Kosan v. Utah Department of Corrections , 290 F. App'x 145 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 21, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
VIVIAN KOSAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-4261
(D.C. No. 2:06-CV-00592-PGC)
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF (D. Utah)
CORRECTIONS; MIKE CHABRIES;
SCOTT CARVER; BRANDON
BURR; ANNABELLE BROUGH;
DALE SCHIPANNBOORD,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
Vivian Kosan was employed by the Utah Department of Corrections
(UDOC). She sued UDOC, four of its directors, and her former supervisor for
violating Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision and the First Amendment’s
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
free-exercise and free-speech clauses. The district court granted the defendants’
summary judgment motion, prompting the instant appeal. We affirm, concluding
that (1) Kosan’s Title VII claim fails because the defendants’ termination reason
was not a pretext for retaliation; (2) her free-exercise claim fails because any
burden on her religion was the result of neutral, generally applicable UDOC
policies; and (3) her free speech claim fails because her speech was not a matter
of public concern.
B ACKGROUND
Kosan began working for UDOC in November 2001 as a counselor at the
Central Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF). In August 2003, UDOC allowed her
to transfer to another position in order to distance herself from her supervisor,
Brandon Burr, whom Kosan had reported for sexual harassment. Four months
later, in December 2003, UDOC’s Program Services Director, Dale
Schipannboord, gave Kosan a “Letter of Warning” for “telling Brandon Burr’s
LDS Stake President . . . about unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct by Mr.
Burr.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 392. The letter notified Kosan that “harsher
disciplinary sanctions” would be considered if she repeated “this type of
misconduct.” Id. at 393. And in August 2004, UDOC’s Director of Institutional
Operations, Belle Brough, ordered Kosan, under threat of disciplinary action, not
to “speak or bring up past issues regarding Mr. Burr with anyone.” Id. at 400.
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In September 2004, Kosan filed charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Utah Antidiscrimination and Labor
Division (UALD), claiming that she had suffered (1) discrimination based on
national origin, and (2) retaliation for complaining of Burr’s harassment. In
January 2005, Kosan agreed to dismiss the charges and to forego any Title VII
claim based on those charges in exchange for UDOC’s promises to keep Burr out
of her chain of command, to refrain from further retaliation, and to audit her
position to determine whether she was entitled to a reclassification.
In March 2005, after the parties had settled Kosan’s discrimination charges,
UDOC suspended her employment for several days because she had reported
outside her chain of command that a coworker was sleeping on duty, had referred
to him as a “joke,” had failed to comply with an instruction to report the incident
to an officer in the coworker’s chain of command, and was untruthful during the
subsequent investigation. Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 421.
In May 2005, while auditing Kosan’s position, UDOC began to suspect that
Kosan had misrepresented her education credentials on several documents. In the
position-analysis form she submitted in conjunction with her desk audit, she
wrote in the form’s education section, “I have been awarded and brought with me
my BA and DMA in dance/history and technique in French, Russian and Latin.”
Id. at 491. Kosan had also claimed one or more bachelor’s degrees on the resume
that accompanied her initial job application:
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BA Bachelor of Arts, Brigham Young University (May ‘78)
Snow College (Sept ‘91) Equivalency given for my
dance certification and education upon invitation to join
both faculties as an instructor and lecturer.
Id. Finally, in her August 2000 application for Utah’s Peace Officer Standards
and Training (POST) program, in response to a prompt for “all colleges,
universities and trade schools . . . attended,” Kosan wrote, “BA equivalency given
by Snow College to teach.” Id. (underline omitted).
To investigate the matter, UDOC’s human-resources manager asked Kosan
for transcripts substantiating the claimed degrees. Kosan then admitted that she
“did not have a liberal college degree but had been given a BA equivalency when
[she] was invited as a faculty member for both [Brigham Young University] and
Snow College.” Id. at 456. On May 24, 2005, Kosan was removed from CUCF
and notified by administrative complaint that UDOC intended to terminate her
employment for falsely claiming a bachelor’s degree.
Utah’s Department of Public Safety investigated whether Kosan had
“entered false information on [her] POST application,” and it concluded in June
2005 that she did not. Id. at 478. The Department did, however, voice a “concern
that the information [Kosan] provided inadvertently misled reviewers at a later
date.” Id.
