Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Hans Lingl Anlagenbau Und Verfahrenstechnik GMBH & Co. KG ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 26, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TRAVELERS IND EM NITY
COM PA NY, as subrogee of
Commercial Brick Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant, Nos. 04-7062 & 04-7128
(D.C. No. 03-CV-389-W )
v. (E.D. Okla.)
H A N S LIN G L A N LA G EN BA U UND
V ERFA H REN STEC HN IK G MBH &
C O. K G ; TH E N O RTH A ME RICAN
M A N U FACTU RIN G CO M PA NY,
LTD.; ENCERTEC, IN C.,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, A ND ER SO N, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
these consolidated appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G ).
The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
This lawsuit arises from a kiln explosion that occurred in W ewoka,
Oklahoma on D ecember 28, 2000. Commercial Brick Corporation (CBC) owned
and operated the commercial kiln, known as Kiln B, to make bricks. Plaintiff
Travelers Indemnity Co. (Travelers), CBC’s insurance carrier, paid over $4
million on CBC’s claim for property damage and business interruption losses.
The defendants provided various components to the structure and operation of
Kiln B. Claiming those components were defective and caused the explosion,
Travelers, as subrogee of CBC, sued defendants to recover the insurance pay-out.
The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. In a later order, the
district court ordered Travelers to pay defendants’ attorney fees. Travelers
appeals both judgments, which we have consolidated for disposition.
I. Background
Kiln B is a brick making facility. It was constructed in 1981 by defendant
Hans Lingl Anlagenbau Und Verfahrenstechnik G M BH & Co. KG (Lingl KG),
and upgraded in 1997–1998, using components provided and installed by
defendants North American M anufacturing Co., Ltd. (NAM CO) and Encertec,
Inc. One of the upgraded components, made by NAM CO, was a set of preheat
burners equipped with a Flame Supervision System (FSS). The purpose of the
FSS was to stop the flow of natural gas to the preheat burners when a flame w as
not detected.
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After its installation, the FSS repeatedly malfunctioned, causing the burners
to shut down even in the presence of a flame. Consequently, CBC’s foreman,
Leonard Dooley, wired around the FSS, effectively disabling it, so the burners
would continue to operate and CBC would not suffer a loss of brick production.
A pow er outage caused the kiln to shut down on December 26, 2000. On
December 28, CBC employees started the kiln without incident. The explosion
happened during a second start-up procedure necessitated by the failure of a
pressure blower after the first start-up. Foreman D ooley told a fireman to shut off
the gas valves going to the preheat burners, but the fireman failed to do so, and
Dooley did not check. Dooley also did not check the vestibule door or the kiln
door. Therefore, unbeknownst to the CBC employees, gas flowed into the kiln
via the preheat burner valves for five to seven minutes before the ignition switch
was thrown, causing the explosion.
After paying CBC on its insurance policy, Travelers filed suit in CBC’s
shoes, alleging various theories of recovery. During the discovery phase,
Travelers designated Philip Ambrose as its corporate deponent, pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). M r. Ambrose declined to answer deposition questions about
the factual bases for Travelers’ claims, following the advice of counsel. Travelers
maintained that the information sought was protected by the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine. During the deposition, the parties
telephoned the district judge, who declined to grant defendants’ motion to compel
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because it would be futile to order a witness to answ er questions to which he said
he did not know the answ er. The district judge warned Travelers, however, that if
it continued to deny knowledge and refuse to reveal information, it could not later
claim knowledge in any summary-judgment proceedings. In his later order
granting summary judgment to defendants, the judge characterized Ambrose’s
deposition testimony as “effectively [giving] no answer, [which stood] as
plaintiff’s evidentiary presentation.” Aplt. App. Vol. 8, at 1734. Accordingly,
the district judge granted summary judgment to defendants, holding that Travelers
was precluded from presenting evidence in addition to or contrary to the evidence
it produced at the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, which was inadequate to resist
summary judgment.
The district court also issued an alternative ruling in granting summary
judgment to defendants. After considering Travelers’ expert reports, the district
court concluded that Travelers’ failed to prove causation for purposes of summary
judgment. The court also rejected Travelers’ agency theory against defendant
Lingl KG because it was raised too late in the proceedings. Finally, the court
awarded attorney fees in full to all defendants as prevailing parties.
