United States v. Aragon-Concha ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 27, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 10-3232
(D. Ct. No. 10-CR-10007-001-WEB)
MIGUEL ARAGON-CONCHA, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Circuit Judge, TACHA, Senior Circuit Judge, and
O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant-appellant Miguel Aragon-Concha, a native and citizen of
Mexico, pleaded guilty to one count of re-entry after deportation subsequent to a
conviction for an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1) and
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
(b)(2). He was sentenced to 70 months’ imprisonment. Mr. Aragon-Concha now
appeals his sentence. We take jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 7, 2010, Mr. Aragon-Concha pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of re-entry after deportation subsequent to a conviction
for an aggravated felony. The United States Probation Office prepared a
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) which determined that under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) Mr. Aragon-Concha’s
total offense level was 21 and his criminal history category was V. Based on
these calculations, the PSR recommended a sentencing range of 70 to 87 months’
imprisonment. Mr. Aragon-Concha filed several objections to the PSR and
requested a downward departure based on his alleged cultural assimilation as well
as a variance under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court denied Mr. Aragon-Concha’s
requests for a downward departure and variance. In a subsequent sentencing
memorandum and order, the court more fully explained its reasoning for both
denials. The court noted that the provision allowing for a departure based upon
cultural assimilation was merely a proposed amendment and was not yet part of
the Guidelines. Moreover, the court concluded that even if the provision were in
effect, Mr. Aragon-Concha “d[id] not qualify for this departure” because of his
extensive criminal history. Additionally, the district court denied the requested
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variance because after considering the § 3553 factors, it found that “a sentence of
70 months, which represents the low end of the guideline range, is an appropriate
sentence in this case.”
On appeal, Mr. Aragon-Concha contends that the district court improperly
denied his requests for a downward departure and a variance. We review
sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion, asking whether the sentence is
reasonable. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).
II. DISCUSSION
First, Mr. Aragon-Concha argues that the district court erred in denying his
request for a downward departure based on cultural assimilation. He contends
that district court was required to announce the three-part test outlined in then-
proposed amendment U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 Application Note 8 at sentencing, as well
as to analyze independently in its written order each of the seven factors set forth
in the proposed amendment.
As Mr. Aragon-Concha concedes, however, the provision allowing for the
departure at issue was not in effect at the time of his sentencing. Accordingly,
the district court did not err by failing to apply it. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11.
Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Mr.
Aragon-Concha’s extensive criminal history—which includes convictions for
evading arrests and reckless driving, terroristic threat, aggravated assault,
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, distribution of cocaine, and possession with
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the intent to distribute—also precluded application of the departure provision.
See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.8 (“In determining whether such a departure is
appropriate, the court should consider, among other things, . . . the seriousness of
the defendant’s criminal history . . . .”).
Second, Mr. Aragon-Concha maintains that the district court erred in
refusing to grant a variance because “all of the § 3553 factors should be viewed
through the cultural assimilation filter advanced in his argument for a downward
departure.” It is well-settled law, however, that “the district court has a wide
range of discretion in striking a balance among the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,”
United States v. Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d 1221, 1232 (10th Cir. 2008), and that
when—as is the case here—the sentence imposed falls within the correctly
calculated Guidelines range, it is presumed to be reasonable on appeal. United
States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006). Mr. Aragon-Concha has
not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness attached to his within-Guidelines
sentence. Indeed, based on Mr. Aragon-Concha’s substantial criminal history, the
district court’s conclusion that the need to protect the public outweighed any
unique circumstances of his case is a thoroughly reasonable balancing of the §
3553(a) factors.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court did not err in
sentencing Mr. Aragon-Concha and AFFIRM his sentence.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Senior Circuit Judge
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