United States v. Sarber , 196 F. App'x 673 ( 2006 )

F IL E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
U N IT E D ST A T E S C O U R T O F A PP E A L S
September 14, 2006
FO R T H E T E N T H C IR C U IT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-3231
(D.C. No. 05-CR-10137-W EB)
M ICHAEL A. SARBER, (D . Kan.)
Defendant-Appellant.
O R D E R A N D JU D G M E N T *
Before M U R PH Y , H A R T Z, and T Y M K O V IC H , Circuit Judges.
Defendant M ichael A. Sarber pled guilty to one count of possession with
intent to distribute more than five grams of pure methamphetamine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a). His plea agreement states that he “knowingly and voluntarily
waives any right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter in connection with this
prosecution, conviction and sentence.” Plea Agreement at 5 (dated M arch 10 and
*
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
filed M arch 13, 2006). M ore specifically, it recites that he “knowingly waives
any right to appeal a sentence imposed which is within the guideline range
determined appropriate by the court,” reserving the right to appeal only “to the
extent, if any, the court departs upwards from the applicable sentencing guideline
range determined by the court.” Id. at 6. The agreement also recites defendant’s
understanding that he faced a sentence of “not less than 5 years nor more than
40 years of imprisonment, a $2,000,000 fine, 4-5 years of supervised release, and
a $100 mandatory special assessment.” Id. at 1. The district court determined
that defendant was a career offender, resulting in a guideline range of 188 to 235
months. The court imposed a sentence of 188 months followed by four years of
supervised release, and defendant appealed. The government has now moved to
enforce defendant’s appeal waiver under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315(10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). W e grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
Under Hahn, we consider “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the
scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver
would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1325. The miscarriage-of-justice
prong requires the defendant to show (a) his sentence relied on an impermissible
factor such as race; (b) ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the
negotiation of the appeal waiver rendered the waiver invalid; (c) his sentence
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exceeded the statutory maximum; or (d) his appeal waiver is otherwise unlawful
and the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1327 (quotation omitted). The government’s motion
addresses these considerations, explaining why none undermines defendant’s
appeal w aiver here. W e agree.
Defendant does not contest that he “knowingly and voluntarily admitted his
guilt at the time of the Plea,” “understood the contents of his Plea Agreement,
including the possible punishment,” and “understood at the time of Plea that the
written Plea Agreement included a Waiver of his right to appeal the conviction
and sentence imposed and the application of the guidelines.” Appellant, M ichael
A. Sarber’s Response to Appellee’s M otion for Enforcement of Plea Agreement
at 3. Specifically with respect to the Hahn test, he concedes that the sentencing
issues to be raised on appeal fall within the scope of his waiver, that the plea
colloquy reflects that the w aiver was knowing and voluntary, and that the first
three miscarriage-of-justice factors do not apply. Id. at 5-6. His sole argument
against enforcement of his appeal waiver is that the “waiver is otherwise unlawful
in that the court erred in adopting the PIR findings [regarding the two predicate
offenses the court used to establish his career offender status], seriously affecting
the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 6.
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Defendant’s argument is fundamentally misdirected. The waiver exception
he invokes looks to w hether “the waiver is otherwise unlawful,” Hahn, 359 F.3d
at 1327 (quotation omitted and emphasis added), not whether some other aspect of
the proceeding may have involved legal error. Defendant’s position that his
appeal waiver should be excused due to alleged error in the determination of his
sentence entails w hat Hahn noted as “the logical failing[] of focusing on the
result of the proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing
whether an appeal waiver is [valid].” 1 Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1326 n.12.
Thus, “[t]he relevant question . . . is not whether [defendant’s] sentence is
unlawful . . ., but whether . . . his appeal waiver itself [is] unenforceable.”
United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
550 (2005). Indeed, to hold that alleged errors under the sentencing guidelines
render an appeal waiver unlawful would nullify the w aiver based on the very sort
of claim it was intended to waive. This circular argument has been repudiated in
many cases. 2 See, e.g., United States v. M organ, 386 F.3d 376, 381-82 (2d Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 1543 U.S. 1169 (2005); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886,
1
Hahn drew this distinction in relation to whether an appeal waiver was
knowing and voluntary, 359 F.3d at 1326 & n.12, but it is no less apt in relation
to whether such a waiver was lawful.
2
Of course, if a sentence deviates from the plea agreement’s terms or the
defendant’s expressed understanding at the time of his plea, the error involved
could undercut an appeal waiver in a non-circular way, but we do not have such a
situation here.
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892 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403-04 (4th Cir.
2000); United States v. Kratz, 179 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999). W hile we
have not explicitly addressed the point after Hahn, we previously enforced an
appeal waiver to dismiss an appeal raising error under the sentencing guidelines.
See United States v. Atterberry, 144 F.3d 1299, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 1998).
Defendant has not asserted any claim regarding the critical issue whether
his appeal waiver itself was unlawful, much less shown that enforcement of the
waiver would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial proceedings. In the latter regard, we note (1) that the plea agreement
clearly set out the maximum sentence defendant faced and explained the appellate
rights he relinquished in exchange for the benefits offered by the government, 3
and (2) that the sentence imposed by the district court complies with the terms of
the agreement and the understanding expressed by the defendant at the plea
hearing. See Porter, 405 F.3d at 1145.
Having review ed the pertinent materials, we find nothing to except this
case from the consequences of the broad appeal waiver included in defendant’s
3
W e emphasize that the nature and extent of appellate rights relinquished are
negotiable parts of the plea bargain process. Defendants can preserve sentencing
errors for appeal by specifically excepting them from waiver, see United States v.
Green, 405 F.3d 1180, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2005), or, for constitutional errors, by
reserving the right to appeal an “illegal sentence,” see United States v. Groves,
369 F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2004).
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plea agreement. The government’s motion to enforce the waiver is GR AN TED
and the appeal is DISM ISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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