Lara-Mijares v. Mukasey , 278 F. App'x 814 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 20, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
BERTHA ALICIA LARA-MIJARES,
Petitioner,
v. No. 07-9515
(Petition for Review)
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, United
States Attorney General,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, PORFILIO, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Bertha Alicia Lara-Mijares is a native and citizen of Mexico. An
immigration judge (IJ) granted her cancellation of removal. The government
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which determined that she
was not eligible for cancellation, vacated the IJ’s decision, and ordered her
removed to Mexico. She filed a combined motion to reopen and to reconsider,
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
which the BIA denied. She then filed the present petition for review, which we
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
B ACKGROUND
In August 2002, an investigation by immigration officials into a complaint
by a United States citizen that someone in Colorado was using the citizen’s name,
date of birth, and social security number, led to Ms. Lara-Mijares. She was
served a notice to appear before an IJ and charged with removability under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) 1 because she had entered the United States without
being inspected or admitted by an Immigration Officer. Represented by counsel
at the hearing, she conceded removability but requested cancellation of removal
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). To be eligible for a discretionary grant of
cancellation under that provision, an alien must establish four elements:
(1) physical presence in the United States for a continuous period of not less than
ten years; (2) good moral character during that time; (3) no convictions for certain
enumerated offenses; and (4) “that removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a United
States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Id.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(A)-(D).
1
The statute provides: “An alien present in the United States without being
admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other
than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
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Ms. Lara-Mijares testified that she entered the United States in 1991 and
obtained a birth certificate and social security card in the name of the
complaining citizen in 1993. She used those documents to obtain a Colorado
identification card, employment, college courses, car insurance, emergency
medical services, and telephone service. She also presented evidence regarding
the hardship that her two U.S.-citizen daughters would face if she was removed to
Mexico.
The IJ determined that Ms. Lara-Mijares established all four statutory
elements and granted her application for cancellation. Only the second and fourth
elements of the statute are relevant to this appeal. As to the second element, the
IJ found that despite Ms. Lara-Mijares’s procurement and use of fraudulent
identification documents, she did not intend “to willfully misrepresent anything.”
Admin. R. at 119. Therefore, the IJ concluded, she was of good moral character.
Concerning the fourth element, the IJ concluded that removal to Mexico would
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for Ms. Lara-Mijares’s elder
daughter, who was then ten years old and an exceptional student, based on his
finding that there were diminished educational and health care opportunities for
her in Mexico. 2
2
Ms. Lara-Mijares’s other daughter was an infant at the time, and the IJ
concluded that her mother’s removal would not be problematic for her. That
determination is not at issue here.
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The government successfully appealed to the BIA. In a decision issued on
October 27, 2006, the BIA concluded that Ms. Lara-Mijares was not eligible for
cancellation. As to the moral-character element, the BIA concluded that the IJ’s
statement that Ms. Lara-Mijares did not intend to willfully misrepresent anything
was clearly erroneous because it was plainly contradicted by her own testimony
that she had engaged in a string of dishonest acts involving her identity.
As an independent ground for its decision, the BIA concluded that
Ms. Lara-Mijares had not established that removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship because her older daughter would not “be deprived of
all schooling or of an opportunity to obtain any education.” Admin. R. at 49
(quotation omitted). The BIA therefore vacated the IJ’s decision and ordered
Ms. Lara-Mijares’s removal to Mexico.
Ms. Lara-Mijares obtained new counsel and filed a combined motion to
reopen and to reconsider, which the BIA denied on March 9, 2007. Although a
motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider are often filed as a combined motion,
they are distinct motions with different purposes and requirements, and we
examine them as such. A motion to reopen seeks to present evidence that “is
material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at
the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B).
A motion to reconsider is available to raise “errors of fact or law” in the BIA’s
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prior decision and must be supported by “pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(b)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C).