Travelers appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on
its trial tactics. It also appeals the summary judgment entered on the merits based
on products liability against all defendants, and breach of warranties against
NAM CO only. Travelers contends that the following four components of the
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1997-1998 upgrade were defective and caused the explosion: the purge system, 1
explosion relief, 2 the FSS and preheat burners, and lack of written warnings and
instructions. Travelers has abandoned on appeal all other claims, including those
for negligence and breach of contract.
II. Discussion
A. Travelers’ Litigation Tactics
Before turning to the merits, we address the district court’s grant of
summary judgment based on Travelers’ obdurate litigation tactics. In directing its
corporate representative not to answ er numerous relevant questions germane to its
complaint, Travelers’ counsel invoked the attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine. M ost of these objections were entirely baseless; the
objectionable questions merely sought routine factual support for the allegations
underlying the complaint.
Even though we do not affirm on this ground, we express our strong
disapproval of Travelers’ deposition tactics. Travelers w ould have had difficulty
1
“A properly designed timed purge system w ill ensure that there will be no
accumulation of gas in the kiln at the time the burners are ignited.” Aplt. App.
Vol. 4, at 853 (report by Raymond Ostrowski, expert witness endorsed by
Travelers).
2
“Explosion relief is simply a wall section or panel fitted to the furnace and
designed such that the material has less resistance to an explosion than the
furnace itself. The relief components are designed to fail, vent the explosion and
minimize the damage and destructive effects to the kiln.” Aplt. App. Vol. 2, at
403 (report by W illiam M . Norman, consulting engineer engaged by Travelers).
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demonstrating an abuse of discretion in the district court’s discovery rulings,
particularly since Travelers did not follow the preferred course of action and seek
a pre-deposition order on its unusual work-product position. See Cummings v.
Gen. M otors Corp., 365 F.3d 944, 952-53 (10th Cir. 2004) (reviewing district
court’s discovery rulings for abuse of discretion); Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Dabney, 73 F.3d 262, 266-67 (10th Cir. 1995) (chastising counsel for not seeking
pre-deposition order, despite his pre-deposition belief that the work-product
doctrine might foreclose certain lines of questioning).
B. Summary Judgment
1. Legal Standards
In this diversity action we apply Oklahoma substantive law. See
Cooperm an v. David, 214 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000). W e review de novo
the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing the record in the light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Lanm an v. Johnson
County, 393 F.3d 1151, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is
appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law . Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
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2. Products Liability Claims Against NAM CO and Encertec
Travelers contends that Kiln B was defective after the upgrade. As noted
above, it maintains the following defects caused the explosion: the FSS and
preheat burners, the lack of a purge system, and the lack of an explosion relief
system. Travelers further claims that the component products were defective due
to the lack of written warnings and instructions.
As an initial matter, although the briefs are unclear on this point, Travelers
has not established that any defendant contracted to provide either a purge system
or an explosion relief system as part of the upgrade. Instead, Travelers argues
that the safety standards promulgated by the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) imposed an affirmative duty on defendants to undertake to install these
systems in Kiln B, even though CBC did not specifically request such an overhaul
of the kiln or contract to pay for them. 3 Travelers has cited no authority for its
position that the NFPA standards place any duty on NAM CO or Encertec, and
under the circumstances of this case, we decline to entertain this argument. See
Simpson v. T.D. Williamson Inc., 414 F.3d 1203, 1206 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005)
(declining to address claims unless supported by legal authority or by argument
that position is sound despite lack of authority); cf. Fellers v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., 572 P.2d 972, 977 (Okla. 1977) (Simms, J., dissenting) (noting
3
As noted, Travelers has abandoned its claims for breach of contract and
negligence.
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that industry standards, “[w]hile not carrying the force of law, . . . are recognized
as relevant and material on the issue of negligence”). Therefore, we will consider
only Travelers’ arguments based on the FSS and preheat burners, as well as the
lack of written warnings and instructions.
