United States v. Garcia , 189 F. App'x 819 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                       F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
    July 27, 2006
    TENTH CIRCUIT                     Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                      No. 05-2371
    v.                                       District of New M exico
    D A N IEL R EN E G A RC IA ,                   (D.C. No. CR-04-2249 W PJ)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
    Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant-Appellant Daniel G arcia pleaded guilty to being a felon in
    possession of a firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1). He filed a motion
    for a downward departure, which the district court denied. His criminal history
    category was VI and his offense level 21, resulting in an advisory guideline range
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
    of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is
    therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not
    binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
    judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
    conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    of 77 to 96 months. He was sentenced to 77 months’ imprisonment, at the low
    end of the guidelines range. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in United
    States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), and the criteria in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a),
    M r. Garcia objected to the sentence and claimed that a reduction was warranted
    because his sentence was unreasonably calculated for two reasons: (1) his
    possession of the gun should be considered a lesser harm because the gun
    belonged to his wife and was inadvertently left in the truck that he took to work;
    and (2) the court failed to consider his family circumstances, namely that his
    presence is required to take care of his ill wife and her three children. Exercising
    jurisdiction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a) and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm.
    I. Background
    M r. Garcia claims the gun belonged to his then girlfriend Anna Lara, who
    married M r. Garcia at the conclusion of sentencing. M r. Garcia discovered the
    gun had been left in his truck and called M s. Lara to come and retrieve it.
    However, she was the only employee at work and was unable to leave. Later that
    day, M r. Garcia was suspected w hen money went missing from M r. Garcia’s boss.
    M r. Garcia gave the police consent to search his truck, warning the police in
    advance that his wife’s gun was inside and that he was a felon. M r. Garcia was
    arrested. He told the police that he had handled the gun a couple of days before
    the arrest when he saw the gun in M s. Lara’s home and moved it out of reach of
    the children.
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    M r. Garcia also alleges that since his incarceration M s. Lara has been ill
    and unable “to maintain their home.” A ppellant’s O pening Br. 24. As a result
    she has moved in “with her elderly parents, upon whom the responsibilities of a
    daughter and her three children works a tremendous hardship.” 
    Id.
     In addition,
    M r. Garcia claims he has a relationship w ith M s. Lara’s children, in particular,
    her oldest son, who has a learning disability.
    Agent Francisco Ortega testified at the sentencing hearing that he spoke to
    two individuals, Crusita Gonzales, the Garcia’s apartment manager, and David
    Labuda, M r. Garcia’s boss. Both of these individuals had told Agent Ortega that
    M r. Garcia had mentioned that he had a gun and that he “just gotta be careful”
    about being caught with it.
    The district court denied the motion for a downward departure and found
    that a sentence w ithin the guidelines would be reasonable. The district court
    stated that M r. Garcia “w as candid in his testimony that he knew he w asn’t
    supposed to be around firearms” and found that there was no “bas[is] for
    departure under the sentencing guidelines.” R. Vol. V, pp. 120-21. Furthermore,
    the district court found that M r. Garcia, as a step-father, did not demonstrate
    extraordinary family circumstances that would require a reduced sentence. M r.
    Garcia appeals.
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    II. Discussion
    A sentence properly calculated within the advisory sentencing guidelines is
    entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Kristl, 
    437 F.3d 1050
    , 1054 (10th Cir. 2006). The defendant is required to show that the sentence
    is unreasonable when viewed against factors in § 3553(a). Id. On appeal, to
    determine whether the sentence is reasonable we first examine whether the
    guidelines were properly applied. United States v. Hernandez-C astillo, 
    449 F.3d 1127
    , 1129 (10th Cir. 2006). The district court’s sentence is reviewed de novo and
    the factual findings for clear error. 
    Id.
     If the district court’s application of the
    guidelines was correct or any errors harmless, then we decide whether the
    sentence was reasonable. 
    Id. at 1129-30
    .
    1. § 5K2.11
    M r. Garcia challenges the reasonableness of the sentence that was imposed
    by the district court because his inadvertent possession of M s. Lara’s gun “fits the
    lesser harms rationale articulated in U .S.S.G § 5K2.11.” A ppellant’s Opening Br.
    at 17. A downward departure is appropriate under § 5K2.11, “provided that the
    circumstances significantly diminish society’s interest in punishing the conduct,”
    or when the “conduct does not cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be
    prevented by the law proscribing the offense at issue.” U .S.S.G § 5K2.11. M r.