In the motion to reopen, Ms. Lara-Mijares asked the BIA to consider
additional evidence of her older daughter’s academic achievements that
post-dated the hearing before the IJ. The BIA refused to reopen the matter on the
ground that the new evidence was similar in character to evidence previously
considered and therefore unlikely to change the hardship determination. In the
motion for reconsideration, Ms. Lara-Mijares asked the BIA to reconsider its
determination that she lacked good moral character because the BIA had
erroneously reviewed the IJ’s findings de novo and had made credibility
determinations without giving her notice and a chance to respond. The BIA found
“no basis to reconsider” its moral-character determination, stating that her
admissions concerning the use of fraudulent documents supported its conclusion
that she had not established good moral character during the statutory ten-year
time period. Admin. R. at 2. Ms. Lara-Mijares then filed a petition for review
with this court on April 2, 2007.
D ISCUSSION
We read the petition for review as raising four issues: (1) a due process
argument that the matter should be remanded to the immigration court to address
over 160 indications of “indiscernible” testimony in the hearing transcript; (2) a
challenge to the BIA’s standard of review and alleged credibility determinations
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on both the moral-character inquiry and the hardship issue; (3) whether the BIA
properly adjudicated the combined motion to reopen and to reconsider; and
(4) whether the BIA improperly relied on documents that were not in evidence
before the IJ. The government contends that we lack jurisdiction over most of
these issues and that, in any event, they all lack merit. Exercising “jurisdiction to
determine our jurisdiction,” Schroeck v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 947, 950 (10th Cir.
2005), and mindful of our independent obligation to examine our jurisdiction,
Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 981 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005), we
conclude that we lack jurisdiction over all of the issues raised in the petition. Our
analysis involves several jurisdictional bars, which we address in the most
convenient order. D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1229
(10th Cir. 2004).
A. Timely petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional
In her opening brief, Ms. Lara-Mijares states that she appeals both the
BIA’s underlying removal order and its order denying her combined motion to
reopen and to reconsider. Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 10. But a “petition for review
must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). And “a timely petition for review is mandatory and
jurisdictional.” Nahatchevska v. Ashcroft, 317 F.3d 1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 2003)
(per curiam) (quotation omitted). Ms. Lara-Mijares’s petition for review was
filed on April 2, 2007, which was more than thirty days after the BIA issued the
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underlying order of removal on October 27, 2006. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction
to review the removal order. The petition is timely as to the BIA’s order denying
the motion to reopen and to reconsider, which is a separately reviewable, final
order as to each motion. See Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1361 (10th Cir.
2004) (order denying motion to reopen); Desta v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1179, 1183
(10th Cir. 2003) (order denying motion to reconsider). However, there are other
jurisdictional problems with respect to the BIA’s second order.
B. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is jurisdictional
A second jurisdictional problem with Ms. Lara-Mijares’s petition for
review is her failure to exhaust certain issues. This court has jurisdiction only
when an “alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as
of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). We examine exhaustion on an issue-by-issue
basis. See Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1118-22 (10th Cir. 2007). An
issue is exhausted if the alien raised it before the BIA, id. at 1121, or if the BIA
“issues a full explanatory opinion or a discernible substantive discussion on the
merits” of an issue the alien did not present, id. at 1122. The exhaustion
requirement extends to issues that were not presented in a direct appeal to the
BIA but could have been raised in a motion to reopen or to reconsider, id., and to
constitutional due-process objections that involve administratively correctable
procedural errors, Akinwunmi v. INS, 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 (10th Cir. 1999)
(per curiam).
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Acknowledging that she did not present her first issue, regarding
“indiscernible” testimony in the transcript, to the BIA when the government
appealed the IJ’s decision, Ms. Lara-Mijares postulates that her prior attorney saw
no need to raise the issue because she had prevailed before the IJ. Assuming,
without deciding, that this theory has merit, it overlooks the fact that she could
