McClelland v. Deluxe Financial Services, Inc. , 431 F. App'x 718 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 26, 2011
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
LYNDA MCCLELLAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 08-3258
v.
(D.C. No. 2:05-CV-02137-CM)
(D. Kan.)
DELUXE FINANCIAL SERVICES,
INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HOLMES, BALDOCK, and SILER, ** Circuit Judges.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) provides that, for purposes of the
statute of limitations, a subsequently amended complaint may “relate back” to the
date of the filing of an earlier complaint in certain circumstances. Plaintiff-
Appellant Lynda McClelland seeks to use Rule 15(c) to prevent the statute of
limitations from barring her discrimination suit against Defendant-Appellee
Deluxe Financial Services, Inc. (“Deluxe”). Because we conclude that the
*
This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
**
The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
relevant amended complaint does not arise out of the same “conduct, transaction,
or occurrence set out . . . in the initial pleading,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B), we
hold that Ms. McClelland’s amended complaint does not relate back.
Accordingly, Ms. McClelland’s claims are time-barred. Exercising jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of her lawsuit.
BACKGROUND
Ms. McClelland is the final plaintiff in protracted litigation against Deluxe,
involving two captioned cases, numerous named plaintiffs, and a putative class.
To resolve Ms. McClelland’s appeal, it is necessary to review some of this
litigation’s complex history. We set forth only those details relevant to the
matters at hand.
I. Aikens v. Deluxe
On August 23, 2001, six individuals filed suit against Deluxe, alleging that
it had discriminated against them on the basis of their race in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (as amended). See Aikens v. Deluxe Fin. Servs.,
Inc., No. Civ.A.01-2427-CM, 2005 WL 1041351 (D. Kan. Mar. 2, 2005). “All of
the plaintiffs [were] either current, or former, black employees of [Deluxe].”
Aplt. App. at 185 (Aikens Compl., filed Aug. 23, 2001). They described a
specific series of allegedly discriminatory incidents at Deluxe and asserted that
“[t]he defendant’s treatment of the plaintiffs constitute[d] a continuous pattern
2
and practice of discrimination.” Id. at 186. The Aikens plaintiffs pleaded theories
of disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. Significantly,
they sought only monetary relief. See id. at 187–89 (seeking only “judgment
against the defendant for damages in excess of $500,000.00, consisting of back
pay, front pay, prejudgment interest, compensatory damages, punitive damages,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and such other and further relief as the Court
deems proper”). Several weeks later, they filed a First Amended Complaint,
which added three plaintiffs but otherwise left their factual allegations and legal
claims unaltered.
The Aikens plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on March 6, 2002.
The first part of the complaint was substantively identical to the first two
complaints, except that the new complaint dropped any reference to the specific
set of allegedly discriminatory incidents underlying the first two complaints.
Under a separate heading, plaintiffs introduced claims “on behalf of all African-
American persons who were denied equal pay, equal promotions and/or equal job
training.” Id. at 208 (Aikens Second Am. Compl., filed Mar. 6, 2002). With these
putative class claims, the Aikens plaintiffs widened their focus to allege facility-
wide and upper-management-level discrimination at Deluxe. In addition to the
claims of disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation retained
by the individual plaintiffs, the Aikens plaintiffs stated four claims on behalf of
the class. First, they asserted a broad-sweeping claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
3
which averred that Deluxe “intentionally discriminated . . . by making promotion
and hiring decisions based upon race, by denying the Plaintiffs and all class
members equal pay and equal terms and conditions of employment, and by
maintaining a pervasive atmosphere perpetuating discriminatory treatment.” Id.
at 215. The three other discrimination claims brought on behalf of the class,
which presumably were grounded on Title VII, pertained to compensation,
promotion, and hiring. Although the four class claims expressly charged Deluxe
with “intentionally discriminat[ing] against Plaintiffs, and all class members,” id.,with respect to the compensation and promotion claims, the Second Amended
Complaint also briefly averred that Deluxe’s “conduct . . . has a disparate impact
on African-American employees, including Representative Plaintiffs,” id. at 216.
On behalf of the class, plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary
relief. On March 1, 2004, the Aikens plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification.
During the next year, the parties engaged in “intensified efforts” to resolve
the dispute outside of litigation through mediation. Aikens, 2005 WL 1041351, at
*2. The efforts were successful, as “[e]ach of the individual plaintiffs agreed to
dismiss their individual and class claims in settlement of the litigation.” Id. The
district court concluded that the settlements and their accompanying stipulations
of dismissal resolved all pending claims in the case, and accordingly denied the
pending class-certification motion as moot. Id. at *6. In justifying this ruling,
4
the district court noted that the dismissal would not prejudice absent members of
the putative class:
It is undisputed that claims of the putative class are tolled during
pendency of the class certification. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co.,
Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354–55 (1983) (holding that the
commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute
of limitations for all asserted members of the putative class until
a class certification decision is made). Thus, the absent class
members may file separate actions to protect their claims within
any time remaining in the applicable statute of limitations.
