VanZandt v. Oklahoma Department of Human Services , 276 F. App'x 843 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 5, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
MISTY VANZANDT; S.V., by and
through her mother and next friend,
Misty VanZandt,
No. 06-6377
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. (D.Ct. No. CIV-06-0809-F)
(W. D. Okla.)
OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES, State of
Oklahoma ex rel; JOHN DOE, and
JANE DOE, 1 through 10, whose
identities are not known to the
plaintiffs at this time,
Defendants,
and
HOWARD H. HENDRICK ,
individually and in his official
capacity as the Director of the
Oklahoma Department of Human
Services; MARY WILLIAMS,
individually and in her capacity as a
supervisor at the Sequoyah County
Branch of the DHS; RUBY JAMES,
individually and in her capacity as a
case worker at the Sequoyah County
Branch of the DHS; JOY WALKER,
individually and in her capacity as the
director of the Sequoyah County DHS;
JAN POLASEK, individually and in
her capacity as a case worker at the
Sequoyah County Branch of the DHS,
Defendants - Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER, ** District
Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs-Appellees Misty VanZandt and S.V. are mother and daughter.
S.V. is a four-year-old girl who has allegedly been sexually assaulted many times
in the course of her young life. In an effort to protect her child from these sexual
encounters with various family members, Ms. VanZandt sought protection from
Oklahoma’s Department of Human Services (DHS). Throughout the course of her
dealings with DHS, Ms. VanZandt became angered with what she perceived as a
lack of protection for her daughter. Ultimately, Ms. VanZandt and S.V. fled to
Texas to protect S.V. from her abusers. While Ms. VanZandt and S.V. were
living in Texas, certain Oklahoma DHS employees allegedly made deliberate
misstatements and submitted a false affidavit to procure an arrest warrant for Ms.
VanZandt on felony child abuse charges. Ms. VanZandt was arrested on those
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
The Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, United States District Judge for the
District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
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charges. The charges, however, were later dismissed.
On July 28, 2006, Ms. VanZandt and S.V. filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma against the State of
Oklahoma Department of Human Services, five named employees of DHS in their
individual and official capacities, and ten unnamed individuals. Plaintiffs seek
damages and other relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for alleged violations of their
constitutional rights and pursuant to various state law tort claims. 1
The Oklahoma Department of Human Services and the five named DHS
employees, Howard Hendrick, Mary Williams, Ruby James, Joy Walker and Jan
Polasek filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The DHS Defendants contend the
complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ action is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and that the complaint fails to state a claim for relief. The district
court ruled on Defendants’ motion to dismiss on November 20, 2006. The district
court granted the motion to dismiss in part, and denied the motion in part. The
1
Plaintiffs complaint alleges two claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983. Count One alleges violations of Plaintiffs’ First, Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by Defendants James, Williams, Walker and Polasek. Count
Two alleges Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations by DHS, Hendrick,
Williams and Walker for failing to supervise and train employees under their
control. The complaint alleges two factual bases to support both §1983 counts.
First, the complaint alleges constitutional violations for events which culminated
in the filing of felony child abuse charges against Ms. VanZandt. Second, the
complaint alleges constitutional violations for events related to the care and
custody of S.V.
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court denied the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual
Defendants pertaining to the events which culminated in the filing of felony child
abuse charges against Ms. VanZandt. The district court stated that actionable
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations had been pled by the Plaintiffs, and
as a result, qualified immunity was inappropriate. 2
Defendants Hendrick, Williams, Walker, James and Polasek now appeal the
district court’s partial denial of their motion to dismiss and ask the Court to
consider whether the district court erred in not granting them qualified immunity.
We affirm the district court in part, and reverse in part, and instruct that
Plaintiffs’ claims in Count One, be dismissed as to Defendants Williams, Walker
and Polasek for failure to state a claim.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Scope of the Appeal
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges two claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Count One alleges that Defendants James, Williams, Walker and Polasek
personally violated Plaintiffs’ First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Count Two alleges that Defendants DHS, Hendrick, Williams and Walker failed
to supervise and train employees under their control and thereby violated
Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
2
The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Count One claim for alleged First
Amendment violations.
