United States v. Varela , 193 F. App'x 808 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
August 31, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-2085
(D.C. No. CR-05-2012-RB)
R AU L EDWA R D VA RELA , (D . N.M .)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, BR ISC OE, and M U RPH Y, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Raul Edward Varela pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to
possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). The district court sentenced him to
eighty-four months’ imprisonment and four years’ supervised release. Although
his sentence fell beneath the statutory maximum and the plea agreement waived
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
any right to appeal a sentence within the statutory maximum, M r. Varela filed this
appeal. Thereafter, the government moved to enforce the plea agreement under
United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam).
M r. Varela, who is proceeding pro se, 1 opposes the motion for the following
reasons: (1) he should have received a lesser sentence because he played only a
minor role; (2) he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead guilty;
(3) his counsel was ineffective; and (4) he never had an opportunity to fully
review the presentence investigation report. As discussed below, we grant the
government’s motion to enforce and dismiss the appeal.
In Hahn, this court held that “in reviewing appeals brought after a
defendant has entered into an appeal waiver” this court will determine
“(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate
rights; (2) w hether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate
rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of
justice.” Id. at 1325. A miscarriage of justice will result if (1) “the district court
relied on an impermissible factor such as race”; (2) “ineffective assistance of
1
Although M r. Varela was represented by retained counsel during his district
court proceedings, he filed a pro se notice of appeal. On July 18, 2006, he filed a
letter with this court setting forth his opposition to the government’s motion to
enforce the plea agreement. We construe this letter as a response to the motion to
enforce. Because M r. Varela proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his appellate
filing. See Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
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counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver
invalid”; (3) “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the waiver is
otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 1327 (quotation omitted). Applying the three-part
Hahn test, w e conclude that M r. V arela’s waiver is valid and should be enforced.
SCOPE OF W AIVER
The plea agreement language encompasses M r. Varela’s argument that he
was entitled to a two-to-four-level deduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 because he
allegedly played a minor role in the crime. M r. Varela “knowingly waive[d] the
right to appeal . . . any sentence within the statutory maximum authorized by
law.” Plea Agreement at 4-5. His sentence of eighty-four months’ imprisonment
falls within the statutory maximum of forty years’ imprisonment. Furthermore,
no promise was made that M r. Varela would receive a two-to-four-level deduction
for playing a minor role. Rather, he agreed not to seek any adjustment of the
offense level determined by the district court. Id. at 3; see also Plea Hr’g Tr. at
21.
KN OW ING AN D V OLU NTA RY W AIVER
W ith respect to the second part of the Hahn test, M r. Varela argues that he
did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his appellate rights
because he never had an opportunity to review all of the facts of his case or all of
the aspects of his plea agreement. In determining whether M r. Varela’s waiver of
his right to appeal was made knowingly and voluntarily, we consider “whether the
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language of the plea agreement states that [he] entered the agreement knowingly
and voluntarily” and whether there is “an adequate Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 colloquy.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. M r. Varela bears the “burden
to present evidence from the record establishing that he did not understand the
waiver.” Id. at 1329 (quotation omitted).
M r. Varela fails to meet his burden. He fails to set forth the facts of his
case or the aspects of the plea agreement he did not have an opportunity to
review. And he presents no record evidence showing that he did not understand
the waiver. See id. Both the plea agreement and the plea colloquy establish that
the plea was knowing and voluntary. The plea agreement states that M r. Varela
freely and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement. Plea Agreement at 5. The
agreement also states that he had “thoroughly reviewed all aspects of this case”
with counsel, and he was “fully satisfied with [counsel’s] representation.” Id. at
1. Likewise, at the plea colloquy, M r. Varela indicated that he understood the
charge against him and the elements and allegations set forth in the indictment,
that he understood the maximum penalty, that he had discussed the case fully with
his attorney, that he understood the plea agreement and had discussed it with his
attorney, that he had had sufficient time to discuss the case with his attorney and
his attorney has answ ered all of his questions to his satifaction, that he voluntarily
signed the plea agreement, that his plea at the hearing was voluntary, and that he
knowingly waived his right to appeal his sentence so long as it was within the
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statutory maximum. Plea Hr’g at 9-12, 14-19, 23-24. Additionally, at the plea
hearing, the prosecutor recited the facts of the case, and M r. Varela stated that
those facts were true. Id. at 27-28. W e therefore conclude that M r. Varela
knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights.
M ISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
Lastly, we consider the final part of the Hahn test: whether enforcing the
waiver w ill result in a miscarriage of justice. M r. Varela first argues that his
counsel was ineffective because counsel misled him by telling him that he would
receive a sentence of sixty-three month’s imprisonment. At the plea colloquy,
however, M r. Varela indicated that he understood that no promises had been made
concerning the length of his sentence, that his attorney could only give a best
guess regarding the length of the sentence, that the judge would decide the actual
sentence, and that he could get a more severe sentence than he thought he would.
Id. at 18, 19-20. Also, the plea agreement states that no promises or
representations were made by anyone regarding what sentence the district court
w ould im pose. Plea A greement at 5. M r. Varela therefore has not shown
ineffective assistance of counsel rendering the waiver invalid.
W e construe M r. Varela’s remaining argument, that he never received an
opportunity to fully review the presentence investigation report, as an assertion
that the waiver was “otherwise unlawful.” See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (quotation
omitted). For an “otherwise unlawful” waiver, the error must seriously affect the
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fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327. After reviewing the
appellate filings and the record on appeal, we conclude that M r. Varela has not
met his burden of persuading us that the waiver is unlawful. See United States v.
M aldonado, 410 F.3d 1231, 1233 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
577 (2005). The plea agreement made clear that M r. Varela faced a possible
maximum sentence of forty years’ imprisonment and that he was giving up his
constitutional and appellate rights. Also, the sentence complied with the terms of
the plea agreement and with M r. V arela’s understanding of the plea. See id. at
1234. Additionally, defense counsel represented at the sentencing hearing that he
had reviewed the presentence investigation report with M r. Varela and that the
report was accurate. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 2. M r. Varela had an opportunity to
speak at the sentencing hearing, but he made no mention of the report. W e
therefore conclude that M r. Varela failed to show any error affecting the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of his judicial proceedings. See Olano, 507 U.S. at
732; Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327.
W e GRANT the government’s motion to enforce the plea agreement and
DISM ISS the appeal. In light of our decision, we DENY M r. Varela’s request for
appointment of counsel as moot. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR TH E CO UR T
PER CURIAM
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