Id. at *5. The Aikens suit was dismissed on March 2, 2005.
II. Webb v. Deluxe
On April 11, 2005, a new set of individual plaintiffs initiated the lawsuit
Webb v. Deluxe Financial Services, Inc. Like the plaintiffs in Aikens, the Webb
plaintiffs alleged that Deluxe had engaged in a pattern and practice of racial
discrimination. Like the plaintiffs in Aikens, they raised claims of disparate
treatment, hostile work environment, retaliation, and other general claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1981. They did not, however, aver class claims. The Webb plaintiffs
sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Ms. McClelland joined the
Webb suit on April 19, 2005, with the filing of the First Amended Complaint.
Deluxe moved for summary judgment, asserting that the claims of several
Webb plaintiffs—including Ms. McClelland—were barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. Consistent with the district court’s statements in dismissing
the Aikens suit, Deluxe acknowledged that the putative class action in Aikens
5
tolled the statute of limitations for some of the Webb plaintiffs. But it contended
that the four-year statute of limitations on Ms. McClelland’s claims expired
before the Aikens class claims were filed on March 6, 2002. Thus, according to
Deluxe, Ms. McClelland had nothing for the Aikens class claims to toll.
In response, Ms. McClelland did not dispute that, counting back to the date
of the Second Amended Complaint in Aikens, her claims were not timely.
However, she argued that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), the
Second Amended Complaint should relate back to the initial Complaint in Aikens.
Ms. McClelland argued that, counting back from the date of the initial Complaint,
rather than the Second Amended Complaint, her claims were timely.
The district court granted Deluxe’s motion for summary judgment. As to
the issue of whether the Second Amended Complaint related back, it stated:
The Aikens plaintiffs first alleged a class action suit in the
Second Amended Complaint, which they filed on March 6, 2002.
While it is arguable whether this complaint relates back to the
first complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), such
an analysis is unnecessary for the court’s present decision. This
court denied class certification on March 2, 2005. For this
decision, the court considers the statute of limitations for putative
class members tolled from at least March 6, 2002 to March 2,
2005.
Id. at 242 (Mem. & Order, filed Sept. 22, 2006) (citations omitted). It is not clear
why the district court deemed the relation-back analysis unnecessary. However,
operating on the view that the limitations period was four years, and taking into
account the almost three-year tolling period, the district court concluded that “any
6
claim regarding employment practices” could not have accrued before mid-April
1998, because otherwise it “would be barred regardless of its association with the
Aikens case.” Id. at 243. In other words, the court reasoned that the claim must
have accrued in or after mid-April 1998 in order to fall within the limitations
period. Because Ms. McClelland stopped working at Deluxe on March 2, 1998,
the district court concluded that her claims were barred by the statute of
limitations.
Ms. McClelland later argued that the district court should return to the
relation-back question because it had not actually decided the issue, but the court
rejected her arguments on procedural grounds. The court then granted final
judgment to Deluxe on Ms. McClelland’s claims. Ms. McClelland submitted a
timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Although Ms. McClelland’s appeal implicates several significant issues, we
need only resolve one. Specifically, Ms. McClelland argues that her claims
against Deluxe are timely because the Second Amended Complaint in Aikens
relates back under Rule 15(c) to the initial Aikens Complaint. We disagree.
Thus, we hold that Ms. McClelland’s claims are barred by the statute of
limitations.
I. Standard of Review
7
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
applying the same legal standard employed by the district court. See, e.g.,
Narotzky v. Natrona Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. Bd. of Trs., 610 F.3d 558, 565 (10th Cir.
2010). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In applying this standard,
we construe the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. McClelland, the non-
moving party. See, e.g., Kannady v. City of Kiowa, 590 F.3d 1161, 1168–69 (10th
Cir. 2010). Further, “[w]e review de novo the district court’s application of Rule
15(c) to undisputed facts, a ‘purely legal interpretation.’” Garrett v. Fleming,
362 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Slade v. U.S. Postal Serv., 875 F.2d
814, 815 (10th Cir. 1989)); cf. Sawtell v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 22
F.3d 248, 253 (10th Cir. 1994) (“If the district court’s refusal to toll the statute of
limitations resides in the grant of summary judgment, we review the refusal de
novo.”).
II. Ms. McClelland’s Claim Is Not Timely
As the district court noted, the Supreme Court has long held “that the
commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as
to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit
been permitted to continue as a class action.” Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah,
414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974). Such a rule, the Supreme Court stated, comports with
8
the fairness principles underlying limitations periods because “a named plaintiff
who is found to be representative of a class commences a suit and thereby notifies
the defendants not only of the substantive claims being brought against them, but
also of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may
participate in the judgment.” Id. at 554–55; accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1228–30 (10th Cir. 2008); Joseph v. Wiles, 223
F.3d 1155, 1166–68 (10th Cir. 2000); see Parker, 462 U.S. at 354 (“Once the
statute of limitations has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the
putative class until class certification is denied.”). Thus, assuming, arguendo,
that she is a member of the putative Aikens class, we may further assume that Ms.