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Defendants failed to present argument or authority to the Court in their
opening brief concerning Count Two (supervisory liability). This Court has on
several occasions stated “an appellant’s opening brief must identify [his or her]
contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of
the record on which the appellant relies.” Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099,
1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(a)). Considering this
requirement, we have routinely declined to consider arguments that are not raised,
or are inadequately presented in an appellant’s opening brief. Bronson, 500 F.3d
at 1104. Therefore, “the omission of an issue in an opening brief generally
forfeits appellate consideration of that issue.” Id.Defendants-Appellants’ opening brief broadly states the issue as whether
the district court erred in partially denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, which
includes the question of whether they are entitled to qualified immunity. Unlike
Count One, where Defendants-Appellants argue that various comments and
statements made in the course of the investigation do not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation for purposes of qualified immunity, their brief is void of
any argument or reference to supervisor liability. 3 Not one time did Defendants-
3
The district court stated that the complaint “suggests a pattern of
misconduct, and it alleges that the supervisory defendants were deliberate in their
actions because these defendants knew the allegations against Misty VanZandt
‘were false and contrived to protect certain persons in Sequoyah County.’” (ROA
93 (citing complaint ¶25)). The district court stated these allegations were
sufficient in light of Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10th Cir.
(continued...)
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Appellants argue with regard to training or supervision, or that Count Two was
improperly pled. In fact, the only time any briefing can possibly be construed as
referencing supervisory liability is Defendants-Appellants’ reference to the titles
of each individual Defendant. 4 Defendants-Appellants’ meager and cursory
references, without specifying their contentions, and without supporting analysis
and case law, fail to constitute the briefing that is necessary to avoid application
of the forfeiture doctrine. Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1105. Therefore, based on the
Defendants-Appellants’ failure to properly raise the issue of supervisory liability
in their opening brief, we have no choice but to conclude that this issue has been
effectively waived. This discussion will, therefore, proceed only with regard to
Count One of Plaintiffs’ complaint.
B. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo, applying
the same standard used by the district court. Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d
1267, 1270 (10th Cir. 2001). At the time the district court partially denied the
3
(...continued)
1988)(stating that allegations that a sheriff failed to properly supervise his
deputies, that he was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s constitutional rights,
and that at least three of his deputies participated in the assault, were held
sufficient to allege § 1983 claims against the sheriff in his individual capacity for
failure to train and supervise deputies).
4
Appellants’ opening brief describes Howard Hendrick as the state
“Director of DHS” while Mary Williams is referred to as the “Sequoyah County
Director.” (Appellants’ Opening Brief at 3.) The brief gives no supervisory title
to Joy Walker.
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motion to dismiss, many courts, including the district court, embraced a liberal
pleading requirement. This liberal standard held, “a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Accordingly, a complaint
containing only conclusory allegations could withstand a motion to dismiss if
there was a possibility that a fact not stated in the complaint could render the
complaint sufficient. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1246.
The standard for such a motion to dismiss, however, has changed since the
district court’s November 20, 2006 order. In May 2007, the United States
Supreme Court handed down Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, — U.S. —, 127
S.Ct. 1955 (2007). The Twombly case announced a new (or clarified) standard
for motions to dismiss, and stated that a complaint must contain enough factual
allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Robbins, 519
F.3d at 1247 (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). Thus, Twombly rejected the
“no set of facts” standard that had been the motion to dismiss benchmark for
many years. 127 S.Ct. at 1974.
Now, the Plaintiff has the burden to frame a “complaint with enough
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that he or she is entitled to relief.
Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). In order for a
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complaint to satisfy this new standard, a plaintiff must do more than generally
allege a wide swath of conduct. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247. A plaintiff must
allege sufficient facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974).
