United States v. Saignaphone ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
May 12, 2011
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
__________________________ Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 10-1444
v. (D.Ct. No. 1:08-CR-00458-MSK-4)
(D. Colo.)
MANIVONE SAIGNAPHONE, a/k/a
Mindy Saignaphone,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BARRETT, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellant Manivone Saignaphone, also known as Mindy Saignaphone, pled
guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the government in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 286, after which the district court sentenced her to sixteen months
incarceration – eight months to be served in prison and eight months in home
detention. Ms. Saignaphone now appeals her sentence, arguing it is substantively
unreasonable under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors because the
district court unreasonably discounted the evidence she proffered which
demonstrated her extremely low risk of recidivism. We exercise jurisdiction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm Mrs.
Saignaphone’s sentence.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On November 4, 2008, a forty-count indictment issued against multiple
individuals, including Ms. Saignaphone who was charged with nineteen counts of
mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, as well as one count of conspiracy to
defraud the government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286. The indictment
stemmed from an investigation into a fraud scheme occurring from January 28,
2005, through September 4, 2006, involving a Colorado corporation, Olympia
Financial and Tax Services, Inc. (Olympia). During Ms. Saignaphone’s
involvement in the fraud scheme, she worked in Denver at Olympia as a
salesperson and at the United States Postal Service as a distribution and mail
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processing clerk. The investigation revealed Olympia submitted fraudulent
amended tax returns on behalf of taxpayers, which resulted in refunds being
issued to them, from which Olympia received a commission of forty to fifty
percent. Ms. Saignaphone participated in the scheme by soliciting customers and
facilitating the filing of their amended tax returns, including her co-workers at the
Postal Service, during which she made false representations to them about the
legitimacy of Olympia’s business and the legality of the amended tax returns
submitted. As part of the fraud scheme, Olympia filed over 700 amended false
federal tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service and over 400 amended false
state tax returns with the Colorado Department of Revenue. The total loss
attributed to Olympia’s scheme was $2,757,744.
On December 3, 2009, Ms. Saignaphone pled guilty to Count 20 for
conspiracy to defraud the government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286, in return
for the government requesting that the remaining counts be dismissed against her.
In addition, in her plea agreement, she acknowledged $2,300,000 was the loss
reasonably foreseeable and attributable to her as a result of her participation in
Olympia’s fraud scheme. She also agreed to cooperate with the government in its
ongoing investigation in exchange for its agreement to move for a downward
departure for her cooperation.
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Following her guilty plea, a probation officer prepared a presentence report,
calculating Ms. Saignaphone’s sentence under the applicable 2009 United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”). The probation officer
recommended applying a base offense level of six, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(a)(2), for her violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286, and increasing her base level
sixteen levels, pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I), because the actual and/or intended
loss attributable to her was more than $1,000,000 but less than $2,500,000. The
probation officer also recommended a three-level reduction as a mitigating role
adjustment and another three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, for
a total offense level of sixteen, which, together with her criminal history category
of I, resulted in a recommended Guidelines range of twenty-one to twenty-seven
months imprisonment.
In computing Ms. Saignaphone’s sentence, the probation officer also
acknowledged the government’s intent to request a downward departure if she
cooperated in its investigation. The probation officer also discussed the
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), noting, in part, the seriousness of
Ms. Saignaphone’s offense and the need for her sentence to promote respect for
the law, provide just punishment, and afford adequate deterrence, but also
explaining her lack of prior criminal history or prior imprisonment meant any
sentence of incarceration would likely provide a deterrent effect on her.
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Ms. Saignaphone filed formal objections to the presentence report,
requesting a variant sentence of probation with home detention, contending
Congress intended sentences in cases like hers to be imposed through probation,
but, instead, the United States Sentencing Commission recommended a Guidelines
sentence of incarceration based on a flawed analysis of “empirical data and
national experience.” In support, she (1) provided data suggesting similar forty-
four-year-old defendants with no prior criminal history had only a 6.9 percent
chance of re-offending; (2) cited to federal cases from other jurisdictions which
imposed or upheld variant sentences based on the defendant’s statistically low
recidivism risk; (3) pointed out the non-violent nature of her offense where she
played a narrow and limited role in soliciting prospective customers; and (4)
noted she lacked any history in committing prior offenses and maintained positive
personal characteristics, as evidenced by almost two dozen letters submitted on
her behalf. As a result, she argued, a sentence of home detention would result in
a sentence sufficient but not greater than necessary to meet the sentencing factor
goals in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) by promoting respect for the law, adequate
deterrence, and protection of the public.
Prior to sentencing, the government filed a motion for a downward
departure based on Ms. Saignaphone’s substantial assistance in its investigation.
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In so doing, it requested a twenty-five-percent downward departure from the low
end of the Guidelines range for a sentence of sixteen months imprisonment.