McClelland’s statute of limitations was tolled from the date of the filing of the
Second Amended Complaint in Aikens—when the class claims were first
asserted—to the date when the class claims were denied.
The issue before us is whether Ms. McClelland is entitled to additional
tolling by operation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). She argues that,
under Rule 15(c), the Second Amended Complaint in Aikens should be found to
relate back to the initial Aikens Complaint, and, thus, that she is entitled to class
tolling all the way back to the date of that initial Complaint. 1 If the Second
1
Deluxe categorically objects to this proposed maneuver, contending
that “[t]olling and the relation back doctrine are analytically distinct,” Aplee. Br.
at 28, and that it would be improper to use relation back to extend the American
Pipe tolling period. We need not definitively decide whether it is appropriate to
9
Amended Complaint relates back, Ms. McClelland contends that her claims are
timely. If it does not, there is no dispute that her claims are barred.
A. Relation Back Under Rule 15(c) 2
Rule 15(c) provides that “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the
date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense
that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to
be set out—in the original pleading . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). “Relation
back is intimately connected with the policy of the statute of limitations.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15 advisory committee’s note (1966). As the Supreme Court has stated,
extend American Pipe as Ms. McClelland asks us to do. For even if we assume,
without deciding, that Ms. McClelland may use class tolling in conjunction with
relation back under Rule 15(c), her claim fails because we nevertheless conclude
that the Second Amended Complaint in Aikens does not relate back.
2
As noted above, the district court did not explicitly hold that the
Second Amended Complaint did not relate back; rather, the court deemed it
unnecessary to consider the issue and then refused Ms. McClelland’s request to
reconsider this decision. However, because this legal issue was litigated before
the district court and has been fully briefed by the parties before us, we do not
hesitate to resolve this appeal on the relation-back issue. See, e.g., Prison Legal
News v. Exec. Office of the U.S. Attorneys, 628 F.3d 1243, 1251 (10th Cir. 2011)
(“This court may nonetheless affirm on any ground that is supported in the record
and raised on appeal.”); Shroff v. Spellman, 604 F.3d 1179, 1187 n.4 (10th Cir.
2010) (“[W]e may ‘affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there
is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon
by the district court.’” (quoting Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational & Prof’l
Licensing, 240 F.3d 871, 876 (10th Cir. 2001))); Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751,
760 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Although the district court did not rely on this ground, ‘we
may affirm on any grounds supported by the record.’ Defendants raised this
ground in the district court, thus providing plaintiffs an opportunity to address it.”
(citation omitted) (quoting Hayes v. Whitman, 264 F.3d 1017, 1025 (10th Cir. 2001))).
10
the purpose of relation back is “to balance the interests of the defendant protected
by the statute of limitations with the preference expressed in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in particular, for resolving disputes on
their merits.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010).
Though a potential defendant has a “strong interest in repose,” repose should not
be a “windfall” for a defendant who possesses sufficient notice of impending
claims. Id. “The rationale of Rule 15(c) is that a party who has been notified of
litigation concerning a particular occurrence has been given all the notice that
statutes of limitations were intended to provide.” Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Cntr. v.
Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149 n.3 (1984). 3 The same general standard of notice
3
The Fifth Circuit’s discussion of the relation-back doctrine is
noteworthy:
Relation back is intimately connected with the policy of the
statute of limitations. The policies underlying statutes of
limitations—evidentiary concerns and repose—require that a
plaintiff (1) commence suit (preserving the evidence) and (2)
furnish the defendant notice of the suit and its claims (preventing
repose from vesting). When Rule 15(c) is satisfied, neither of
these policies is impinged because the plaintiff commenced suit
before the limitations period lapsed and the defendant knew or
should have known of the suit and the claims, allowing him to
preserve his evidence. In such a circumstance, at least according
to the drafters of the Rules, it would work an injustice to time-
bar a plaintiff’s claim against a particular defendant not earlier
named or a specific claim not earlier pleaded.
Admiral Ins. Co. v. Abshire, 574 F.3d 267, 277 (5th Cir.) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee’s notes) (internal quotation marks
omitted), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 756 (2009).
11
applies regardless of whether a litigant seeks to add defendants, plaintiffs, or
claims. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee’s note.
