Wells v. Krebs , 432 F. App'x 724 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 18, 2011
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
VINCENT EUGENE WELLS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 10-1514
v. (D.C. No. 1:10-CV-00023-LTB-KMT)
(D. Colo.)
STEPHEN R. KREBS, M.D., Medical
Director, Physician Health Partners;
JOSEPH FORTUNATO, M.D.,
Sterling Correctional Facility; BARRY
GOLDSMITH, M.D., Sterling
Correctional Facility; PAULA
FRANTZ, M.D., Medical Director,
Colorado Department of Corrections;
JO ANNE STOCK, P.A., Sterling
Correctional Facility; BEVERLY
DOWIS, Health Service
Administrator; CHERYL SMITH,
Clinical Chief of Operations, Colorado
Department of Corrections,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Vincent Eugene Wells, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from a
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of
an Eighth Amendment violation, deliberate medical indifference. He also
complains about scheduling matters and the delay in ruling on his motion for a
preliminary injunction. ** We AFFIRM.
B ACKGROUND
Wells is incarcerated in Colorado’s Sterling Correctional Facility. In
January 2010, he filed this action, claiming he received inadequate medical care
for various health problems, including: “lupus, hepatitis, degenerative disc
disease, kidney cysts, lymphatic disorder and a malignant neoplastic prostate, or
even undiagnosed cancer,” as well as constipation, deep vein thrombosis and
polycythemia vera. R. at 13, 14. He named as defendants, doctors Stephen
Krebs, Joseph Fortunato, Barry Goldsmith, Paula Frantz; physician’s assistant Jo
Anne Stock; and prison administrators Beverly Dowis and Cheryl Smith.
Wells also moved for a preliminary injunction to require the defendants “to
provide proper and adequate Chronic health care and[/]or transfer him to a full
hospital facility that will provide such medical care.” Id. at 36. The defendants
opposed the motion, providing evidence of the extensive medical care provided to
**
Our jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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Wells. Dr. Frantz, the chief medical officer for the Colorado Department of
Corrections, submitted an affidavit, opining there was no medical support for
many of Wells’ health concerns. There were also medical records noting Wells’
“uncanny fear of dying,” id. at 182, and his “demand[s] something [is] wrong
with him” even when imaging and lab reports show otherwise, id. at 184, 186.
A magistrate judge reviewed the complaint, noted there were no allegations
the defendants had personally participated in the deprivation of any constitutional
right, and ordered Wells to file an amended complaint. In response, Wells filed a
more detailed complaint.
The defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing they were
entitled to qualified immunity. Wells sought to postpone a summary judgment
ruling, contending the district court should rule on his request for injunctive relief
and establish an “[e]xpedited [d]iscovery process or meeting.” Id. at 558.
Several weeks later, Wells responded to the defendants’ summary judgment
motion, submitting medical records and his own affidavit. The following day, the
magistrate judge entered a minute order denying Wells’ request to postpone a
summary judgment ruling, stating Wells failed to indicate why facts precluding
summary judgment could not be presented, what steps had been taken to obtain
such facts, or how additional time would enable him to rebut the defendants’
arguments. Wells sought reconsideration of the minute order, asserting that a
recent hospitalization was the result of inadequate medical care.
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The magistrate judge denied reconsideration and recommended granting the
defendants’ summary judgment motion. In regard to summary judgment, the
magistrate judge concluded that Wells’ claims regarding hepatitis treatment failed
because there were no allegations of personal participation by any defendant in
denying care. Similarly, there was no evidence Dr. Frantz or Administrator Smith
had personally participated in any of the acts forming the bases of his claims. As
for Wells’ claims regarding lupus, cancer, hypoglycemia, and polycythemia vera,
the magistrate judge noted there was no evidence he had those diseases. As to his
claims of inadequate care for deep vein thrombosis, a separated shoulder, kidney
cysts, degenerative disc disease, swollen lymph nodes, weight loss, constipation
and other conditions, the magistrate judge rejected them on a variety of grounds:
they were belied by the medical evidence, they merely reflected Wells’
disagreement with treatment protocols, or they were premised on a difference of
medical opinion among the defendant doctors. Because Wells was unable to
establish a Constitutional violation with respect to his medical care, the
magistrate judge concluded the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
and injunctive relief was unwarranted.