In July 2005, UDOC finalized her termination. Kosan then filed a second
charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the UALD. She also contested her
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termination before the Utah Career Service Review Board (CSRB). The
termination was initially upheld by a CSRB hearing officer, id., Vol. 4 at 751, but
later overturned by a panel of CSRB members, who concluded that Kosan’s
“equivalency statements were [not] intentionally misleading or otherwise a
violation of Department policy,” id., Vol. 3 at 498. In its written decision, the
CSRB panel indicated that “equivalency” referred to Brigham Young University
and Snow College’s ability to hire Kosan as an instructor, even though she lacked
the required college degree, by substituting Kosan’s practical experience for the
degree. Id. at 492. UDOC appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, but later
dismissed the appeal after Kosan agreed to waive her right of reinstatement in
exchange for UDOC paying the “full measure of her backpay” and notifying her
husband of certain jobs within UDOC. Id., Vol. 4 at 693.
After receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC on her second charge of
discrimination, Kosan commenced the instant litigation, claiming violations of her
rights under Title VII (hostile work environment, sex discrimination, and
retaliation), the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and
federal and state constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion and speech. The
district court entered summary judgment against Kosan on her federal claims, and
dismissed her state-law claims without prejudice. Kosan now appeals the
summary judgment as it relates to her Title VII retaliation claim and her federal
constitutional claims.
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D ISCUSSION
I. Standards of Review
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same legal standard as the district court. Byers v. City of Albuquerque,
150 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When applying
this standard, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Byers, 150 F.3d at 1274.
II. Title VII Retaliation
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
employee for “oppos[ing] any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
[Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To successfully invoke this anti-retaliatory
provision, an employee “must establish that retaliation played a part in the
employment decision.” Fye v. Okla. Corp. Com’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1224
(10th Cir. 2008). This may be accomplished by “directly show[ing] that
retaliatory animus played a motivating part in the employment decision” or, if
there is no direct evidence of the employer’s motive, by relying “on the familiar
three-part McDonnell Douglas framework to prove that the employer’s proffered
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reason for its decision is a pretext for retaliation.” Id. at 1225 (quotation omitted).
Kosan relies on McDonnell Douglas, which first requires the employee to
“establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing (1) she engaged in
protected opposition to Title VII discrimination; (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action. Fye, 516 F.3d at 1227 (quotation
omitted). Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the employer to produce evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for the conduct,
and then the employee has the burden of demonstrating pretext. Fischer v.
Forestwood Co., Inc., 525 F.3d 972, 979 (10th Cir. 2008).
The district court accepted Kosan’s argument that she had engaged in
protected opposition to discrimination. The district court also accepted Kosan’s
assertion that her suspension and termination were adverse employment actions
causally connected to protected activities. 1 Kosan did not, however, challenge
whether UDOC had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
suspension and termination. Nor did she argue that UDOC’s reasons for the
1
On appeal, Kosan adds to the list of adverse actions that her work station
was moved to a closet, she was given no assistance in completing her
position-analysis form, and her husband, who also worked for UDOC, received a
letter of reprimand. Aplt. Br. at 15. But she did not raise these actions below
when discussing adverse employment actions, see Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 266, and
we decline to consider them for the first time on appeal, see Utah Lighthouse
Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Information & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1051
(10th Cir. 2008).
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suspension were pretextual. Consequently, the district court focused on Kosan’s
only remaining argument: that UDOC’s reason for terminating her—falsely
claiming a bachelor’s degree—was a pretext for retaliation. We likewise limit
our focus to determining whether UDOC’s termination reason was pretextual, and
we consider only those theories of pretext advanced in the district court. Cf.
Herrera v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 474 F.3d 675, 684 (10th Cir. 2007) (considering on
appeal only those arguments presented to the district court regarding the existence
of an implied-in-fact employment contract).