Under Oklahoma law, a products-liability plaintiff must prove that the
defective product was the cause of the injury. Prince v. B.F. Ascher Co., 90 P.3d
1020, 1026 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004); accord Kirkland v. Gen. M otors Corp., 521
P.2d 1353, 1363 (Okla. 1974). “If some act of the plaintiff caused the injury,
rather than the defective product itself, causation is missing, and the plaintiff may
not recover.” Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 1366.
Oklahoma law defines a proximate cause “as one that, ‘in the natural and
continuous sequence, produces [the plaintiff’s] injury and without which the
injury would not have happened.’” Woolard v. JLG Indus., Inc., 210 F.3d 1158,
1172 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dirickson v. M ings, 910 P.2d 1015, 1018–19
(Okla. 1996)) (further quotation omitted). An asserted causal connection may be
rejected if a factfinder must “heap conclusion upon conclusion as to the course
events would have taken . . . in order to establish the causal connection between
the defective [product] and the ultimate [damage].” Hardy v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co.,
910 P.2d 1024, 1029 (O kla. 1996) (quotation omitted).
Travelers submitted reports of two experts, both of whom opined that the
explosion could have been avoided or the damages minimized if Kiln B operated
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with an effective purge system and explosion relief system. Neither expert said
the condition of the FSS or the preheat burners caused or contributed to the
explosion. Furthermore, Traveler’s initial investigator stated that “[t]he explosion
was caused by employees failing to insure that the gas valves to the preheat
burners had been shut off prior to igniting the preheat burners.” Aplt. App. Vol.
3, at 570. That was also the opinion held by Foreman Dooley and CBC’s
president. Id. Vol. 1, at 132; Vol. 6, at 1219.
Travelers first argues that the fact of CBC employees’ negligence as a
contributing cause of the explosion does not defeat its products-liability claim
because contributory negligence is irrelevant to the claim. See Hogue v. A.B.
Chance Co., 592 P.2d 973, 975 (Okla. 1978) (holding contributory negligence not
relevant to products liability action absent showing that plaintiff knew of danger).
However, this argument misses the mark because liability may only be imposed
on defendants if plaintiffs first prove that defendants’ product caused the harm.
It is undisputed that the FSS was not in use and that the preheat burners “lit
and ran fine.” Aplt. App. Vol. 1, at 160. Consequently, Travelers rests its legal
theory on the following logic: if the FSS had w orked properly it would not have
been disabled and would have turned off the gas flow to the preheat burners,
which, in turn, would have prevented the kiln from igniting, thus preventing the
explosion.
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This theory does not withstand scrutiny. It attempts to impose liability on a
manufacturer not because the product did not function as designed, but because it
had been disabled by the user. Travelers confuses CBC’s failure to maintain the
FSS system w ith a failure of the system to operate properly. Under this logic,
however, one could just as easily presume that if the FSS had not been disabled, it
would have prevented the explosion. Or, conversely, one could also easily
presume that if the FSS had been repaired, the explosion also would have been
avoided. But to assume that a worker’s zeal to ignite the kiln and subsequent
dismantling of the FSS that might have prevented the explosion, is no basis to
show that the FSS proximately caused the accident. In short, for Travelers to
prevail under its theory of causation, a factfinder would be required
impermissibly to “heap conclusion upon conclusion as to the course events w ould
have taken” in order to find that defendants’ products caused the explosion. See
Hardy, 910 P.2d at 1029. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
determination that a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that the disabled
FSS proximately caused CBC’s injuries under a theory of strict product liability. 4
Travelers also argues that defendants’ products were defective because they
did not come with written warnings and safety labeling. It contends that it is
entitled to the rebuttable presumption that CBC employees would have read and
4
In so holding, we need not address the district court’s alternative rulings on
supervening cause, assumption of the risk, and misuse of the product.
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heeded an adequate warning. See Black v. M & W Gear Co., 269 F.3d 1220,
1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying Oklahoma law). The presumption can be
rebutted with evidence that the plaintiff would not have followed the warning. Id.
at 1232. In addition, Oklahoma law provides that “[w]here the danger or
potentiality of danger is known or should be known to the user, the duty to w arn
does not attach.” Prince, 90 P.3d at 1027. Furthermore, there is no duty to w arn
a knowledgeable user of the dangers of a product, and there is no duty to warn of
an obvious danger. Duane v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 833 P.2d 284, 286 (Okla.