At sentencing, Ms. Saignaphone did not object to the calculation of her
sentence or the downward departure, but through counsel she renewed her
arguments for a variant non-Guidelines sentence of eight months home detention
and five years probation, again claiming an eight-month sentence of home
detention would be sufficient but not greater than necessary to meet the
sentencing factor goals in § 3553(a) for the same reasons articulated in her prior
motion. She also continued her assertion a sixteen-level offense increase for her
crime was based on a “flawed analysis of both empirical data and national
experience” unsupported by “social science research” where the Sentencing
Commission continually “ratcheted up” the sentences. In requesting a variant
sentence, Ms. Saignaphone’s counsel also pointed out another co-defendant,
Annalisa Wittaker, received a downward-variant sentence of home detention and
probation, but admitted Ms. Wittaker received such a variance for reasons
different than those presented by Ms. Saignaphone and a different length of time
than requested by Ms. Saignaphone.
In response, the government argued against a variant sentence of home
detention, pointing to the fact Ms. Saignaphone’s recommended Guidelines
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sentence was already a relatively short one and advocating incarceration rather
than home detention because her offense resulted in a foreseeable loss of millions
of dollars. While it agreed co-defendant sentences must be considered, it pointed
out Ms. Saignaphone’s circumstances in the fraud scheme differed from Ms.
Wittaker’s because of the close familial relationship Ms. Wittaker had with her
father, who operated the scheme, and the fact he was overbearing and
domineering towards her. Rather than a variant sentence, the government
renewed its request for a downward departure resulting in a sixteen-month
sentence with eight months served in incarceration and the other eight months
served during home detention.
After granting the government’s motion for a downward departure, the
district court addressed Ms. Saignaphone’s request for a variant sentence. In
determining a variant sentence was not justified, it acknowledged that, in
imposing the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission may have failed to pay
deference to the Congressional preference for probationary sentences, and the
Guidelines applicable to her offense had resulted in a historical increase or
“ratcheting up.” However, after noting it had authority to impose a variant
sentence if it believed the Guidelines were flawed, it stated the record presented
in the instant case did not support a variant sentence and, therefore, it would not
second-guess either the Guidelines or whether the Sentencing Commission
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inappropriately relied on faulty information in recommending such Guidelines.
While the district court acknowledged an accurate interpretation of the statistical
information was that Ms. Saignaphone fell into a demographic for which there is
not a high risk of recidivism, it concluded that same information “in no way
predict[ed] her individual likelihood of recidivism, only the likelihood of
recidivism of an entire population with the same characteristics.” It also
explained the other co-defendant, Ms. Wittaker, received a lighter sentence than
requested by Ms. Saignaphone based on Ms. Wittaker’s unusual situation,
including her particular vulnerability to her father, so that Ms. Saignaphone was
not similarly-situated for the purpose of a variance.
Finally, the district court explicitly considered the sentencing factors under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), noting Ms. Saignaphone had never been convicted of a crime
and possessed fine personal qualities and great family support but that she had
admitted to falsely representing and inducing others with respect to the tax returns
at issue and thereby caused victimization of taxpayers by defrauding the federal
and state governments. The district court then imposed a sentence of eight
months imprisonment and eight months home detention, to be followed by three
years of supervised release and payment of $52,868.65 in restitution. It
determined such a sentence was sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy
the sentencing objectives in § 3553(a), including for the sentence to reflect the
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seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, deter others from
committing the same offense, and provide just punishment.
Ms. Saignaphone’s counsel objected to the sentence, stating he “disagree[d]
with the Court’s analysis concerning the [G]uidelines and specifically disagree[d]
that the Court [was] not in a position to determine if there ha[d] been
inappropriate reliance on improper factors by the Sentencing Commission” and
also “disagree[d] with how the Court interpret[ed] the recidivism statistics with
respect to the demographics.” The district court responded by stating, “so the
record is absolutely clear, the Court’s finding is that the record as submitted does
not allow the Court to conclude that there is justification for a variance on either
of those grounds ... [n]ot that I lack the authority to make that determination.”
II. Discussion
On appeal, Ms. Saignaphone does not challenge the procedural component
in the calculation of her sentence but argues her sentence is substantively
unreasonable because the district court “unreasonably discounted the evidence she
proffered to demonstrate her extremely low risk of recidivism.” In support, she
contends the district court:
deemed [the] statistical and comparative evidence irrelevant to
whether Ms. Saignaphone, specifically, would reoffend, ignoring
both that statistical evidence is precisely what courts should consider
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in assessing recidivism risk, and that because this was Ms.
Saignaphone’s first criminal offense, her recidivist risk could only be
assessed by comparing her to others with similar characteristics.
