United States v. Creighton , 277 F. App'x 796 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 8, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff- Appellant, No. 07-1351
v. (D. Colorado)
RONALD RICHARD CREIGHTON, (D.C. No. 06-CR-372-WDM-1)
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, McKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
I. Introduction
Defendant-Appellee Ronald Richard Creighton was charged in a multi-
count indictment with crimes related to a fraud scheme involving mail and
identity theft. Creighton filed a motion seeking to suppress evidence obtained
from four unrelated searches. The only search relevant to this appeal took place
after Creighton was arrested at the home of a co-defendant, Melissa Bowery, who
initially accused him of holding her in the home against her will. The district
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
court granted Creighton’s motion as to the evidence obtained as a result of that
arrest. Applying the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the court
concluded the Government failed to show Creighton’s continued detention was
justified by probable cause. The Government brought this appeal, challenging the
district court’s probable cause determination. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3731, we reverse the district court’s grant of Creighton’s suppression
motion.
II. Background
On July 11, 2006, Creighton was arrested at a home located in Aurora,
Colorado. We agree with the district court that the record contains very little
explanation of what occurred prior to and during the encounter between Creighton
and the police at the Aurora residence. 1 A portion of that relevant evidence is the
testimony of Kenneth Giger, a detective with the Aurora Police Department who
testified at the suppression hearing. Detective Giger received information on July
11, 2006, that a woman named Melissa Bowery had advised police she and her
mother, Linda Bowery, were being held against their will in their home located on
1
The Government argues Creighton’s Supplemental Appendix should be
stricken because it is comprised of documents that were never admitted into
evidence during the suppression hearing. Although these documents provide a
more comprehensive picture of the arrest and detention of Creighton, we agree
with the Government that they are not properly before this court and, thus, grant
the Government’s motion to strike. See United States v. Kennedy, 225 F.3d 1187,
1191 (10th Cir. 2000).
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Granby Way in Aurora. Bowery also asserted that the suspect, later identified as
defendant Creighton, had forced her to make and pass fraudulent checks to satisfy
a drug debt owed by her husband. Bowery told police that Creighton had a
firearm and kept it near him at all times. He had shown the gun to Bowery but
never pointed it at her, although he had threatened to harm her husband.
Officers were dispatched to the Granby Way address and they succeeded in
removing Bowery’s mother from the home. Creighton was then ordered to exit
the residence and he complied, after being warned that the officers would send in
a trained police dog if he did not accede. Creighton was handcuffed and placed in
a patrol car.
When Detective Giger arrived at the Granby Way address, he was met by
Detective Mike Thomas and they discussed an interview Thomas had conducted
with Bowery. During the interview, Bowery repeated her story that Creighton
had been holding her against her will in the Granby Way home for several days.
Bowery indicated she escaped by telling Creighton she had to attend a custody
hearing. Creighton told her to return within three hours or he would harm her
mother. Bowery left the house and notified the Denver Police Department of the
situation.
Giger and Thomas then took Creighton out of the patrol car and Mirandized
him. Creighton waived his Miranda rights and agreed to be interviewed.
Creighton told Giger he had been invited to stay in the home by Bowery and,
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while there, had made false identification cards and checks for Bowery and a false
identification card for himself. Creighton claimed that Bowery had voluntarily
passed five or six of the checks. Creighton also told Giger he owned a Toshiba
laptop computer but he made the checks using a removable disk and a Dell laptop
computer owned by a man named Duane whom he had not seen in several weeks.
Creighton was taken into the Granby Way residence and asked to identify
his property. Among that property was a checkbook with checks bearing the
name of Carl Tanner together with an identification card for Carl Tanner.
Creighton’s photograph was on the Tanner identification card. Creighton signed a
consent form related to his property located inside the residence, including two
backpacks, five suitcases, a messenger bag, a keyboard box, two plastic trays, and
a plastic bag. Creighton later signed a second consent form authorizing the
search of his laptop and computer media.
Creighton was transported to the Aurora City Jail. Giger then interviewed
Bowery who repeated her assertion that Creighton had provided her with a false
identification card and checks. She also told Giger that Creighton had cashed
several fraudulent checks. Bowery reiterated her allegation that Creighton held
her against her will as collateral on a drug debt owed by her husband and she
stated she cashed the checks to protect her husband. Giger, however, testified
that Linda Bowery told the officers she had not been threatened by Creighton or
held against her will. He admitted during redirect examination that Bowery’s
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story and her allegations of false imprisonment and extortion were “quickly
falling apart” even before Creighton was transported to jail.
Creighton was charged in a multi-count indictment with numerous federal
offenses. Three of the charges arose from the Granby Way incident on July 11:
possession of stolen mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708; possession of
implements to make counterfeit documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028(a)(5); and unlawful possession of the identification of another person, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Bowery was charged in the same indictment with
possessing implements to make counterfeit documents and unlawfully possessing
another person’s identification documents. Creighton moved to suppress the
evidence obtained following his arrest at the Granby Way residence. 2 The district
court held an evidentiary hearing at which Detective Giger testified. The court
granted the motion as to the July 11 search and the Government filed this
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731.
III. Discussion
When reviewing the grant of a motion to suppress, this court examines the
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and accepts the district
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v.
2
In his motion Creighton also sought to suppress evidence obtain during
three additional searches. The district court’s ruling on those searches is not
relevant to this appeal.
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Nielson, 415 F.3d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). The determination of whether a
Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, however, is reviewed de novo. United
States v. Oliver, 363 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 2004).
