United States v. Silva , 423 F. App'x 809 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    May 18, 2011
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    TENTH CIRCUIT                         Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                       No. 10-2272
    (D. of N.M.)
    JOSEPH ERIC SILVA,                             (D.C. No. 2:02-CR-01167-LH-1)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
    Joseph Silva, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 filed a petition for a
    writ of audita querela in the district court to challenge the legality of his sentence.
    This common law writ was available to a defendant who sought “a rehearing of a
    matter on grounds of newly discovered evidence or newly existing legal
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    **
    After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
    panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
    assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
    Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    1
    Because Silva proceeds pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. See
    Ledbetter v. City of Topeka Kan., 
    318 F.3d 1183
    , 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
    defenses.” Black’s Law Dictionary 141 (8th ed. 2004). 2 Silva appeals the district
    court’s denial of his petition. We construe Silva’s notice of appeal and appellate
    brief as an implied application for leave to file a successive petition for a writ of
    habeas corpus under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     and deny authorization.
    In July 2002, Silva pleaded guilty to one count of possession with the intent
    to distribute more than 50 kilograms of marijuana and was sentenced to 220
    months’ imprisonment. We affirmed the sentence on direct appeal. United States
    v. Silva, 94 F. App’x 747 (10th Cir. 2004). Silva challenged his sentence on
    collateral review under § 2255. The district court denied his petition and we
    denied Silva’s application for a certificate of appealability. United States v.
    2
    The ancient writ of audita querela was introduced during the reign of
    King Edward III and was “based on equitable, rather than common law
    principles.” Black’s Law Dictionary 141 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting L.B. Curzon,
    English Legal History 103 (2d ed. 1979)). Audita querela is similar, but not
    identical, to a writ of coram nobis. United States v. Torres, 
    282 F.3d 1241
    , 1245
    n.6 (10th Cir. 2002). Coram nobis is a “writ of error directed to a court for
    review of its own judgment and predicated on alleged errors of fact.” Black’s
    Law Dictionary 362 (8th ed. 2004). “[A] writ of coram nobis attacks a judgment
    that was infirm at the time it was rendered for reasons that later came to light,
    while a writ of audita querela is used to challenge a judgment that was correct at
    the time it was rendered but which is made infirm by matters that arose after its
    rendition.” United States v. Miller, 
    599 F.3d 484
    , 487 (5th Cir. 2010). Both writs
    were formally abolished by Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
    F ED . R. C IV . P. 60(e). However, in the criminal context, the Supreme Court has
    held a defendant may pursue a writ of coram nobis under the All Writs Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1651
    . United States v. Morgan, 
    346 U.S. 502
    , 510–11 (1954). In accord
    with other circuits, we have assumed, without deciding, a prisoner may seek a
    writ of audita querela under the All Writs Act to challenge an otherwise final
    conviction. See Torres, 
    282 F.3d at
    1245 n.6; Miller, 
    599 F.3d at
    487–88
    (collecting cases).
    -2-
    Silva, 
    430 F.3d 1096
     (10th Cir. 2005). Silva then sought authorization from this
    court to file a second or successive § 2255 petition, arguing newly discovered
    evidence showed the amount of marijuana involved was less than 50 kilograms.
    We denied his request. Finally, Silva filed the petition at issue here arguing (1)
    he should be re-sentenced because the amount of marijuana was incorrectly
    calculated, and (2) United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), should be
    applied retroactively to his sentence. The district court denied his petition and
    Silva timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    In his petition, Silva attacks the validity of his sentence. But when other
    remedies are available, a writ of audita querela is not the proper vehicle to pursue
    his claims. See United States v. Torres, 
    282 F.3d 1241
    , 1245 (10th Cir. 2002)
    (“[A] writ of audita querela is not available to a petitioner when other remedies
    exist, such as a motion to vacate sentence under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .”). As a
    federal prisoner, his exclusive remedy to challenge the validity of his sentence is
    provided under § 2255, unless he can show that remedy would be inadequate or
    ineffective. See § 2255(e).
    We see no reason why the remedy provided by § 2255 is inadequate or
    ineffective to challenge Silva’s sentence. The fact that he must surmount
    procedural hurdles to bring a successive § 2255 petition does not make the § 2255
    remedy inadequate or ineffective. See Sines v. Wilner, 
    609 F.3d 1070
    , 1073 (10th
    Cir. 2010) (“[T]he remedy under § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely
    -3-
    because the statute greatly restricts second or successive motions.”).
    Accordingly, Silva must raise his claims under § 2255 and not through a petition
    for writ of audita querela.
    Since Silva has previously sought relief under § 2255, he must raise his
    claims through a successive § 2255 petition. To do that, Silva must first seek
    authorization from this court. See 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 2244
    (b)(3), 2255(h). He cannot
    simply invoke an ancient writ—while asserting it is not a § 2255 motion—to
    evade the statutory command. See Torres, 
    282 F.3d at 1246
     (“[T]o allow a
    petitioner to avoid the bar against successive § 2255 petitions by simply styling a
    petition under a different name would severely erode the procedural restraints
    imposed under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 2244
    (b)(3) and 2255.”) (internal quotations and
    citations omitted). Because Silva’s petition is an unauthorized second or
    successive § 2255 motion, it should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 3
    or transferred to this court. See In re Cline, 
    531 F.3d 1249
    , 1251 (10th Cir.
    2008). However, we construe his notice of appeal and appellate brief as a request
    for authorization to file a successive § 2255 petition and now consider his
    request. See Torres, 
    282 F.3d at 1246
    .
    3
    It appears the district court did not explicitly dismiss Silva’s petition for
    a lack of jurisdiction. But we interpret the court’s discussion of successive
    § 2255 petitions and its finding Silva presented no basis for issuing a writ of
    audita querela as a determination the court lacked jurisdiction.
    -4-
    After a careful review of the record, we conclude Silva has failed to make
    the prima facie showing required by § 2255(h) to bring a successive § 2255
    petition. His arguments are not based on either “newly discovered evidence that,
    if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to
    establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder would
    have found [him] guilty of the offense” or “a new rule of constitutional law, made
    retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
    previously unavailable.” § 2255(h).
    Silva does not claim there is newly discovered evidence that would
    demonstrate his innocence. Rather, he claims the presentence report improperly
    calculated the amount of marijuana. This is not newly discovered evidence and
    Silva fails to meet the requirements of § 2255(h)(1).
    We have clearly held Booker was not made retroactive to cases on
    collateral review, as required by § 2255(h). See Bey v. United States, 
    399 F.3d 1266
    , 1269 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[U]nder the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
    Penalty Act (AEDPA), Booker may not be applied retroactively to second or
    successive habeas petitions.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, Silva fails to meet
    the requirements of § 2255(h)(2).
    Silva has failed to satisfy the requirements to bring a successive § 2255
    petition. Accordingly, the implied application for authorization to file a
    -5-
    successive § 2255 petition is DENIED.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Timothy M. Tymkovich
    Circuit Judge
    -6-