Because it can be challenging to give life to the general language of Rule
15(c), we canvas some of our salient cases to illuminate the manner in which we
have applied the relation-back concept. In Gilles v. United States, 906 F.2d 1386(10th Cir. 1990) (en banc), the district court concluded that Mr. Gilles’s amended
complaint did not relate back and dismissed his suit as untimely. Reversing on
this point, we stated:
Here both the original and amended complaints contain almost
identical portions entitled “Gravamen Of Complaint,” averring
that the United States, through its agents and employees,
negligently treated plaintiff Gilles with resulting irreparable
damage to his health so that his heart condition became
inoperable and his life expectancy has been considerably
diminished. The two complaints are grounded on the same
nucleus of operative facts, and thus, within the meaning of Rule
15(c), the claim asserted in the amended complaint arose out of
the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence . . . .”
Id. at 1389–90 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
In Southern Colorado Prestress Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission, 586 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1978), a construction company
appealed an order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,
alleging that the Commission’s amended citation for workplace safety violations
was untimely. Id. at 1346. We rejected this argument, holding that Rule 15(c)
was satisfied because “the citation as amended alleged the same basic facts and
12
circumstances and complained of the same omission by the employer as had the
original citation and complaint[;] that is, the failure to provide scaffolding or
safety nets.” Id. at 1346–47. We further explained:
The original citation stated that . . . the employer did not provide
scaffolding or safety nets for an employee . . . . This citation
alleged a serious violation under 29 C.F.R.
[§] 1926.750(b)(1)(ii) . . . . The amendment . . . essentially
alleged that ‘the same conditions are also a serious violation of
the standards found at’ 29 C.F.R. [§] 1926.105(a) and (b). No
new facts were alleged.
Id. at 1347 n.7 (alterations omitted).
In Superior Manufacturing Corp. v. Hessler, Manufacturing Corp., 267
F.2d 302 (10th Cir. 1959), a group of creditors filed a petition to compel
bankruptcy proceedings, but the petition was dismissed for procedural defects.
Id. at 303. The creditors then “filed a petition in form and substance in practical
identity with the initial pleading” (but minus the procedural defects). Id. The
debtors moved to dismiss the amended petition as untimely. We stated:
An amended pleading is one which clarifies or amplifies
a cause of action which can be identified with certainty as the
same cause of action originally pleaded or attempted to be
pleaded. It is a perfection of an original pleading rather than the
establishment of a new cause of action. . . . Of course the
intention of the bankruptcy act cannot be defeated by the filing
of a skeleton petition complying with statutory requirements
pleaded as generalities and then later amended to supply requisite
particulars. The essential claim must be capable of determination
in the original pleading and continued in the amended pleading.
13
Id. at 304 (citations omitted). “The most casual comparison” of the two pleadings
in that case indicated that this test was satisfied and, therefore, that the amended
pleading related back. Id.In Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Clint, 235 F.2d 445 (10th
Cir. 1956), a widow sued her husband’s employer for the husband’s wrongful
death. After the limitations period had run, she amended her complaint to change
the state statute on which her claim was predicated. Id. at 447. In ruling on
whether the amended complaint related back under Rule 15(c), we stated:
The claim asserted in the amended complaint arose out of
the same conduct and occurrence set forth, or attempted to be set
forth in the original complaint. The parties were the same, the
occurrence was the same, and in both pleadings the same
negligence was pleaded as the proximate cause of the accident
which resulted in David’s death. From the beginning, Ane
sought to recover damages for the death of David, her husband,
caused by an explosion of the locomotive in which he was riding,
which explosion was caused by the negligence of the employees
of the Railroad Company, the engineer and fireman in charge of
the locomotive.
Id. Accordingly, we held that “the amendment related back to the time of the
filing of the original complaint and that, therefore, the claim asserted in the
amended complaint [wa]s not barred.” Id.Finally, in Kansas Milling Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 185 F.2d
413 (10th Cir. 1951), the appellant challenged an order of the National Labor
Relations Board, contending that the Board’s amended complaint alleging unfair
labor practices was untimely and did not relate back to an earlier complaint. We
14
disagreed. “The first charge,” we noted, “alleged in the general language of the
statute that the company had interfered with, restrained and coerced its
employees, discriminated in regard to hire and tenure and had refused to bargain
in good faith in violation of their rights . . . .” Id. at 416. By comparison, the
second amended charge alleged that
the company had threatened its employees with loss of seniority
and their jobs if they engaged in a strike; told them during the
course of the strike that unless they returned to work they would
lose their seniority and their jobs; and told them to repudiate the
Union and that unless they did so they would be discharged.
