United States v. Norcutt , 282 F. App'x 723 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                 FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    June 24, 2008
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                  Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                No. 07-8088
    (D. Ct. No. 07-CR-90-WFD)
    RAYMOND NORCUTT, JR.,                                        (D. Wyo.)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    Before TACHA, KELLY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has
    determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the
    determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
    case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Defendant-Appellant Raymond Norcutt appeals the district court’s denial of his
    motion to withdraw his guilty plea. His appointed counsel has filed a brief and motion to
    withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744 (1967). We have reviewed
    the record and conclude that no meritorious appellate issues exist. Accordingly, we
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
    law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
    persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    GRANT the motion to withdraw and DISMISS Mr. Norcutt’s appeal.
    I. BACKGROUND
    After he sold seven grams of methamphetamine and a semiautomatic pistol to an
    undercover police officer while being audio-recorded, Mr. Norcutt was indicted in March
    2007 on two counts of distributing methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1); one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of
    a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(i); and one count of
    unlawful possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (k). Thereafter, a conflict arose between Mr. Norcutt and his appointed
    counsel, so new counsel was appointed to represent him. That attorney negotiated a plea
    agreement with the government pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), and Mr. Norcutt
    signed it on July 2.
    Under the terms of the plea agreement, Mr. Norcutt agreed to plead guilty to three
    of the five counts in the indictment, acknowledged his waiver of specified constitutional
    rights, further acknowledged that he was aware of the charges against him and the
    minimum and maximum penalties that could be imposed, agreed that there were no
    circumstances that would entitle him to withdraw his plea, and promised to cooperate
    with the government. Additionally, the parties agreed that the district court could not
    sentence Mr. Norcutt to more than 151 months’ imprisonment, but that Mr. Norcutt could
    ask for a lesser sentence. The government agreed to dismiss two of the five counts in the
    -2-
    indictment and to seek a reduction of three offense levels for acceptance of responsibility
    under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b). At the change-of-plea hearing the following week, the
    district court determined that Mr. Norcutt’s plea was knowing and voluntary and accepted
    it.
    Prior to sentencing, in September 2007, Mr. Norcutt filed a pro se motion for
    substitution of counsel. In October, he filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea and
    another pro se motion to suppress all evidence in the case. At the sentencing hearing in
    January 2008, the district court denied the motions and sentenced Mr. Norcutt to 84
    months’ imprisonment. Mr. Norcutt’s trial counsel was permitted to withdraw, and new
    counsel was appointed to assist Mr. Norcutt on appeal. That counsel filed a timely notice
    of appeal and submitted an Anders brief on the issue of whether Mr. Norcutt should be
    permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.
    II. DISCUSSION
    We review the district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an
    abuse of discretion. United States v. Hamilton, 
    510 F.3d 1209
    , 1213 (10th Cir. 2007).
    Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B), a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea prior to
    sentencing “if the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the
    withdrawal.” The defendant bears the burden to establish a fair and just reason. 
    Id. at 1214
    . In determining whether the defendant has met his burden, we consider “(1)
    whether the defendant has asserted his innocence, (2) prejudice to the government, (3)
    delay in filing defendant’s motion, (4) inconvenience to the court, (5) defendant’s
    -3-
    assistance of counsel, (6) whether the plea is knowing and voluntary, and (7) waste of
    judicial resources.” United States v. Gordon, 
    4 F.3d 1567
    , 1572 (10th Cir. 1993).
    A.     Assertion of Innocence
    At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Norcutt stated that he did not commit the offenses
    to which he pleaded guilty. We also construe Mr. Norcutt’s pro se motion to suppress as
    an assertion of his innocence. See Hamilton, 
    510 F.3d at 1214
     (explaining that a
    defendant may satisfy the assertion-of-innocence factor by claiming he is legally
    innocent). In that motion, Mr. Norcutt argued that the recorded communications that
    captured the sale of methamphetamine and the firearm to the undercover officer violated
    his Fourth Amendment rights by failing to obtain proper authorization to intercept his
    wire or oral communications as required by 
    18 U.S.C. § 2518
    .
    “[A]lthough the assertion of legal innocence may satisfy this factor in some
    instances, the mere assertion of a legal defense is insufficient; the defendant must present
    a credible claim of legal innocence.” 
    Id.
     Put another way, the defendant must set forth
    facts that would support a legally cognizable defense. 
    Id.
     No such facts exist here. Mr.
    Hamilton’s contention that 
    18 U.S.C. § 2518
     provides a basis for suppressing the
    recording of the sale is factually unsupportable because that statute governs interceptions
    of communications. In this case, however, there was no intercepted communication; the
    undercover officer simply recorded the conversation he personally had with Mr. Norcutt.
    Mr. Norcutt also contends that he has an entrapment defense. Mr. Norcutt does
    not explain, however, the facts that would support any such defense. We have also
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    thoroughly reviewed the entire record and have located nothing that would support an
    entrapment defense. Similarly, Mr. Norcutt did not explain the basis for his assertion of
    innocence during the sentencing hearing. Therefore, we conclude that he has not satisfied
    this factor.
    B.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    “Ineffective-assistance claims should generally be brought in collateral
    proceedings, rather than on direct appeal, so that a factual record enabling effective
    appellate review may be developed in the district court.” Hamilton, 
    510 F.3d at 1213
    . As
    this issue was not fully developed below, there is no reason to depart from this general
    rule in this case. Therefore, we do not consider Mr. Norcutt’s claim that he pleaded
    guilty based on ineffective representation.
    C.     Knowing and Voluntary Plea
    Mr. Norcutt contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because
    his attorney informed him that he could withdraw the plea at any time. This is contrary to
    the advisement that he received from the district court at the change-of-plea hearing.
    Moreover, the record made by the district court demonstrates that Mr. Norcutt’s plea was
    made with a complete understanding of the charges, the possible consequences, his plea
    options and the rights he waived, that he had the benefit of competent counsel to assist
    him, that he was competent to enter the plea and that he was fully advised as to the nature
    of the proceedings against him.
    D.     Other Factors
    -5-
    Because Mr. Norcutt has failed to establish a fair and just reason for withdrawing
    his plea by sufficiently asserting his innocence, prevailing on his ineffective-assistance
    claim, or demonstrating that his plea was not knowing or voluntary, we need not address
    the remaining four factors and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
    in denying Mr. Norcutt’s motion. See 
    id. at 1217
    .
    III. CONCLUSION
    Upon a full examination of the record as required by Anders, we find no
    nonfrivolous basis for Mr. Norcutt to challenge his guilty plea. Accordingly, we GRANT
    counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS this appeal.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
    Deanell Reece Tacha
    Circuit Judge
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-8088

Citation Numbers: 282 F. App'x 723

Judges: Tacha, Kelly, McConnell

Filed Date: 6/24/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024