    Garcia argues that his possession of the gun was not for an unlawful purpose.
    However, we have held that the lesser harm provision of the guidelines should be
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    interpreted narrowly. United States v. Warner, 
    43 F.3d 1335
    , 1338 (10th Cir.
    1994) (reversing the district court’s downward departure for a war veteran in
    possession of a machine gun). Congress designed § 922(g) to sweep broadly, and
    the statute draws the criminal line at possession rather than illicit purpose. See
    United States v. Riley, 
    376 F.3d 1160
    , 1166-67 (D.C. Cir. 2004). To violate §
    922(g), the felon has to possess the gun knowingly. 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (a)(2).
    Because M r. Garcia possessed the gun knowingly, “the mere absence of an
    unlawful purpose does not warrant a departure under § 5K2.11.” Riley, 
    376 F.3d 1167
    .
    2. Family Circumstances
    M r. Garcia also argues that the dependency of his ill wife and her three
    children on his economic support should have led to a lower sentence. Under the
    sentencing guidelines, “[f]amily ties and responsibilities and community ties are
    not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be warranted.”
    U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6. Indeed, family circumstances are only considered in the most
    extraordinary situations. United States v. Jones, 
    158 F.3d 492
    , 499 (10th Cir.
    1998); United States v. Rodriguez-Velarde, 
    127 F.3d 966
    , 968 (10th Cir. 1997)
    (“To justify a departure, a defendant must demonstrate that the period of
    incarceration set by the Guidelines w ould have an effect on the family or family
    members beyond the disruption to family and parental relationships that would be
    present in the usual case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). M r. Garcia has
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    not demonstrated that his imprisonment has imposed a greater hardship on his
    family than a similar sentence would on any other imprisoned defendant’s family.
    See United States v. Sierra-Castillo, 
    405 F.3d 932
    , 938 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding
    that the defendant’s ill wife and need for emotional and financial support was not
    sufficient to constitute a downward departure in sentencing); United States v.
    M cClatchey, 
    316 F.3d 1122
    , 1130 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The fact that a defendant
    cares for a family member with a mental and physical disability is not by itself
    sufficient to make the circumstances ‘exceptional.’”). Therefore, the district
    court did not err in denying M r. G arcia’s request for a downward departure.
    3. 3553(a) Reasonableness
    The district court correctly calculated the guidelines range, carefully
    considered the factors of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), and found a sentence at the bottom
    of the range reasonable. The first factor in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) requires the
    district court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
    history and characteristics of the defendant.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1). Because
    M r. Garcia has an extensive criminal history, admitted to being a felon-in-
    possession of the gun, and stated that there were other instances where he had
    contact with the gun, the district court found that the sentence was warranted
    under the facts of the case. The second factor in deciding whether the sentence
    was reasonable is “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the
    seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
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    punishment for the offense.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2)(A). The district court found
    that “the sentencing guideline range comports with that factor.” The last factor
    discussed by the district court was “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
    disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
    similar conduct.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
     (a)(6). The district court found that other
    defendants with M r. Garcia’s criminal history are not given a sentence below the
    sentencing guideline range and to do so for M r. Garcia w ould give him “a benefit
    or a break that other similarly situated defendants do not receive.”
    M r. Garcia argues strenuously that the circumstances under which he
    possessed a firearm were unusually innocuous and warranted a lesser sentence. If
    the district court had credited M r. Garcia’s account and had rendered a below-
    guidelines sentence, we might well agree that a reduction was reasonable and
    appropriate under these facts. But the Supreme Court’s Booker decision was not
    intended to give appellate courts the freedom to determine sentences in accord
    with our sense of justice. It was to give district courts the latitude to do justice in
    the individual case, without being bound to mandatory and inflexible “guidelines”
    that were, in fact, dictates. Appellate review is limited to determining whether
    guidelines ranges were properly calculated and sentences within the bounds of
    reasonableness. After reviewing the record we do not think that the district
    court’s judgment regarding an appropriate sentence in this case exceeded those
    bounds.
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    The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New
    M exico is AFFIRM ED.
    Entered for the Court,
    M ichael W . M cConnell
    Circuit Judge
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