To show pretext, Kosan “must produce evidence of such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in [UDOC’s]
proffered legitimate reason[ ] for its action that a reasonable factfinder could
rationally find [the reason] unworthy of credence and hence infer that [UDOC]
did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reason[ ].” Fye, 516 F.3d at 1228(quotation omitted). Kosan argues that pretext is demonstrated by four points:
(1) the CSRB’s reversal of her termination; (2) the Utah Department of Public
Safety’s finding that she did not enter false information on her POST application;
(3) the fact that UDOC issued its administrative complaint threatening to
terminate Kosan before the deadline it had imposed for Kosan to provide
transcripts supporting her degrees; and (4) her alleged misrepresentations were
not materially significant.
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First, in regard to the CSRB’s reversal of Kosan’s termination, “[t]he
pertinent question in determining pretext is not whether [UDOC] was right to
think [Kosan] engaged in misconduct, but whether [UDOC’s] belief was genuine
or pretextual.” Tran v. Trustees of State Colleges in Colo., 355 F.3d 1263, 1270
(10th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). The CSRB determined only that Kosan had
not intentionally misled UDOC, and therefore did not violate UDOC’s policy
regarding falsifying records. The CSRB did not determine, as we must, whether
UDOC could have genuinely believed that Kosan falsely claimed to have a
bachelor’s degree. We conclude that no reasonable jury could dispute the
genuineness of UDOC’s belief. Specifically, Kosan’s assertion on the position-
analysis form that she had “been awarded and brought with me my BA” suggests
only one thing—that she indeed possessed a bachelor’s degree. Kosan’s resume
also portrays her as possessing a bachelor’s degree from at least Brigham Young
University, given the language, “Bachelor of Arts, Brigham Young University
(May ‘78).” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 491. While Kosan attempted to explain to
UDOC that she had “BA equivalency,” and had even mentioned “[e]quivalency”
on her resume, id., we are not persuaded that her use of that term would have
dispelled the reasonable belief that she had falsely claimed a bachelor’s degree.
As used in this case, “equivalency” simply refers to Brigham Young University
and Snow College overlooking her lack of a bachelor’s degree and employing her
based on experience. The fact that those institutions substituted experience for
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education in no way means that Kosan was “awarded” or otherwise in possession
of a bachelor’s degree.
Second, regarding the Utah Department of Public Safety’s finding that
Kosan did not enter false information on her POST application, it likewise does
not undercut the genuineness of UDOC’s termination reason. As far as we can
tell, the Department’s investigation was limited to Kosan claiming a bachelor’s
degree from Snow College. Consequently, the results of the investigation would
have no bearing on Kosan’s claim to a degree from Brigham Young University.
But more importantly, the Department recognized that the information Kosan
provided on her POST application was potentially misleading. Thus, UDOC’s
reliance on the application to terminate Kosan does not establish pretext.
Third, as for the timing of UDOC’s administrative complaint threatening
termination, there is no hint of pretext. The complaint was apparently issued
several hours before the 5:00 p.m. deadline on May 24 for Kosan to produce
transcripts showing a bachelor’s degree. But there was no reason for UDOC to
wait until 5:00 p.m., as Kosan had stated five days earlier that she did not have a
degree.
Kosan’s fourth and final pretext argument is that her misrepresentations
“were not materially significant.” Aplt. Br. at 20. She claims that after
submitting her position-analysis form, she “attempted to correct [it]” but was told
by her supervisor, Wayne Larson, and the human resources officer assigned to her
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desk audit, Mike Tribe, that “her corrections did not matter.” Id. 2 Our review of
the record, however, reveals that only Tribe made such a statement. See Aplt.
App., Vol. 2 at 310-12, 315. And even then, he simply told Kosan that his focus
in evaluating the desk audit was on what she had accomplished after becoming
employed at UDOC. Id. at 310. Nothing he said indicates that the
misrepresentation of a bachelor’s degree is not a terminable offense. Indeed, the
undisputed evidence shows that UDOC has terminated at least fifteen employees
since 1997 for “falsifying some type of record.” Id., Vol. 1 at 189. Further, when
a UDOC employment application has been falsified, Utah Administrative Code
§ R251-105-4(3) authorizes termination without regard to the significance of the
falsification.
We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact in regard to
pretext and that the district court properly granted summary judgment against
Kosan on her Title VII retaliation claim. 3
2
While the district court stated that it would not consider Kosan’s
materiality argument because she failed to provide record support, see Aplt. App.,
Vol. 4 at 776 n.103, it appears that the district court did in fact consider the
argument, see id. at 779-780. In any event, we conclude that Kosan sufficiently
briefed the argument below to perfect it for this appeal. See id., Vol. 2 at 252-53,
269.