Id. In this light, we found “nothing inconsistent in the . . . amended charge with
the general allegations of the original charge. [It is] somewhat in the nature of a
bill of particulars making more definite the general allegations of the original
charge and thus relate[s] back to the original charge.” Id.; see also Am. Fid. &
Cas. Co. v. All Am. Bus Lines, 190 F.2d 234, 237 (10th Cir. 1951) (“The
complaint, both before and after the substitution of Security as the party plaintiff,
centered with the same impact and force around the pivotal question whether
American failed to exercise good faith in declining to settle the case pending in
the state court.”). Compare Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 387 F.3d 298, 310 (3d
Cir. 2004) (“By virtue of the series of events drafted in the original Complaint,
[Defendant] was unquestionably on notice that it would be held liable for every
possible breach . . . occasioned by the outlined facts. The additional purported
breaches particularized in the Second Amended Restated Complaint derive
15
directly from the factual circumstances adumbrated in the original Complaint.”),
and Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp. 522, 553 n.31 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Although
the original complaint did not contain class action allegations, it did allege all of
the basic facts material to the class claims and, by its request for injunctive relief,
gave adequate notice that class-wide relief might well be merited. Under these
circumstances the amended complaint may be deemed to relate back to the date of
filing of the original pleading even though in effect it added a large number of
inmates as potential beneficiaries of plaintiffs’ claims.”), with Cliff v. Payco Gen.
Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1133 n.16 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that
plaintiff’s complaint alleging nationwide class-action claims did not relate back
under Rule 15(c) when plaintiff “made the strategic decision to limit the class to
individuals residing in one state, and subsequently decided—after the statute of
limitations had run—that he wished to expand his suit to encompass individuals in
all fifty states”), and 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1497, at 99–104 (3d ed. 2010) (“[I]f the
alteration of the original pleading is so substantial that it cannot be said that
defendant was given adequate notice of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
that forms the basis of the new claim or defense, then the amendment will not
relate back . . . .”).
B. The Aikens Second Amended Complaint Does Not Relate Back
16
Ms. McClelland argues that the Second Amended Complaint in Aikens
should relate back to the initial Complaint. In light of the principles and
precedents above, we conclude that the Complaint did not give Deluxe sufficient
notice of the impending class claims. Thus, we hold that the Second Amended
Complaint does not relate back.
1. Initial Complaint in Aikens
On August 23, 2001, six individual plaintiffs filed the initial Complaint in
the Aikens case. They alleged that Deluxe had discriminated against them based
upon their race. They pleaded a general discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, which alleged that Deluxe discriminated against them “in regard to the
conditions and privileges of their employment, including but not limited to, their
rate of pay, promotion, hiring, evaluation of their work and performance,
assignment of helpers, assignment of duties, and the handling of work related
injuries.” Aplt. App. at 187. The individual plaintiffs also pleaded specific
claims for hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII and § 1981.
The Complaint noted that all of the plaintiffs had filed administrative charges
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The individual
plaintiffs sought only money damages, not injunctive or declaratory relief.
The focus of this Complaint was a series of allegedly discriminatory
incidents at Deluxe. Specifically, the Complaint stated:
17
In mid-1999, the defendant hired Lindsey Jones, a black
male, to be its plant manager at the Lenexa, Kansas, facilities.
Mr. Jones was the first black plant manager hired by the
defendant.
In mid-1999, the defendant also hired Sherry Vega, a
Hispanic female, to be its Human Resources manager at the
Lenexa, Kansas, facilities[.]
Mr. Jones, as the plant manager, together with Ms. Vega,
began to initiate several plans to improve the status of minority
employees at the defendant’s Lenexa, Kansas, facilities.
In mid-2000, the defendant terminated the employment of
Mr. Jones and Ms. Vega.
Both Mr. Jones and Ms. Vega filed complaints of
discrimination with the [EEOC], which has rendered a probable
cause determination in their cases.
Throughout their employment, the plaintiffs were subjected
to racially discriminatory jokes, comments and depictions.
Most of the plaintiffs participated in a corporate meeting
where the president of the company was present. During that
meeting, plaintiffs spoke out about the problems that minority
workers faced and about their feelings regarding the termination
of Mr. Jones and Ms. Vega.
After the corporate meeting, the plaintiffs were called into
the new plant manager’s office and informed that their comments
were inappropriate, and that plaintiffs and the other minority
workers who spoke up did not allow the white employees an
opportunity to express their concerns.
The defendant’s treatment of the plaintiffs constitutes a
continuous pattern and practice of discrimination.
Id. at 185–86 (paragraph numbers omitted).
18
Just as these allegations centered on a discrete set of incidents involving
Mr. Jones and Ms. Vega, other averments in the Complaint centered on the
individual plaintiffs’ own experiences and impressions and did not exhibit an
obvious connection with general policies and practices at Deluxe. See, e.g., id. at
185 (“All of the plaintiffs were paid at a lesser pay grade and salary range than
similarly situated white employees.” (emphasis added)); id. at 187 (“Throughout
the course of their employment, the plaintiffs were treated differently than
similarly situated white employees . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. (“The
defendant’s treatment of the plaintiffs . . . is motivated by improper factors,
including plaintiffs’ race.” (emphasis added)); id. (“As a result of the defendant’s
illegal and intentional conduct, plaintiffs have suffered serious economic losses as
well as physical and emotional pain and suffering.” (emphasis added)). The
Complaint did aver that Deluxe’s “treatment of the plaintiffs constitute[d] a
continuous pattern and practice of discrimination.” Id. at 186 (emphasis added).