This Court, in Robbins, stated that plausibility serves two purposes: (1) to
weed out claims that, absent additional pleadings, do not have a reasonable
prospect of success, and (2) to inform the defendants of the actual grounds of the
claim against them. 519 F.3d at 1248. A court, therefore, must review a
complaint with these purposes in mind. Not surprisingly, the Twombly Court is
critical of complaints that do not mention specific times, places or people
involved. Id. (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1971 n.10).
This Court also acknowledged that the degree of specificity necessary to
establish plausibility and fair notice is dependant on the context of the case
involved. Id. To “nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible,” in the context of a case involving qualified immunity, plaintiffs must
allege facts sufficient to show that the defendants violated their constitutional
rights, and that those rights were clearly established at the time. Id. at 1249.
This Court stated, “this requires enough allegations to give the defendants notice
of the theory under which their claim is made.” Id.
Although we apply the same standard in evaluating dismissals in qualified
immunity cases as to dismissals generally, complaints in § 1983 cases against
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individual government actors pose a greater likelihood of failures in notice and
plausibility because they typically include complex claims against multiple
defendants. Id. The Twombly standard has greater “bite” in these contexts,
“reflecting the special interest in resolving the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity ‘at the earliest stage of a litigation.’” Id, (citations omitted). Therefore,
in § 1983 cases, a plaintiff must “make clear exactly who is alleged to have done
what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the
claims against him or her . . . .” Id. at 1250. Of course, neither Twombly nor
Robbins requires, and we do not demand, the sort of specificity required in claims
subject to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
C. Defendant Ruby James
With regard to Ruby James, the complaint states, “[i]n an effort to procure
felony child abuse charges against Misty, defendant James submitted a false
affidavit for use as a statement of ‘probable cause’ to Special District Court Judge
Dennis Sprouse in Sallisaw, Oklahoma on May 5, 2003.” (ROA 16.) The
complaint then recites several alleged fabricated statements that were contained in
the affidavit, and produces corroborating evidence of these statements’ falsity. 5
5
The complaint alleges that Ruby James’ affidavit included the following
deliberate misstatements:
(1) No physical evidence has ever been confirmed on the allegations of
sexual abuse;
(2) No allegations of domestic violence has ever been made to DHS or law
(continued...)
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Finally, the complaint states: “[a]s a result of the false affidavit submitted by
defendant James, Misty VanZandt was charged with felony child abuse.” (ROA
17.)
These allegations are more than sufficient under the Twombly pleading
requirement. First, the complaint gives Ms. James notice that she is the specific
defendant at issue by directly naming her. Second, the complaint alleges specific
actions Ms. James took against Ms. VanZandt. Third, the complaint alleges a
specific date, and purpose for the submission of the false affidavit. Fourth, the
complaint contains a detailed factual basis for why Ms. James’ statements were
indeed false. Finally, the complaint links Ms. James’ actions to the end result,
which was Ms. VanZandt’s arrest. As a result of these detailed factual averments,
the Plaintiff has nudged this claim across the line from conceivable to plausible,
and has provided sufficient notice of who is alleged to have done what to whom.
See id, at 1249-50 (describing the requirements for plausibility and notice
pleading under the Twombly standard).
5
(...continued)
enforcement; and
(3) S.V. has never indicated that the father or grandfather has ever sexually
assaulted her.
The complaint goes on to corroborate the falsity of these statements with names
and dates of doctors who confirmed sexual abuse against S.V. The complaint also
alleges that Ms. VanZandt had reported incidents of domestic abuse to DHS.
Finally, the complaint details counseling sessions where S.V., on two different
occasions to two different counselors, admitted to being sexually abused by
family members, and how both counselors reported these allegations to DHS.