3
Because Kosan has not shown a triable issue of retaliation, her argument
concerning “the appropriate remedy for a breach of a Title VII settlement
agreement” is moot. Aplt. Br. at 22. Moreover, we note that Kosan did not
include in her complaint a claim for breach of that agreement.
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III. First Amendment Claims
Because this case also “implicates First Amendment freedoms, we perform
an independent examination of the whole record in order to ensure that the
judgment protects the rights of free expression.” Faustin v. City & County of
Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2005). Additionally, because we
conclude in the following sections that Kosan has not shown a constitutional
violation, we need not reach the individual Defendants-Appellees’ argument that
they are entitled to qualified immunity. See Christiansen v. City of Tulsa,
332 F.3d 1270, 1278 (10th Cir. 2003).
A. Free Exercise Claim
The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause “requires government respect
for, and noninterference with, the religious beliefs and practices of our Nation’s
people.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). Kosan argues that
Schipannboord’s Letter of Warning, which admonished her for telling Burr’s
Stake President “about unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct by Mr. Burr,”
and which cautioned her against repeating that “type of misconduct,” Aplt. App.,
Vol. 2 at 392-93, intruded upon her “right to consult with her clergy,” Aplt. Br. at
24. But Burr’s Stake President was not Kosan’s Stake President. And Kosan did,
at some time, consult with her own Stake President and Bishop regarding Burr.
Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 127.
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Further, even if the Letter burdened Kosan’s ability to consult with her own
clergy, there is no evidence that the policies the Letter effectuated were
religiously motivated or applicable to only religious conduct. “Neutral rules of
general applicability ordinarily do not raise free exercise concerns even if they
incidentally burden a particular religious practice or belief.” Axson-Flynn v.
Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1294 (10th Cir. 2004) (footnote omitted). The Letter of
Warning indicated that Kosan’s actions violated various UDOC policies,
including prohibitions against defaming administrators or staff, revealing
confidential information, and discrediting UDOC or causing the public to lose
confidence in UDOC. And it noted that the policies applied when “discussing
Departmental business . . . with those in the community.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at
393. Because these policies are religiously neutral and are applicable generally,
not just in her consultations with clergy, Kosan’s free-exercise claim fails.
Free Speech Claim
“The freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the
least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern
without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.” Federal Election
Com’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2007) (quotation
omitted). “So long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public
concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their
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employers to operate efficiently and effectively.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410, 419 (2006).
Kosan argues that “the policy of [UDOC] combined with the actions of
Defendant Brough and Defendant Schipannboord violated [her] free speech
rights.” Aplt. Br. at 27. Her argument appears to encompass Schipannboord’s
Letter of Warning and Brough’s instruction not to “speak or bring up past issues
regarding Mr. Burr with anyone.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 400. 4 We conclude that
Kosan’s free-speech rights were not violated because she was not disciplined or
threatened with discipline for speaking on a matter of public concern.
“[P]ublic concern is something that is a subject of legitimate news interest;
that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public at the
time of publication.” City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004).
But “speech relating to internal personnel disputes and working conditions
ordinarily will not be viewed as addressing matters of public concern.” David v.
City & County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1355 (10th Cir. 1996). Kosan’s
communication with Burr’s Stake President, and the resulting limitations imposed
by Schipannboord and Brough, concerned her allegations of misconduct against
Burr—specifically, sexual harassment. Nothing in the record indicates, however,
4
While Kosan summarily asserts that her free-speech rights were violated
when UDOC suspended her for her conduct in the sleeping-coworker incident, she
made no such assertion in the district court. We decline to consider the assertion
for the first time on this appeal. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 527 F.3d at 1051.
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that Kosan spoke, or was prohibited from speaking about, sexual harassment “as a
widespread practice affecting [UDOC’s] performance of its public
responsibilities.” Id. at 1356 n.2. Because Kosan’s speech and the resulting
limitations related to a purely personal grievance affecting her own conditions of
employment, her free-speech claim fails.
C ONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Senior Circuit Judge
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