However, the Complaint’s averments did not even hint that this allegedly
discriminatory pattern and practice extended to other African American
employees, beyond the named individual plaintiffs. Similarly, there was no
suggestion in these averments that any such pattern and practice was formulated
or orchestrated by Deluxe’s high-level management or implemented throughout
the Lenexa, Kansas, facility or company-wide.
2. Second Amended Complaint in Aikens
19
The Aikens plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on March 6, 2002.
The first several pages of this complaint repeated the individual allegations made
in the initial Complaint. Gone, however, was any mention of the series of events
centering on Mr. Jones and Ms. Vega. Rather, under a separate heading, the
complaint introduced “Class Allegations.” Id. at 206. At a superficial level, the
class averments principally focus on the same subject matter as the
Complaint—i.e., Deluxe’s allegedly intentional discrimination against African-
American employees. Beneath these superficial similarities, however, lie very
significant differences.
First, the classes proposed by the Second Amended Complaint expanded
the case from six individual plaintiffs to “all African-American persons who were
denied equal pay, equal promotions and/or equal job training” at Deluxe’s
Lenexa, Kansas, facility. Id. at 208. More specifically, this master class itself
was divided into two subclasses. One subclass included “any African-Americans
employed by Defendant in Lenexa[,] Kansas[,] from October 13, 1994, to
present,” and the other included “[a]ll African-Americans who attempted to
obtain employment with Defendant in Lenexa[,] Kansas[,] from 1996, to present.”
Id. The complaint further indicated that “[t]he African-Americans in the
[proposed] Classes . . . are so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. Upon information and belief, the members of this class will
exceed 300 persons.” Id. at 209.
20
Second, the Second Amended Complaint sought new forms of relief. While
the initial Complaint sought only money damages, the Second Amended
Complaint sought money damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
Third, and more generally, the Second Amended Complaint transformed the
gravamen of the case from alleged discrimination centering on a series of discrete
incidents relating to specified employees, to allegations that Deluxe discriminated
against African-American employees on at least a facility-wide basis; that Deluxe
did so by “maintain[ing] unconstitutional and discriminatory policies, practices,
and customs of racial discrimination, including, but not limited to, promotional,
training, hiring and pay practices,” id. at 206; and that these “purposefully
discriminatory employment policies, practices, and procedures [were] conceived
and directed by [Deluxe’s] upper management, id. at 215; see also id. at 207
(“Defendant has had actual and/or constructive notice of . . . , but has taken no
constructive steps to eliminate said discriminatory policies, procedures and
practices.”); id. at 213 (“Defendant’s management personnel have actual
knowledge of discrimination directed against African-American
employees . . . .”).
In particular, the class averments implicate much of the framework of
policies and practices that Deluxe has erected for dealing with employees, not
only at the Lenexa facility, but also apparently throughout the company as a
whole. See id. (“Defendant has promotion practices which are based on
21
subjective rather than objective, job-related criteria, and which are not uniformly
applied to African-American and Caucasian employees.”); id. at 214 (“There are
inadequate written policies, procedures, or guidelines at [Deluxe] with respect to
promotion of its employees[,] . . . render[ing] the system arbitrary, and such
arbitrariness is used as pretext for denying qualified African-American
employees, including Representative Plaintiffs, promotions to which they are
qualified and entitled.”); id. at 216 (alleging that Deluxe “fails to maintain a
salary or pay scale which is based on objective, job-related criteria”). In this
regard, although the principal focus of the Second Amended Complaint appears to
have been on alleged intentional discrimination, it is at least noteworthy that the
class averments hint at another theory of discrimination that does not require such
intent—that is, the disparate-impact theory. See id. (averring briefly with regard
to the compensation and promotion class claims that Deluxe’s “conduct . . . has a
disparate impact on African-American employees, including Representative
Plaintiffs”); cf. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (“Proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not required under a disparate-
impact theory.”); Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“In a disparate-impact claim the plaintiff is challenging an employment practice
that is fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” (quoting Bullington v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1312 (10th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
22
3. No Relation Back
In contending that the Second Amended Complaint relates back, Ms.
McClelland focuses on two factors. First, she points out that the initial Aikens
Complaint contained broad allegations of discrimination, including allegations
that Deluxe’s actions “constitute[d] a continuous pattern and practice of
discrimination.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Aikens Compl.
at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted). Deluxe was thus “on notice of the nature
of the substantive claims [that] it might have to defend [against].” Id. Second,
she highlights that both the initial Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint
focused on Deluxe’s facility in Lenexa, Kansas. Thus, “Deluxe was on notice of
the generic identities of the putative class members . . . , i.e.[,] all African-
American employees who worked for Deluxe at its Lenexa, Kansas[,] facilities.”