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In addition to notice and plausibility, when a qualified immunity challenge
is made at the motion to dismiss stage, there are two distinct inquiries: (1)
whether the facts, taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, set forth a
constitutional violation; and (2) whether the violation was clearly established at
the time the conduct took place. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
If both of these inquiries can be answered in the affirmative, then the Defendants
are not entitled to qualified immunity. Id.The first question in the present case is whether the alleged intentional or
reckless falsification of an affidavit, submitted for the purpose of producing
probable cause for an arrest warrant is a constitutional violation. The second
question is whether this conduct was clearly established in May 2003. This Court
has clearly spoken to both questions. First, this Court in Pierce v. Gilchrist, held
that knowingly or recklessly falsifying or omitting evidence, for the purpose of
producing information for an arrest warrant, violates a person’s Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights with “obvious clarity.” 359 F.3d 1279, 1285-93,
1300 (10th Cir. 2004). Second, the Pierce Court, in analyzing whether this right
was clearly established stated, “[n]o one could doubt that the prohibition on
falsification or omission of evidence, knowingly or with reckless disregard for the
truth, was firmly established as of 1986, in the context of information supplied to
support a warrant for arrest.” Id. at 1298. As both prongs of the test for
qualified immunity have been clearly satisfied, the district court was correct in
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denying qualified immunity to Ruby James under Count One.
D. Other “Count One” Defendants
The complaint, concerning the other Count One Defendants, however, is
less clear regarding “who is alleged to have done what to whom.” 6 Robbins, 519F.3d at 1250. The complaint only broadly alleges, “[t]he Defendants assigned to
the Sequoyah County office of DHS, mentioned above, and others in concert with
them, made deliberate misstatements which caused the plaintiff Misty VanZandt
to be charged with a felony. . . .” (ROA 17.)
When Plaintiffs use the phrase “the Defendants assigned to the Sequoyah
County office of DHS,” presumably they are referring to Defendants Joy Walker,
Jan Polasek and Mary Williams, as Howard Hendrick is not employed in the
Sequoyah County office and Ruby James has already been separately and
individually named. (ROA 17.) This Court, however, does not need to speculate
as to the identity of the Defendants these allegations are levied against as “the
burden rests on the plaintiffs to provide fair notice of the grounds for the claims
made against each of the defendants.” Id.To carry their burden, plaintiffs under the Twombly standard must do more
than generally use the collective term “defendants.” Id. This Court, in Robbins,
placed great importance on the need for a plaintiff to differentiate between the
6
The other “Count One Defendants” are Mary Williams, Joy Walker and
Jan Polasek.
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actions of each individual defendant and the actions of the group as a whole. 7 Id.This is because the purposes of plausibility, notice and gatekeeping, are best
served by requiring plaintiffs to directly link an actual individual with the alleged
improper conduct. When a plaintiff “fails to isolate the allegedly unconstitutional
acts of each defendant,” adequate notice is not provided to each defendant. Id.In the present case, Plaintiffs, with respect to the “other Count One
Defendants,” failed to meet the minimal pleading requirements of notice and
plausibility. By stating “the defendants assigned to the Sequoyah County office”
Plaintiffs fail to individualize each Defendant’s alleged misconduct from the
Defendants as a collective group. As multiple governmental actors are involved
in this §1983 action, notice and plausibility are best served by specifically stating
“who is alleged to have done what to whom.” See id. Because Plaintiffs have
failed to meet these minimal notice pleading requirements, further analysis of
qualified immunity and plausibility is not needed. As such, the district court
erred in not granting qualified immunity to Defendants Joy Walker, Mary
Williams, and Jan Polasek under Count One of the complaint.
7
The Robbins Court cited Attuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F.App’x 33, 34
(2d Cir., 2001) (unpublished); Medina v. Bauer, 2004 WL 136636, *6 (S.D.N.Y.,
Jan. 27, 2004) (unpublished); and Lane v. Capital Acquisitions and Mgmt. Co.,
2006 WL 4590705, *5 (S.D. Fla., April 14, 2006) (unpublished) in support of its
proposition that failing to differentiate among the defendants is proper grounds to
dismiss a complaint for failing to provide fair notice under Rule 8. Robbins, 519
F. 3d at 1250.
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III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons the district court’s partial denial of qualified immunity is
AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED in part, and we REMAND with
instructions to dismiss Count One of the complaint as to Mary Williams, Joy
Walker and Jan Polasek, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted.
Entered by the Court:
CLARENCE A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
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