1992). “The plaintiff must establish that the failure to warn was a proximate,
producing cause of the injuries received.” Id.W e agree with the district court that this claim also fails as a matter of law.
Foreman D ooley testified that he knew it was unsafe to operate the kiln with the
FSS disabled. M oreover, it is undisputed that CBC operated the kiln from 1981,
when it was first constructed, until the 2000 explosion, fully aw are of the kiln’s
safety features, including the FSS. W e agree with the district court that CBC was
a knowledgeable user who could be expected to, and did, appreciate the danger of
disabling the FSS. Accordingly, there was no duty to warn.
3. Breach of Warranty Claims Against NAMCO
To prevail on its claims for breach of warranty, Travelers must demonstrate
that the breach “was the proximate cause of the loss sustained,” in addition to
showing the existence of a warranty and a breach of it. Am. Fertilizer Specialists,
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Inc. v. Wood, 635 P.2d 592, 595 & n.10 (Okla. 1981). Our conclusion that
Travelers’ evidence of causation is insufficient to resist summary judgment as to
its products-liability claims also defeats its breach-of-warranty claims against
NAM CO.
4. Claims Against Lingl KG.
Finally, Travelers’ claims against Lingl KG are without merit. Travelers’
theory of liability against Lingl KG was that Encertec was Lingl KG’s agent. The
district court ruled that this agency theory was raised too late in the proceedings.
W e need not review this ruling, however, because we have concluded that
Encertec is not liable to Travelers. Consequently, even if Encertec were Lingl
KG’s agent, no liability would attach to Lingl KG. See, e.g., Sisk v. J.B. Hunt
Transport, Inc., 81 P.3d 55, 60 & n.21 (Okla. 2003) (stating where agent not
liable, principal also not liable).
C. Attorney Fees
Travelers contends that the district court erred in awarding attorney fees to
defendants not authorized under Oklahoma law. In particular, it argues that
Oklahoma law does not allow the award of fees in successfully defending
products liability claims, although it acknowledges that prevailing-party attorney
fees were authorized on the claims for breach of warranty and negligent or willful
injury to property. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §§ 936, 939 & 940. As a result,
Travelers contends the district court should have apportioned fees among the
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various theories of liability, thereby reducing the overall amount of the award.
Defendants do not claim that Oklahoma law permits an attorney fee award for a
products-liability claim; rather, defendants maintain that their defense to all of the
various theories of recovery was the same. Therefore, defendants claim
apportionment was not required.
Generally, an award of attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Browder v. City of M oab, 427 F.3d 717, 719 (10th Cir. 2005). “[W ]e review de
novo whether the district court applied the correct legal standard, and we review
its findings of fact for clear error.” Id.The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that attorney fees must be
apportioned between claims for which there is statutory authority for an award of
attorney fees and those for w hich there is not. Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v.
Preferred Packaging, Inc., 932 P.2d 1091, 1098 (Okla. 1996); Sisney v. Smalley,
690 P.2d 1048, 1051-52 (Okla. 1984). But where non-authorized claims contain
comm on components of a claim for which attorney fees are authorized, it may be
proper to award fees without apportionment. Green Bay Packaging, 932 P.2d at
1098.
Here, defendants’ opposition to the products-liability claims was the same
as its defense to the other claims— the explosion was caused by CBC employees’
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actions and not by any of the defendants’ products or services. 5 Accordingly, it is
apparent that the time defendants’ attorneys devoted to the products-liability
claims was necessarily incurred in defending the other claims, for which attorney
fees are authorized. See Transpower Constructors v. Grand River Dam Auth., 905
F.2d 1413, 1423 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying Oklahoma law to hold that prevailing
party can recover fees for his attorney’s work on claims not covered by
fee-shifting statute where those fees were necessarily incurred on claims for
which attorney fees w ere authorized). Therefore, we hold that the district court
did not err in refusing to apportion the attorney fee award, and we affirm the
award.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M . Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
5
As Travelers points out, defendants did not argue that the products were not
unreasonably dangerous, a theory limited to the products-liability claim. If
defendants had, the attorney fees generated for such a defense arguably should
have been deducted.
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