Id.To support her argument, Ms. McClelland relies chiefly on Paskuly v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1981). In that case, Ms. Paskuly
brought suit under Title VII, “alleg[ing] that her employer, defendant Marshall
Field & Company, had discriminated against her because of her sex.” Id. at
1210–11. After the statute of limitations had run, Ms. Paskuly “filed an amended
complaint seeking to transform her action into a class action on behalf of all
similarly situated female employees of the defendant.” Id. at 1211. The district
court denied Marshall Field’s motion to strike her class claims as untimely.
23
Reviewing for an abuse of discretion, the Seventh Circuit—in a one-page per
curiam opinion—affirmed under Rule 15(c). Id. “We note,” the court stated,
“that the original complaint alleged that defendant engaged in practices that
discriminated against women because of their sex; the defendant was thereby on
notice that it might be required to defend its employment practices from charges
of class-based discrimination.” Id. The court also held that Ms. Paskuly’s filing
of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC “placed defendant on notice of the
likelihood of a class-wide action later being maintained against it.” Id. Ms.
McClelland contends that we should reach a “similar conclusion” in this case.
Aplt. Opening Br. at 27.
In response, Deluxe contends that relation back would be improper because
it was not until the Second Amended Complaint that it was aware of “any
substantive claims of putative class members.” Aplee. Br. at 25. “On the
contrary, [the first two Aikens complaints] focused exclusively on the treatment of
the individual plaintiffs.” Id. Deluxe continues:
The original and First Amended Complaints also failed to
notify Deluxe of the generic identities of the putative class
members who may participate in a judgment. They contained no
description of any putative class. Moreover, the pleadings
expressly excluded anyone other than the identified plaintiffs
from participating in the judgment. The relief demanded was
exclusively individualized and reserved to the identified
plaintiffs. Indeed, the pleadings contained no request for
injunctive or declaratory relief that might impact someone other
than the identified plaintiffs. As a result, no one other than the
24
identified, individual Aikens plaintiffs could have participated in
any aspect of the judgment.
Id. at 26 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). Deluxe also contends—and Ms.
McClelland does not dispute—that the individual plaintiffs in the initial Aikens
Complaint all worked in Deluxe’s manufacturing plants in Lenexa, Kansas. Id. at
26 n.5. The Second Amended Complaint, in declaring a class of “all African-
American persons who were denied equal pay, equal promotions and/or equal job
training” at Deluxe, Aplt. App. at 208, does not appear to limit its coverage to
manufacturing employees in Lenexa, Kansas. “Without a class description,”
Deluxe argues, “a Complaint does not notify a defendant what evidence needs to
be preserved, for what claims, for what period of time, from what facilities, and
so on.” Aplee. Br. at 27 n.6.
We agree with Deluxe. More specifically, we conclude that there is no
relation back under Rule 15(c). Upon receiving the initial Aikens Complaint, a
reasonable defendant in Deluxe’s position certainly would have been aware that
claims of discrimination were brewing among a certain subset of its employees.
For example, Deluxe would have had no grounds for objecting if the initial Aikens
plaintiffs had sought to add new legal claims based on the “basic facts and
circumstances” laid out in the initial Complaint. S. Colo. Prestress, 586 F.2d at
1346. Nor could Deluxe reasonably claim to have been surprised by the addition
of further plaintiffs who had worked under Mr. Jones and Ms. Vega, or who had
25
been involved in the series of allegedly discriminatory incidents set out in the
initial Complaint. Indeed, this is precisely what occurred when three individual
plaintiffs were added by the First Amended Complaint.
Unlike the First Amended Complaint, however, the Second Amended
Complaint alleged something different altogether. The first two complaints
involved a set of allegedly discriminatory incidents affecting a limited number of
identified employees that involved, among other things, pay and promotions. And
Mr. Jones and Ms. Vega, and Deluxe’s allegedly adverse treatment of them, had a
somewhat ill-defined nexus to these events. Yet, the Second Amended
Complaint, rather than containing “almost identical” allegations, Gilles, 906 F.2d
at 1389, instead alleged that upper management instigated discrimination and
implemented it on at least a facility-wide basis, affecting more than 300 potential
plaintiffs. The Second Amended Complaint was not “somewhat in the nature of a
bill of particulars making more definite the general allegations of the original
charge,” Kan. Milling Co., 185 F.2d at 416, but instead included a set of new and
separate allegations implicating a wider set of facts, witnesses, and proofs. “The
fact that both [complaints] involve[d] allegations of racial discrimination does not
alter [this] conclusion.” Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir.
2008).