The district court accepted the recommendations, entered summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, and denied Wells’ motion for injunctive
relief.
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D ISCUSSION 1
Wells first challenges the order denying his motion to postpone a ruling on
the motion for summary judgment. Wells did not, however, file an affidavit to
support his motion. “Where a party opposing summary judgment and seeking a
continuance pending completion of discovery fails to take advantage of the shelter
provided by Rule 56(f) by filing an affidavit, [2] there is no abuse of discretion in
granting summary judgment if it is otherwise appropriate.” Pasternak v. Lear
Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 832-33 (10th Cir. 1986).
While Wells did file the required affidavit when seeking reconsideration, he
identified a need for additional discovery only as to a hospitalization occurring
after the filing of his amended complaint. That matter was not part of the original
complaint and Wells did not seek to amend to include it. Consequently, the
magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in declining to delay decision on the
1
Because Wells is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe his appellate
briefs. See Butler v. Kempthorne, 532 F.3d 1108, 1110 (10th Cir. 2008).
2
Effective December 1, 2010, the provision for obtaining a summary
judgment continuance was moved to subdivision (d) of Rule 56 without
substantial change:
If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the
court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow
time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or
(3) issue any other appropriate order.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); see also Advisory Committee’s Note (2010 Amendments).
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motion for summary judgment or in denying reconsideration. See Pasternak, 790
F.2d at 832-33; Ysais v. Richardson, 603 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 163 (2010). On a related note, Wells complains of the failure
to hold a scheduling conference or issue a scheduling order, but he does not
identify—nor do we see—how that affected any of his substantial rights. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 61.
Wells next contends the “[d]istrict [c]ourt incorrect[ly] determin[ed] that no
material facts or genuine issue existed to support his claims.” Aplt. Br. at 2(a).
We disagree. Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When a defendant asserts
“the qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must meet
a strict two-part test by showing (1) that the defendant violated a constitutional or
statutory right, and (2) that this right was clearly established at the time of the
defendant’s conduct.” Bowling v. Rector, 584 F.3d 956, 964 (10th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “We review a grant of summary judgment on
the basis of qualified immunity de novo.” Harman v. Pollock, 586 F.3d 1254,
1260 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 73 (2010).
Wells asserts the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. Such a “claim has both an objective component—whether
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the deprivation is sufficiently serious—and a subjective component—whether the
official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t
of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 809 (10th Cir. 1999). But “[a] negligent failure to
provide adequate medical care, even one constituting medical malpractice, does
not give rise to a constitutional violation. Moreover, a prisoner who merely
disagrees with a diagnosis or a prescribed course of treatment does not state a
constitutional violation.” Id. at 811 (citation omitted).
We have reviewed the record, and agree with the magistrate judge and for
substantially the same reasons she identified in her detailed recommendation filed
September 1, 2010– Wells failed to show an Eighth Amendment violation. The
defendants were qualifiedly immune from suit and entitled to summary judgment.
Finally, Wells contends the magistrate judge should have “immediate[ly]
rul[ed]” on his motion for preliminary injunctive relief, rather than resolve it at
the same time as the defendants’ summary judgment motion. Aplt. Br. at 3. 3 But
Wells does not indicate how an earlier ruling would have made any difference in
the ultimate result. Indeed, based on the medical records and other evidence
submitted by the defendants in response to his motion—which was much the same
evidence submitted in support of the summary judgment motion—the magistrate
3
To the extent this contention also concerns Wells’ motion for a temporary
restraining order, the denial of a temporary restraining order is not appealable.
See Populist Party v. Herschler, 746 F.2d 656, 661 n.2 (10th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam).
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judge could have immediately denied injunctive relief because he failed to show
“a substantial likelihood that he [would] prevail on the merits,” Utah Licensed
Beverage Ass’n v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1075 (10th Cir. 2001).
C ONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Wells’ “Request for an
Expidited [sic] Ruling” is DENIED as moot. His motion to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis is DENIED as this appeal is frivolous. He must forthwith pay the
entire $455 filing and docketing fees to the Clerk of the District Court.
Entered for the Court
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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