220(2005). Specifically, Mr. Collins argues that his sentence is (1) procedurally
unreasonable because the drug amount was not shown and therefore the base
offense level was improperly calculated and (2) substantively unreasonable
because his sentence of 19 years was plainly unreasonable.
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We largely addressed the substance of the procedural reasonableness
argument above in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to show the drug
amount warranting a base offense level of 38. “In setting a procedurally
reasonable sentence, a district court must calculate the proper advisory Guidelines
range and apply the factors set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. Atencio, 476
F.3d 1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007). Since we found that the district court had
sufficient evidence to calculate a base offense level of 38, Mr. Collins’s sentence
was properly calculated and therefore procedurally reasonable.
4. Substantive Reasonableness
Finally, Mr. Collins argues that his 19 year sentence is substantively
unreasonable and should therefore be remanded. Mr. Collins contends that in
light of the § 3553(a) factors and his particular circumstances, an outside the
guidelines sentence would be reasonable. Appellant does not specifically lay out
what specific facts about his individual circumstance warrant imposition of an
outside the guidelines sentence. However, relevant facts are that he was a
methamphetamine addict who used the drug three times a week for fourteen years,
has never received drug rehabilitation, and that this criminal conduct coincided
with his acquaintance with Gary Nolen. Although § 3553(a)(D)(2) enumerates
the need for considering an individual’s medical and treatment needs in
considering sentencing, Mr. Collins’s addiction to illegal narcotics is all too
familiar. Addiction, although quite serious, is not sufficient by itself to make a
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within the guidelines sentence plainly unreasonable. Furthermore, that Mr.
Collins chose to associate with Mr. Nolen is not a fact that would warrant an
outside the guidelines sentence. We cannot say that the within guidelines
sentence is plainly unreasonable.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the sentence handed down by the district court. The sentence
was properly calculated and was not plainly unreasonable. By continuing the
sentencing hearing to acquire additional evidence, the district court upheld its
duty to determine the appropriate base offense level and did not abuse its
discretion. In light of the testimony, the district court had sufficient evidence to
warrant a base offense level of 38.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Entered for the Court
William J. Holloway, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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