Ms. McClelland is correct to note that the initial Complaint and the Second
Amended Complaint use the phrase “pattern and practice” in discussing the
26
alleged discrimination of Deluxe. For the purpose of notice, however, it is the
content of the allegations, not the phrases employed, that matters. The allegations
in the initial Complaint focused on the individual plaintiffs; it was not until the
Second Amended Complaint that Deluxe was made aware of specific claims of
systemic, facility-wide (and possibly company-wide) discrimination. An
individual may believe—and thus allege—that an employer’s treatment of him is
part of a “pattern and practice” of discrimination. But without specific
allegations of class-wide discrimination, such vague claims by individual
plaintiffs are not enough to alert a defendant that class claims are on the horizon.
The phrase “pattern and practice” is not a shibboleth which, once uttered, puts the
defendant on alert that the limitations period is tolled. That would be grossly
unfair. See, e.g., Augilar v. U.S. Immig. & Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 16
(1st Cir. 2007) (“While there may be qualitative as well as quantitative
distinctions between class-wide pattern and practice claims, on the one hand, and
individual claims, on the other hand, merely conglomerating individual claims
and posturing the conglomeration as a pattern and practice claim does not have
talismanic effects.” (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Mirasol v. Gutierrez, No.
05 Civ. 6368(DC), 2006 WL 871028, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2006) (“[A]
plaintiff does not properly allege an ongoing discriminatory policy simply by
invoking the magic words pattern or practice.” (quoting Blake v. Bronx Lebanon
27
Hosp. Ctr., No. 02 Civ. 3827(CBM), 2003 WL 21910867, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
11, 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We likewise reject Ms. McClelland’s claim that Deluxe was on notice of
the impending class claims simply because both the initial Complaint and the
class claims of the Second Amended Complaint centered on Deluxe’s facility in
Lenexa, Kansas. As we noted above, Deluxe contends—and Ms. McClelland does
not dispute—that the plaintiffs in the initial Complaint worked exclusively in one
business division of the Lenexa facility, that is, manufacturing; yet, the class
averments of the Second Amended Complaint sweep more broadly. This fact cuts
against the argument that the initial Complaint would have provided Deluxe
notice of the generic identities of the members of the putative class. But even
without this information, 4 Ms. McClelland’s argument is unpersuasive. Simply
4
That all of the named plaintiffs in the initial Complaint worked in the
same business division is not discernable from the face of the Complaint. We do
not appear to have opined on what evidence a court may consider (in addition to
the pleadings) in determining whether a defendant received notice of a particular
claim. See United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493,
517 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that courts may “consider extrinsic evidence in
analyzing whether an amendment relates back to the original complaint”); see
also 6A Wright et al., supra, § 1497, at 110 (“It has been suggested that the
requisite notice must be given by the content of the original pleadings. Other
cases have taken a broader view and have held that it is sufficient if the opposing
party was made aware of the matters to be raised by the amendment from sources
other than the pleadings. This position seems sound . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
And we need not definitively speak to the matter here because Ms. McClelland’s
argument is unpersuasive in any event.
28
because the two complaints focused on the same facility, without additional
context, says nothing about the notice Deluxe received from the initial Complaint.
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit’s short per curiam opinion in Paskuly does not
give us pause. Its persuasive force is undercut by the cursory nature of its
analysis. And, such that it is, Paskuly’s analysis is problematic in at least one
significant respect. The Seventh Circuit stated that Ms. Paskuly’s filing of a
charge with the EEOC “placed defendant on notice of the likelihood of a
class-wide action later being maintained against it.” 646 F.2d at 1211. The court
did not discuss the content of the EEOC charge in reaching this conclusion; it
appears to have held that such a charge provided notice as a categorical matter.
Ms. McClelland points out that all of the plaintiffs in the original Aikens
Complaint filed EEOC charges against Deluxe, and she urges us to follow
Paskuly and find that these charges gave Deluxe notice of the impending class
claims. We reject the idea that the mere act of filing such a charge is sufficient in
and of itself to provide notice to a defendant of class claims. 5 Paskuly does not
5
Assuming that extrinsic evidence such as the contents of an EEOC
charge may be considered in assessing a defendant’s notice for purposes of Rule
15(c), see discussion supra note 4, we do not reject out of hand the possibility
that an EEOC charge—depending on its substantive allegations—might provide
notice to a defendant for purposes of relation back. We need not decide the point
here, however. We note that we would have no way to make such a determination
in this case, for the record on appeal does not include copies of the EEOC charges
filed by the Aikens plaintiffs, and Ms. McClelland does not indicate what the
charges alleged.
29
explain why this should be so, no reason is readily apparent to us, and Ms.
McClelland does not offer us one. Therefore, to the extent that Paskuly’s holding
turns on Ms. Paskuly’s act of filing an EEOC charge, it is dubious. And, more
generally, we conclude that Paskuly should not guide our resolution of the
relation-back issue.
CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that the Second Amended Complaint in Aikens does
not relate back to the initial Aikens Complaint, Ms. McClelland’s claims against
Deluxe are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, we
AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
30