United States v. Roberts , 282 F. App'x 735 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 26, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-6226
(D.C. No. 5:02-CR-00070-D-1)
EUGENE ISIAH ROBERTS, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
Eugene Isiah Roberts appeals the denial of his motion under Fed. R. Crim.
P. 41(g) (formerly Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)) for the return of $1,257,280 in United
States currency, jewelry, watches, and documents that were seized in connection
with his arrest and conviction on drug charges. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we AFFIRM.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Background
In the district court, the government introduced documents that supported a
finding of three seizures of currency totaling $1,192,280: a February 15, 2002,
seizure of $13,280 from Mr. Roberts’ residence; a February 22, 2002, seizure of
$1,077,000 from Mr. Roberts’ residence; and a February 22, 2002, seizure of
$102,000 from a car driven by someone other than Mr. Roberts. 1 All of these
amounts were the subject of forfeiture proceedings, with $13,280 being judicially
forfeited to the State of Oklahoma in an Oklahoma state court proceeding,
$1,077,000 being judicially forfeited to the United States in federal district court,
and $102,000 being administratively forfeited to the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). The government also acknowledged that jewelry,
watches, and documents had been seized, but argued that those items were, and
always had been, in the custody of the Oklahoma City Police Department rather
than the federal government.
The district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Rule 41(g)
motion, indicating that Mr. Roberts had adequate remedies at law and that the
federal government did not have possession of the remaining property.
Accordingly, it dismissed the motion. Mr. Roberts appeals.
1
The government asserted that $1,192,280 was the total of all currency
seized and that no agent or authority had any knowledge of the additional $65,000
that Mr. Roberts claimed was seized. Mr. Roberts has not presented any evidence
to undermine these assertions.
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Payment of Fees
Mr. Roberts claims that he was improperly assessed a filing fee for this
action. He argues that his motion is made pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and thus does not count as a “civil action” subject to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act.
Once the criminal proceedings have ended, a Rule 41(g) motion is treated
as a civil equitable proceeding. See United States v. Madden, 95 F.3d 38, 40
(10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1996). Thus,
the Clerk did not err in informing Mr. Roberts that he must pay the filing fee or
move for leave to proceed without prepayment of the fee. Mr. Roberts’s request
for the refund of his filing fee is denied.
Analysis
Generally we review the denial of a Rule 41(g) motion for an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Deninno, 103 F.3d 82, 84 (10th Cir. 1996). Here
the district court dismissed the motion, however, so our review is de novo. See
United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 414 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2005)
(reviewing de novo the dismissal of a Rule 41(g) motion for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
Judicial Forfeitures
The sums of $13,280 and $1,077,000 were judicially forfeited in state and
federal proceedings, respectively.
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A Rule 41(g) motion is available only where a movant does not have an
adequate remedy at law. With regard to the state proceedings, “[a]ssuming [the
movant] has state avenues of relief open to him, he cannot show an inadequate
remedy at law.” Clymore v. United States, 164 F.3d 569, 571 (10th Cir. 1999);
see also United States v. Copeman, 458 F.3d 1070, 1073 (10th Cir. 2006).
Mr. Roberts has not shown that he has no state avenues of relief.
With regard to the federal proceedings, Mr. Roberts has an adequate
remedy at law in the form of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. “A Rule 41([g])
motion is an inappropriate vehicle for challenging a judicial forfeiture; the proper
vehicle is a motion for relief of judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.” Rodriguez-Aguirre, 414 F.3d at 1182. “Because [the
movant] did not challenge the forfeiture by filing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion
in the civil forfeiture proceeding, the district court was correct to deny relief.”
Madden, 95 F.3d at 40.
Administrative Forfeiture
The sum of $102,000 was administratively forfeited to the DEA. “We have
held that where the property sought to be returned has been administratively
forfeited, the Court should not exercise Rule 41([g]) jurisdiction if the movant has
failed to challenge the forfeiture through the appropriate administrative and
judicial procedures.” Deninno, 103 F.3d at 84. This court may, however,
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consider “collateral due process attacks; that is, deciding whether the forfeiture
offended due process rights.” Id.There is no indication that Mr. Roberts has challenged the forfeiture
through the appropriate procedures. But this claim does involve a collateral due
process attack: the government’s filings indicate that Mr. Roberts may not have
been given constitutionally adequate notice of the forfeiture proceeding. The
DEA knew he was in jail, so appropriately it mailed notice there. See Clark,
84 F.3d at 381 (“When the government is aware that an interested party is
incarcerated, due process requires the government to make an attempt to serve
him with notice in prison.”). The notice, however, had an error in the address and
was returned undelivered. We need not decide whether this unsuccessful attempt
was constitutionally sufficient. See id. (finding that notice mailed to jail was
constitutionally adequate even though prisoner did not receive it). Even assuming
insufficient notice and moving to the merits, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to adjudicate the motion because the motion “does not
offer any plausible legal theories upon which to challenge the forfeitures.”
Deninno, 103 F.3d at 85. 2 While Mr. Roberts argues that he should have been
2
In Clymore, we held that Deninno was not controlling where the statute of
limitations for commencing a forfeiture has expired. 164 F.3d at 573. Although
more than five years have passed since the seizures at issue, see 28 U.S.C. § 2462(establishing a five-year limitation period for civil forfeitures), there is no
limitations problem in this case. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(2)(A) (“Notwithstanding
the expiration of any applicable statute of limitations, if the court grants a motion
(continued...)
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given the opportunity to amend his pleadings before dismissal, he fails to show
that any amendments would not have been futile.
Remaining Property
Finally, Mr. Roberts requests the return of his jewelry, watches, and
documents. It is undisputed that this property is not in the custody of federal
authorities, but instead was seized by and, to the extent it has not already been
destroyed, is still in the custody of the Oklahoma City Police Department. There
are only
limited circumstances under which Rule 41([g]) can be used as a
vehicle to petition for the return of property seized by state
authorities. Those circumstances include actual federal possession of
the property forfeited by the state, constructive federal possession
where the property was considered evidence in the federal
prosecution, or instances where property was seized by state officials
acting at the direction of federal authorities in an agency capacity.
Clymore, 164 F.3d at 571. Mr. Roberts has not shown that any of these
circumstances exist in this case. He contends that his motion is proper because,
when he faced federal charges, his property should have been transferred to
federal authorities. We disagree. Cf. Copeman, 458 F.3d at 1072 (rejecting the
idea that federal prosecution confers constructive possession of property seized by
2
(...continued)
[to set aside an administrative declaration of forfeiture due to lack of written
notice] the court shall set aside the declaration of forfeiture as to the interest of
the moving party without prejudice to the right of the Government to commence a
subsequent forfeiture proceeding as to the interest of the moving party.”); see also
28 U.S.C. § 2462 (allowing exception to five-year limitations period where
Congress has provided otherwise).
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a state, even if the item is not being held as potential evidence in a federal
prosecution).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Senior Circuit Judge
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