As a result, Ms. Saignaphone contends the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to consider such evidence and insisting such evidence would not predict
her individual likelihood of recidivism. She claims her sentence is greater than
necessary to comply with the basic aims of sentencing, particularly deterrence and
protection of the public from future crimes.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, giving deference to the district
court under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d
800, 802, 805-06 (10 th Cir. 2008). The district court abuses its discretion if the
resulting sentence is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly
unreasonable.” United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10 th Cir. 2008)
(quotation marks omitted). “Our appellate review for reasonableness includes
both a procedural component, encompassing the method by which a sentence was
calculated, as well as a substantive component, which relates to the length of the
resulting sentence.” Smart, 518 F.3d at 803. Here, Ms. Saignaphone expressly
states she is not appealing the procedural reasonableness of her sentence, but is
challenging the sufficiency of the § 3553(a) justifications relied on by the district
court, which we have said “implicates the substantive reasonableness of the
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resulting sentence” when viewed under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Id. at
804.
If the sentence is within the correctly-calculated Guidelines range, as Ms.
Saignaphone agrees it is, we apply a presumption of reasonableness. See United
States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053-55 (10 th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). She may
rebut this presumption by demonstrating the sentence is unreasonable when
viewed under the § 3553(a) factors. See id. at 1054-55. The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
sentencing factors include:
The nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to
afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
pertinent guidelines; pertinent policy statements; the need to avoid
unwanted sentence disparities; and the need to provide restitution.
United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184, 1188-89 (10 th Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Contreras-Martinez, 409 F.3d 1236, 1242 n.3 (10 th Cir. 2005)).
“The sentencing court ... is not required to consider individually each factor listed
in § 3553(a), nor is it required to recite any magic words to show us that it
fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed
it to consider before issuing a sentence.” Id. at 1189 (quotation marks omitted).
Instead, the district court must “state in open court the reasons for its imposition
of the particular sentence,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), and satisfy us that it “has
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considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its]
own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356
(2007). In so doing, “[i]t is well established that the sentencing court is entitled
to rely on uncontested facts contained in the [presentence report] for certain
sentencing purposes,” including to draw conclusions about the nature of the
offense and history and characteristics of the defendant relevant to the sentencing
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Mateo, 471 F.3d 1162, 1166-67
(10 th Cir. 2006).
With these principles in mind, we turn to Ms. Saignaphone’s appeal of the
substantive reasonableness of her sentence. In this case, she briefed and orally
presented her arguments to the district court. The district court explicitly
acknowledged Ms. Saignaphone’s arguments, including her contentions: (1) the
Guidelines applicable to her offense have resulted in historical increases in, or the
ratcheting up of, the Guidelines; (2) the Sentencing Commission failed to pay
sufficient deference to the Congressional preference for probationary sentences;
(3) she fell into a demographic for which there is not a high risk of recidivism;
(4) her situation required a variant sentence as provided to one of her co-
defendants and other similarly-situated defendants with a statistically low risk of
recidivism; and (5) her lack of criminal history, commendable personal
characteristics, and strong family support should have resulted in a sentence of
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home detention. Accordingly, we are confident it considered all of Ms.
Saignaphone’s arguments in support of a variance.
Not only did the district court consider those arguments, but it clearly
rejected them. It concluded the record presented in Ms. Saignaphone’s case did
not support a variant sentence of probation, even if the Guidelines applicable to
her resulted in historical increases in the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission
failed to defer to Congress’ preference for probationary sentences, or she fell into
a demographic for which there was a low risk of recidivism. This is because it
found Ms. Saignaphone’s offense of defrauding the government and taxpayers of
$2,300,000 serious and sufficient enough to deny a sentence of home detention,
which it believed would be insufficient punishment for an offense of that
magnitude, regardless of her lack of prior criminal history, chances of recidivism,
or Congress’ intent regarding probation. Instead, it concluded the sentence
imposed was sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy the sentencing
objectives in § 3553(a), including for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, promote respect for the law, deter others from committing the same
offense, and provide just punishment. Thus, the district court sufficiently stated
in open court the reasons for its imposition of her sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c), satisfying us it “considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned
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basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 551 U.S. at
356.
As to Ms. Saignaphone’s specific assertions on variant sentences for
defendants with statistically low recidivism rates, we do not require courts to
distinguish between a defendant’s characteristics and history and those of the
ordinary offender contemplated by the Guidelines when considering or imposing a
variance, nor do we consider the existence of extraordinary defendant
characteristics and history. See Smart, 518 F.3d at 808. Instead, while the
Guidelines “reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve
§ 3553(a)’s objectives” and provide a “measure of national practice to use as a
starting point,” we recognize the district court has “greater familiarity with the
individual case and the individual defendant” for the purpose of determining
whether to impose a variance. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Here, the district
court recognized it had discretion or authority to impose a variant sentence if it
believed the Guidelines were flawed, but under the particular facts of Ms.
Saignaphone’s case, it determined the Guidelines sentence of incarceration was
warranted, regardless of her low chance of recidivism and other arguments to the
contrary. Under the circumstances presented, Ms. Saignaphone has failed to rebut
the presumption her Guidelines sentence is reasonable when viewed under the
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§ 3553(a) factors or that the district court otherwise abused its discretion or
imposed an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable sentence.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we AFFIRM Ms. Saignaphone’s sentence.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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