Moncla v. Kelley , 430 F. App'x 714 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 18, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
DAVID MONCLA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 11-3078
v. (D.C. No. 5:09-CV-03137-MLB-KGG)
(D. Kan.)
ROBERT KELLEY; ROBERT
SAPIEN; RUSSELL STENSENG,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. **
David Moncla, a state inmate appearing pro se, appeals from the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of various prison officials on Mr.
Moncla’s complaint seeking compensatory and punitive damages based upon the
violation of his due process rights. Moncla v. Kelley, No. 09-3137-MLB, 2011
WL 686129 (D. Kan. Feb. 11, 2011). He also appeals the district court’s decision
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
denying his motion to disqualify opposing counsel due to conflict. Our
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Background
The parties are familiar with the facts, and we need not restate them here.
Briefly, in a 2007 disciplinary hearing, Mr. Moncla was found guilty of using
stimulants. See Kan. Admin. Reg. § 44-12-312. Prior to the hearing, Mr.
Moncla’s classification and employment status were changed by Defendant
Sapien. The disciplinary hearing officer (Defendant Kelley) based his decision on
Mr. Moncla’s testimony, a urinalysis, testimony from the canteen supervisor that
the canteen no longer sold the over-the-counter medications which Mr. Moncla
claimed to have taken, and the disciplinary report. The disciplinary hearing
officer did not allow Mr. Moncla to call two exculpatory witnesses including his
doctor, nor were certain items produced that Mr. Moncla claimed were
exculpatory. As sanctions, Mr. Moncla was placed in disciplinary segregation for
30 days, lost three months of good-time credits, and was fined $20.
Mr. Moncla contends that he appealed his disciplinary conviction, and a
rehearing was ordered by the Secretary of Corrections, only to be withdrawn later
based upon false information provided ex parte by Defendant Stenseng. Aplt. Br.
at 4. After Mr. Moncla sought habeas relief from the state district court, the
corrections department agreed to provide Mr. Moncla with a new hearing in
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which he could call witnesses. After that 2009 disciplinary hearing, another
hearing officer dismissed the case, and the $20 fine was returned. The hearing
officer wrote that he was unable to determine whether Mr. Moncla was innocent
or guilty, but that the issue of false positives should have been explored at the
original hearing. 1 R. 329.
On appeal, Mr. Moncla argues that the district court erred in: (1) holding
that Mr. Moncla’s due process rights were not violated, (2) not recognizing a
protected property interest in Mr. Moncla’s prison account, fines, fees, and
interest, (3) basing its opinion on factual errors, (4) dismissing Defendant Sapien,
(5) rejecting a claim of fabrication that was not asserted, (6) dismissing
Defendant Stenseng in his individual capacity, (7) holding that Mr. Moncla lacked
standing to raise a conflict of interest by Defendants’ counsel, and (8) not striking
Defendants’ late response to Mr. Moncla’s motion to strike. Aplt. Br. at 6-24.
Discussion
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo to
determine whether “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, but disputes about immaterial issues of
fact will not preclude summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
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477 U.S. 242, 248 (1977). Essentially, Mr. Moncla disputes whether a urinalysis
occurred, notwithstanding evidence to the contrary, 1 R. 297-98, 300-01, his
complaint stating that he did provide a urine sample to medical personnel, id. at 9,
and his signed retesting agreement, id. at 67. It appears that the real dispute is
over who collected the specimen and the chain of custody. Be that as it may, the
district court’s judgment must be affirmed.
Though Mr. Moncla disputes the adequacy of the second hearing, he was
allowed to call witnesses, present evidence, and obtain a favorable outcome—
dismissal of the charges and return of the $20 fine. See Young v. Hoffman, 970
F.2d 1154, 1156 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Harper v. Lee, 938 F.2d 104, 105
(8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). While we recognize that Mr. Moncla was placed in
disciplinary segregation for 30 days and lost three months of good-time credits,
he lacks a liberty interest regarding either. The segregation does not constitute an
atypical and significant hardship in the prison context–it was imposed for
ostensible violation of prison drug policy, it was determinate (30 days),
apparently not under extreme conditions, and did not increase Mr. Moncla’s
duration of confinement. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995); Estate
of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334, 1342 (10th Cir. 2007). As for
the loss of good time credits, Mr. Moncla was ineligible for such credits given his
conviction for a class A felony. See Kan. Admin. Reg. § 44-6-114(c)(2).
Mr. Moncla also challenges related actions (based upon testing positive,
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rather than after a disciplinary hearing) which changed his classification and
employment status, but he lacks a liberty interest in either. See Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472 (1995); Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1406-07 (10th Cir. 1996).
Mr. Moncla lacks a protectable property interest in a $20 drug retesting
fee, a $3 state court filing fee, or any interest that could have been earned on
these amounts. Nor does he have a protectable property interest in any interest
that could have been earned on the returned fine. The district court incorrectly
assumed that the $20.00 drug retesting fee and the $20.00 disciplinary fine are the
same. Apparently they are not. See Aplee. Br. at 17-18.
Whether Mr. Moncla has a protected property interest in funds removed
from his prison account depends upon whether any deprivation imposes atypical
and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Clark v. Wilson, 625 F.3d 686, 691 (10th Cir. 2010) (adopting Sandin for
property interests in the prison context). We agree with the district court’s
premise that $20.00 expended by Mr. Moncla for retesting does not constitute a
deprivation: Mr. Moncla was informed that he would be required to pay in the
event of a positive test and made a voluntary choice. 1 R. 301. Likewise, the
state-court filing fee for the state district court was not a deprivation. These
expenditures were not part of any sanctions imposed by the prison disciplinary
process.
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Insofar as the $20 disciplinary fee that was later returned and the interest
that might have been earned, we hold that a temporary deprivation (while the
prison administrative process provides due process) does not constitute an
atypical or significant hardship under Sandin. See Webster v. Chevalier, 834 F.
Supp. 628, 630-31 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). Any lost interest on the $20.00 fee is de
minimis. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.21 (1972) (requiring due
process for all but de minimis deprivations).
In light of our disposition, none of the factual mistakes Mr. Moncla claims
the district court made in its order are material to our disposition. The claims
against Defendant Sapien cannot proceed in light of a lack of a protected liberty
interest in Mr. Moncla’s classification or employment status. Mr. Moncla informs
us that he was not asserting a fabrication claim so we need not address his
argument that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting it as a new claim.
As for error in dismissing Mr. Stenseng (for interfering with the disciplinary
appeals process), an inmate lacks a liberty interest in any appeals process; hence
no particular process is due. See Lowe v. Sockey, 36 F. App’x 353, 360 (10th
Cir. 2002) (unpublished). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
holding that Mr. Moncla lacked standing to raise a joint representation issue
(concerning counsel’s sharing a settlement offer to an individual defendant with
the corrections department) and considering a response which was one day late.
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AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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