In his motion to dismiss, Creighton argued that his detention and the search
of his property were unlawful because the officers knew or should have known
that Bowery’s false imprisonment story was untrue. He stated in his brief to the
district court: “Certainly, if the police wished to inquire of Mr. Creighton
concerned [sic] non-related crimes, they could have done so, but not by detaining
him for a crime they knew had not occurred.” After the suppression hearing, both
Creighton and the Government filed post-hearing briefs. In his brief, Creighton
argued his detention was not supported by probable cause, reasonable suspicion,
or exigent circumstances. In its post-hearing brief, the Government relied on
Terry v. Ohio for its argument that Creighton voluntary exited the Aurora
residence and was properly detained while police investigated Bowery’s
allegations.
The district court granted Creighton’s motion, concluding the “initial
detention Terry stop” was proper but that Creighton’s arrest and continued
detention were not supported by probable cause and, thus, were in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Terry, 392 U.S. at 18 (“[A] search which is reasonable at its
inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity
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and scope.”). The Government appealed, challenging the district court’s probable
cause determination.
Although the use of the Terry paradigm is debatable, Creighton has not
challenged the district court’s conclusion that his removal from the residence and
initial detention were appropriate. 3 Instead, like the Government, Creighton
confines his arguments to the issue of whether the officers had probable cause to
arrest and detain him once the initial Terry investigatory detention ended. See
United States v. Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“[A]rrests, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures[, are] reasonable
only if supported by probable cause.” (quotation omitted)); United States v.
Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that a police-citizen
encounter that begins as a Terry investigatory detention supported by reasonable
articulable suspicion may escalate into a “full-blown arrest”).
3
In light of Giger’s testimony that officers threatened to send a police dog
into the Aurora residence if Creighton did not exit, it would appear that
Creighton’s seizure should be analyzed under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573(1980). See United States v. Reeves, No. 07-8028, ---- F.3d ---- (10th Cir. May 7,
2008). Because the issue was not presented to the district court, however, there
are no factual findings relevant to the question of whether Bowery voluntarily
gave the officers consent to enter her residence. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph,
547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (“The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid
warrantless entry and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary consent
of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over the
area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence so
obtained.”); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-72 (1974).
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The question of whether officers had probable cause to arrest an individual
is a legal issue reviewed de novo. United States v. Zamudio-Carrillo, 499 F.3d
1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007). “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and
circumstances within the officers’ knowledge, and of which they have reasonably
trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”
Id. (quotation omitted). It is based on the collective knowledge of all officers
involved in the investigation and is measured against an objective standard of
reasonableness. Id.The crux of Creighton’s argument is that Bowery’s statements were not
reasonably trustworthy and, thus, they did not provide probable cause to support
Creighton’s arrest or continued detention. The Government argues the officers
reasonably relied on Bowery’s statements because they were objectively reliable
and because some of the statements were corroborated by Creighton himself. We
believe the Government has the better argument.
Giger’s uncontroverted testimony indicates that Bowery initially told police
she and her mother were being held against their will in her home. She also
claimed Creighton had forced her to pass fraudulent checks— an admission of
criminal conduct on her part. “Admissions of crime, like admissions against
proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility—sufficient at least to
support a finding of probable cause . . . .” United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573,
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583 (1971). Nothing in the appellate record indicates the officers had any basis
upon which to disbelieve either the false imprisonment or criminal fraud elements
of Bowery’s story at the time the officers surrounded the Granby Way residence.
See Eason v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting that
“the skepticism and careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants”
is “relaxed if the informant is an identified victim”); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search & Seizure § 3.4(a) (4th ed. 2004) (stating the prevailing view that
information given to police by a individual purporting to be victim of a crime
“carries with it indicia of reliability” (quotation omitted)). Under the
circumstances, Bowery’s statements gave police probable cause to believe
Creighton had committed the crime of false imprisonment, criminal fraud, or
both.
After Linda Bowery exited the house, however, she told the officers she
had not been threatened by Creighton. “If the police learn information that
destroys their probable cause to arrest a defendant, the arrest may become
illegal.” United States v. Edwards, 242 F.3d 928, 934 (10th Cir. 2001). While
Linda Bowery’s statement may have affected probable cause relating to the false
imprisonment claims, it did nothing to dissipate probable cause that Creighton
was involved in criminal fraud activities. On this record, we conclude Bowery’s
statements, which included statements against her own penal interest, gave the
officers probable cause to believe Creighton had committed a criminal fraud
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offense at the time he was handcuffed and placed in the police car. His arrest was
valid and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Further, during his subsequent
interview with Giger, Creighton quickly admitted he had created false
identification cards and checks for himself and Bowery. Thus, his continued
detention was clearly supported by probable cause and based on his own
admissions corroborating Bowery’s statements relating to the criminal fraud
activity.
After his arrest, Creighton waived his Miranda rights and gave written
consent to the search of his property. He has never asserted that his statements or
the consent were coerced or involuntarily. Thus, because the search was not
preceded by a Fourth Amendment violation, there is no basis upon which the
evidence obtained after his valid arrest should be suppressed. See United States
v. Davis, 197 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[Defendant’s] arrest was
supported by probable cause and therefore could not ‘taint’ his consent to the
search of his bedroom.”).
IV. Conclusion
Based on our review of the record, we conclude the district court erred
when it determined the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Creighton.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of Creighton’s motion to
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suppress the evidence obtained as a result of his arrest on July 11, 2006, and
remand to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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