have, and therefore should have, presented the issue in her motion to reopen and
to reconsider, which was filed by present counsel. See Sidabutar, 503 F.3d
at 1122. Therefore, because Ms. Lara-Mijares did not exhaust her administrative
remedies as to this issue, we lack jurisdiction to consider it. See Sidabutar,
503 F.3d at 1122.
We reach the same conclusion with respect to Ms. Lara-Mijares’s fourth
issue, that the BIA relied on documents that were not part of the record when it
issued the underlying removal order. As this issue arose as a result of the
underlying order and was not discussed therein, the only opportunity for
Ms. Lara-Mijares to raise it was in a post-decision motion. Since she did not do
so, the issue is unexhausted, and we lack jurisdiction to consider it. See id.Ms. Lara-Mijares presented the second issue, regarding the BIA’s standard
of review and alleged credibility determinations, in her request for
reconsideration of the BIA’s decision on the moral-character element of
cancellation. However, she did not raise this issue with respect to the hardship
determination, and the BIA did not address it. We therefore conclude that the
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second issue is exhausted as to the moral-character element but not with respect
to hardship. We also consider exhausted the third issue, which asserts that the
BIA should have reopened the case to consider additional evidence of hardship
and that the BIA failed to rule on the motion to reconsider its moral-character
determination, because there is no further administrative remedy available: An
alien may not file a motion to reconsider the denial of a previous motion to
reconsider, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), and is limited to one motion to reopen
removal proceedings, subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, id.§ 1003.2(c)(2).
C. Jurisdiction over denial of motion to reopen
Having established that Ms. Lara-Mijares exhausted her administrative
remedies with respect to part of the second issue and all of the third issue, we
next consider our jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to reopen, since
the answer to that question is dispositive of all the exhausted issues.
Whether or not we have jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to
reopen requires us to consider our jurisdiction over the underlying order.
Infanzon, 386 F.3d at 1361. When Congress has explicitly withdrawn jurisdiction
to review the underlying order, we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of a
subsequent motion to reopen, at least where, as here, the motion to reopen is
denied on essentially the same unreviewable merits ground as the underlying
order. See id. at 1362 (citing Sarmadi v. INS, 121 F.3d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir.
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1997), concerning explicit withdrawal of jurisdiction); see also Fernandez v.
Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that there is no jurisdiction
“to review the denial of a motion to reopen that pertains only to the merits basis
for a previously-made discretionary determination under one of the enumerated
provisions [of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), namely], 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h), 1182(i),
1229b, 1229c, and 1255”).
The BIA’s underlying denial of Ms. Lara-Mijares’s application for
cancellation was on the merits and made under one of the provisions enumerated
in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), namely, § 1229b. In denying the motion to reopen, the BIA
reasoned that the additional documentation of the educational achievements of
Ms. Lara-Mijares’s elder daughter was unlikely to change its conclusion that
Ms. Lara-Mijares had not demonstrated exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship. Although not explicitly stated in the BIA’s order, we view this as a
denial on the same ground as the underlying denial of cancellation—that the
additional documentation did not aid Ms. Lara-Mijares in establishing prima facie
eligibility for cancellation. See Mickeviciute v. INS, 327 F.3d 1159, 1162
(10th Cir. 2003) (explaining that one ground on which the BIA may properly
deny a motion to reopen is “that the movant has not established a prima facie case
for the underlying substantive relief sought” (quotation omitted)). The BIA’s
underlying determination that Ms. Lara-Mijares failed to establish that removal
would cause the requisite hardship is a determination that involves the exercise of
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discretion and is therefore unreviewable. See Sabido Valdivia v. Gonzales,
423 F.3d 1144, 1148 (10th Cir. 2005). Because the denial of the motion to reopen
pertained only to the merits of a determination that involved the exercise of
discretion, we lack jurisdiction to review it.
D. Exhausted challenges to denial of motion to reconsider are moot
As stated earlier, an alien must establish four elements under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b) in order to be eligible for cancellation of removal. Thus, failure to
establish one element precludes eligibility. The BIA determined that
Ms. Lara-Mijares could not establish two of those elements, exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship or good moral character. Since we lack jurisdiction
to consider any of Ms. Lara-Mijares’s arguments concerning the hardship
determination, whether or not the BIA erred in denying the motion to reconsider
its moral-character determination is moot, and we lack jurisdiction to consider the
exhausted issues that pertain to the denial of the motion to reconsider. See
Morales Ventura v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1259, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 2003).
The petition for review is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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