Rojo v. IBP, Inc. ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 27, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
ALMA ROSE ROJO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-3089
(D.C. No. 02-CV-4112-JAR)
IBP, INC., (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, PORFILIO, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Alma Rose Rojo sued her former employer, IBP, Inc., alleging a
claim of workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge under Kansas law. IBP
filed a counterclaim, alleging that Ms. Rojo’s claim was barred by a prior
settlement. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment to IBP based
on the prior settlement. In a prior appeal, we determined that the district court
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
erred in this regard. See Rojo v. IBP, Inc., No. 03-3300, 2005 WL 2697253(10th Cir. Oct. 21, 2005) (unpublished). On remand, the district court again
granted summary judgment in favor of IBP, reasoning that although Ms. Rojo had
established a prima facie case of retaliation, she failed to show that IBP’s
proffered reasons for her termination were a pretext for retaliation. Ms. Rojo
appeals, and we affirm.
Summary of the Evidence
The district court thoroughly reviewed the evidence; we briefly summarize
it here. Ms. Rojo began working for IBP on August 7, 1989. She contends that
IBP fired her on July 14, 2000, in retaliation for exercising her rights under the
Kansas Workers’ Compensation Act by filing a workers’ compensation claim
after she injured her thumb at work on March 23, 2000.
Ms. Rojo alleges that IBP retaliated against her after her injury in March
2000 by not giving her vacation time for the period she requested. Her
supervisor, Patsy Soto, explained that Ms. Rojo’s request was denied because her
vacation time did not accrue until her anniversary date in August, but she asked
for time off in June. Nevertheless, she was allowed a leave of absence in June
2000 so she could be on vacation at the same time as her husband, who also
worked for IBP.
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Ms. Rojo also alleges that IBP retaliated against her after her injury in
March 2000 by harassing her at work. When she was released for regular work
on March 30, she was not assigned to her regular job, but was assigned instead to
the “picking belts,” conveyor belts that carry product to a storage bin. She argues
that IBP’s timing in assigning her to the picking belts is circumstantial evidence
of retaliation because that job, in her view, was tougher than her regular job, and
Ms. Soto was “standing right there” and expected her “to get everything out of
that belt, everything.” Aplt. App., Vol. 1, at 137 (Rojo Depo. at 98:6-11).
Ms. Rojo admitted in her deposition, however, that she was uncertain whether her
assignment to the picking belts “had anything to do with [her] workers’
compensation claim[.]” Id. at 136 (Rojo Depo. at 95:9-11). She said: “Maybe it
did, maybe it didn’t. I don’t know.” Id. (Rojo Depo. at 95:20-21).
Ms. Rojo contends that Ms. Soto made a practice of mistreating injured
employees who had filed workers’ compensation claims. On July 14, 2000
(Ms. Rojo’s last day of work), Ms. Soto pulled Ms. Rojo off the line and wrote
her up for not removing items that should have been removed from the conveyor
belt. Ms. Rojo responded that the removal of some of those items should have
been the responsibility of other employees. Ms. Soto took Ms. Rojo to talk to the
personnel manager, Doug Bolton. Ms. Soto said that Ms. Rojo was very angry,
but Ms. Rojo denies that she cursed, as claimed by Mr. Bolton. He told Ms. Rojo
to go home—she thought she was just being sent home for the rest of the day to
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cool off. Mr. Bolton said that she was suspended for insubordination, but not
fired. Before leaving the plant, Ms. Rojo requested information about her
retirement benefits and filled out a form requesting them. She also turned in her
equipment.
Ms. Rojo testified that when she attempted to go back to work the next day,
July 15, Mr. Bolton told her to leave or he would call security. Mr. Bolton
testified that she returned on July 17, saying that she wanted to return to work so
she could earn vacation pay which would accrue on August 7, 2000. Mr. Bolton
kept her on the payroll until August 8 for this reason, but she did not return to
work.
Ms. Rojo admitted in her deposition that she filed this lawsuit because she
was disappointed with the settlement she received from her workers’
compensation claim, and she wanted to get more money to pay medical and legal
bills. Id. at 154-55 (Rojo Depo. at 166:15-170:21).
District Court’s Order
At the outset, the district court noted that Ms. Rojo did not offer additional
material facts in separately numbered paragraphs to controvert IBP’s facts, as
required by the district court’s local rules. Id., Vol. 2, at 314. The court
described her pleadings as “disjointed narrative.” Id. After its own extensive
review of the evidence, the court concluded that there were “shortcomings in the
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quality of [Ms. Rojo’s] proof and arguments that suggest sufficient doubt about
[her] ability to prove a prima facie case with respect to both termination and
causation.” Id. at 329-30. But because her burden to establish a prima facie case
was not “onerous[,]” id. at 330 (quotation omitted), the court assumed for the
purposes of IBP’s summary judgment motion that she was terminated, concluded
that she had “established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge,” and moved
on to the question of whether she had shown that IBP’s proffered reasons for its
actions were a pretext for retaliation, see id. The court then concluded that there
was “simply no evidence before the Court suggesting that IBP suspended or
terminated plaintiff because she filed a worker’s compensation claim.” Id. at 332.
The court noted that the four-month gap between Ms. Rojo’s injury and her
termination did not support her argument that there was a causal connection
between them. See id. The court concluded that Ms. Rojo had “not met her
burden to show a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant’s actions were
pretextual[,]” and granted summary judgment to IBP. Id. at 333.
Discussion
“We review the grant of a summary judgment motion de novo.” Fye v.
Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1222 (10th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment
is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file,
and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
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that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
“We view all evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fye, 516 F.3d at 1223. The district court set
out the “burden-shifting analysis” applicable to a claim of workers’ compensation
retaliatory discharge under Kansas law, see Aplt. App., Vol. 2, at 325-26
(quotation omitted), and we need not repeat that discussion here.
Ms. Rojo contends that there are issues of material fact regarding pretext.
She argues that she is not required to provide direct evidence of retaliation or
“clear and convincing evidence” at the summary judgment stage. Aplt. Reply Br.
at 3. She relies on circumstantial evidence—the chronology of events following
her workers’ compensation claim (oppressive supervision, harassment, and
write-up on July 14, 2000), and evidence showing that the reasons given by IBP
for her termination evolved over time.
Contrary to Ms. Rojo’s assertion, the district court applied the correct legal
standard for assessing a claim of retaliatory discharge under Kansas law. See
Aplt. App., Vol. 2, at 331-32. The court correctly stated that Ms. Rojo had “the
burden of proving her claim by a preponderance of the evidence that is clear and
convincing in nature.” Id. at 325 (quotation omitted). The court acknowledged
that “retaliatory discharge cases typically rely on circumstantial evidence, not
direct evidence, to prove the employer’s unlawful intent[.]” Id. And the court
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left no doubt that it was the quality, not the quantity, of Ms. Rojo’s proof that
must be clear and convincing. Id. at 331.
Under this legal standard, we reach the same conclusion as the district
court: Ms. Rojo has offered little in the way of evidence. Rather, she offers
much speculation regarding the reason for her discharge. See id. at 332. Her
repeated references to other retaliatory discharge cases where IBP was found to
have retaliated against other employees are not relevant to this case and whether
IBP retaliated against Ms. Rojo. We have carefully reviewed the record and
conclude that the district court’s conclusions are both factually and legally
supported.
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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