United States v. Palmer ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 27, 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 14-4121
RODNEY JAMES PALMER, (D.C. No. 2:12-CR-00663-RJS-1)
(D. Utah)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BALDOCK, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges. **
Defendant Rodney Palmer pled guilty to one count of producing child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Prior to his plea, Defendant
acknowledged that between August 2009 and September 2012, he sexually abused
his niece, born in 2003, and photographed the abuse on his cellular telephone.
Following a plea hearing, the district court accepted Defendant’s plea. Thereafter,
however, Defendant had second thoughts and moved to withdraw his plea.
Following an evidentiary hearing and denial of his motion, the court sentenced
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however,
for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant to 210 months in prison consistent with his Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C)
plea agreement. In exchange for the agreement, the Government dismissed a child
pornography possession charge and state authorities agreed not to pursue child sex
abuse charges. Defendant now appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
“When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea—after its acceptance by
the district court but prior to sentencing—the court must decide whether there is a
‘fair and just reason for withdrawal.’” United States v. Byrum, 567 F.3d 1255, 1264
(10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B)). We review that decision for
an abuse of discretion, considering (1) “whether the defendant has asserted his
innocence;” (2) “whether close assistance of counsel was available to the defendant;”
and (3) “whether the plea was knowing and voluntary.” Id. at 1264–65. Only if the
defendant establishes fair and just reason to withdraw his plea need the court address
the timing of the defendant’s motion, prejudice to the Government, inconvenience
to the court, and waste of judicial resources. Id. at 1265.
On appeal, Defendant Palmer tells us he is not challenging his guilty plea
based on any defect in the statement he tendered prior to his plea, or in the plea
colloquy. Nor does Defendant assert his factual or legal innocence of the crime. See
United States v. Hamilton, 510 F.3d 1209, 1214 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he mere
assertion of a legal defense is insufficient; the defendant must present a credible
claim of legal innocence.”). Of the three points Defendant raised to support his
2
motion to withdraw in the district court—namely that his attorneys (1) failed to
pursue a motion to suppress, (2) emphasized the plea offer was about to expire and
he might face life in prison, and (3) impressed upon him the religious and familial
consequences of a failure to plead—Defendant acknowledges the first two get him
nowhere. Thus, he presses only the third point on appeal. Defendant claims that just
prior to his change of plea hearing he had an exchange about religion and family
with the first assistant public defender (FAPD) in the presence of his attorney of
record, an assistant public defender (APD), which rendered his plea involuntary.
According to Defendant, he felt the discussion “about religion, repentance, the effect
on his wife and victim, overtook his will.” Def.’s Br. at 7. “He was so emotional
at the time before his plea due to the pressure from his attorneys, that he was not
able to make a voluntary decision, gave up and pleaded guilty.” Id. at 19.
Following an evidentiary hearing at which Defendant and his APD testified,
the district court delivered thorough findings and conclusions from the bench. The
court ruled Defendant was not coerced into pleading guilty but instead voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently entered into his plea, all the while receiving effective
assistance of counsel. Notably, the court found the APD “credibly testified that
[Defendant] is the person who brought up the subject of his religious beliefs.” Rec.
Vol. 2, at 169. The APD stated Defendant “had referenced on several occasions
praying about the case and what to do and what he felt God was prompting him to
do.” Id. at 95. The APD did not believe the FAPD, who was of the same “religious
3
persuasion” as Defendant, “engaged with him about a religion discussion until the
day of the plea.” Id. at 95, 97. Defendant did not testify otherwise. On that same
day, both the APD and the FAPD told Defendant that “ultimately it was his decision”
whether to plead guilty. Id. at 98.
We have found no case, and the parties have cited none, squarely addressing
the question of what effect a defense attorney’s discussion with a client about the
perceived religious and familial ramifications of a crime may have upon a guilty
plea. Nonetheless, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Craker v. Wisconsin,
223 N.W.2d 872 (Wis. 1972), is instructive. In that case, the defendant claimed his
plea was involuntary “because he was subject to religious scruples and family
pressure which prevailed upon him to plead guilty.” Id. at 875. Distinguishing
“between a motivation which induces and a force which compels the human mind to
act,” the court held “[t]he defendant’s religious beliefs regarding the merits of
confessing one’s wrongdoing and his desire to mollify his family or give in to their
desires are self imposed coercive elements and do not vitiate the voluntary nature of
the defendant’s guilty plea.” Id. at 876 (internal quotation omitted).
Defendant Palmer says his emotion overcame his will immediately preceding
his change of plea hearing. But as we have seen time and again, every child
pornography prosecution is wrought with emotion for the perpetrator, the family, and
the victim. If emotion over what has taken place, what is taking place, and what will
take place serves to render a plea involuntary or counsel ineffective in such case,
4
then virtually every guilty plea to such a heinous crime would be suspect.
The district court specifically recollected observing Defendant’s anxiety
“firsthand” at the time of the change of plea hearing, and found it “neither disabling
nor overwhelming.” Rec. Vol. 2, at 140. “[T]he court viewed [Defendant’s]
demeanor and his responses to [its] questions as an indication . . . that [Defendant]
fully appreciated the significance and consequences of changing his plea,” and that
his decision to do so was knowing and voluntary. Id. The court further noted that
when asked at his plea hearing whether “anyone had threatened him or forced him
in any way to plead guilty,” Defendant “testified under oath that there was, quote,
no threat other than the possibility of the charges being much worse, the addition of
state charges if I don’t accept this, end quote.” Id. (emphasis added).
Defendant’s “solemn declarations made in open court carry a strong
presumption of validity,” a presumption which Defendant has not overcome on the
record before us. United States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248, 1259 (10th Cir.
2014). Moreover, the fact that in all probability a much worse outcome awaited
Defendant had he rejected the plea agreement certainly suggests that to plead other
than he did would have been irrational. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372
(2010) (holding that to obtain relief on a claim that counsel’s ineffectiveness tainted
a guilty plea, a defendant “must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances”).
5
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 1
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
United States Circuit Judge
1
Here we note Defendant also appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se
motion to dismiss, which he filed following his guilty plea but prior to sentencing.
Therein, Defendant argued the statute under which he was charged is
unconstitutional as beyond Congress’s power to enact. Defense counsel
acknowledges the frivolity of Defendant’s motion and we appreciate his candor. See
United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1154 (10th Cir. 2012) (“When a
defendant admits guilt of a substantive crime, he cannot reverse course . . . and claim
the criminal statute is unconstitutional.”).
6