Stein v. Stein , 184 F. App'x 808 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 11, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
STEV EN T. STEIN ;
JO LEEN K . STEIN ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 05-3421
(D.C. No. 04-CV-1311-JTM )
GREGORY L. STEIN; SHARON W . (D . Kan.)
STEIN; M ERIDIAN PLACE, M eridian
Place, LLC; PL WEST, LLC;
W E STER N FR ON T D EV ELO PM ENT
IN C.,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before HA RTZ, A ND ER SO N, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Steven and Joleen Stein appeal from district court’s entry of
summary judgment in favor of defendants, Gregory and Sharon Stein and business
entities formed by Gregory Stein. W e exercise jurisdiction and affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
On September 20, 2004, Steven and Joleen (a married couple) filed a
complaint alleging that Gregory and Sharon (Steven’s brother and his wife) were
liable for damages for breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint
also requested an accounting.
Plaintiffs’ claims arose from a plan for Gregory’s real-estate development
company (defendant W estern Front Development) to purchase and develop the
M eridian Tow n Center, a partially completed shopping center in the State of
W ashington. Steven (a career banker) and Joleen asserted that they had an equity
interest in the project. Gregory (a developer) and Sharon maintained that
plaintiffs were involved as lenders and that by M arch 2004 the $1.4 million loan
had been repaid, along with $200,000 in interest.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, based in part on a
statute-of-limitations argument. In analyzing the undisputed facts, the district
court determined that plaintiffs’ contract claim accrued in the early months of
2000, when the parties allegedly reached a partly oral and partly written
agreement; and that the fraud and breach of duty claims accrued by M ay 2001
at the latest, when Steven and Gregory had a heated argument about Steven’s role
in the project. Therefore, the court concluded, plaintiffs’ claims were barred by
the applicable statutes of limitations. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-512(1) (three-year
limitation period for oral-contract claims, applying to agreements which do not
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contain all material terms in w riting); 1 id. § 60-513(a)(3) (two-year limitation
period for fraud claims); id. § 60-513(a)(4) (two-year limitation period for
“[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not
[previously] enumerated,” w hich applies to breach of duty claims). The court
also decided that plaintiffs had no claim of unjust enrichment because the loan
had been satisfied. It therefore granted defendants’ summary judgment motion.
Plaintiffs appeal, presenting three issues for review :
1. W hether the District Court erred in finding there was not a
written agreement by and between the parties and/or there was
not a meeting of the minds as to the agreement between the
parties.
2. W hether the District Court erred by making the factual finding
that Plaintiffs knew or should have known their causes of
action accrued in M ay of 2001 so as to start the statute of
limitations to run in regards to all of Plaintiffs’ claims.
3. W hether the District Court erred in failing to find there had
been equitable tolling in these claims between these two
brothers which made Plaintiffs’ claims timely.
Aplt. Br. at 1. As a general matter, plaintiffs also assert that the district court
failed to resolve all inferences in their favor.
“W e review the grant of summary judgment de novo and affirm only if the
record, considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establishes no
genuine issue of material fact,” Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 437 F.3d 999, 1004
1
See Chilson v. Capital Bank, 692 P.2d 406, 408 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that a contract which is partly in writing and partly oral is in legal effect
an oral contract).
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(10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted), and the defendant is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law , Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
W e have examined the record on appeal and reviewed the district court’s
summary judgment order against the backdrop of plaintiffs’ appellate issues.
W e conclude that the district court properly sorted through the parties’ factual
contentions, decided which facts were material to plaintiffs’ claims, and viewed
the undisputed facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs. And we discern no
error in the district court’s legal determinations. Accordingly, we AFFIRM for
substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and thoughtful
memorandum and order dated October 12, 2005.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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