United States v. Mendez-Zamora ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
April 3, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-3247
v. (D . of Kan.)
SA LV A DO R M EN D EZ-ZA M ORA, (D.C. Nos. 03-CV-3436-CM and
00-CR-20066-CM )
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY *
Before H E N RY, T YM KOV IC H, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges. **
Salvador M endez-Zamora seeks a Certificate of Appealability (COA) for
his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition. He proceeds pro se so we construe his
pleadings liberally. Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1998). W e
will issue a CO A “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). W e find no
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
constitutional rights were denied M endez-Zamora and DENY his request for a
C OA .
I. Analysis
A federal jury found Salvador M endez-Zamora guilty of 1) conspiracy to
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute at least one kilogram of
methamphetamine; 2) one count of distribution and possession with intent to
distribute more than fifty grams of methamphetamine; 3) one count of possession
with intent to distribute more than five hundred grams of methamphetamine; and
4) one count of using a communication device to facilitate drug distribution. H e
was sentenced to life in prison.
In seeking a COA, M endez-Zamora raises five issues: 1) use of conflicting
theories by the prosecution to enhance his sentence; 2) ineffective counsel at
sentencing and on appeal; 3) disparity in sentencing; 4) increased punishment by
judicial fact-finding in violation of the Sixth Amendment; and 5) denial of an
evidentiary hearing.
His claim that the prosecution used conflicting theories to enhance his
sentence in violation of Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005), was not raised
before the district court and thus is waived here. As for his ineffective counsel
claims, M endez-Zamora offered no more than the conclusory statement that “The
District Court’s finding that counsel did not perform deficiently constitutes an
objectively unreasonable application of Strickland.” Application for COA at 5.
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The district court below carefully reviewed the record and found petitioner’s
claims neither demonstrated counsel’s performance was deficient nor that
counsel’s performance prejudiced the petitioner as required by Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984). W ithout any evidence or allegations
beyond M endez-Zamora’s conclusory allegation that he was denied effective
counsel, defendant’s claim is inadequate to establish a violation. See Cannon v.
Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253, 1262 n.8 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[C]onclusory assertion that
counsel was ineffective, along with a bald reference to Strickland . . . is simply
not sufficient to preserve this claim.”).
M endez-Zamora’s third claim is that he was sentenced differently for
exercising his right to a jury trial. He points to disparities between his sentence
and the sentences of co-conspirators that he believes were equally culpable. The
district court found that facts on the record warranted the disparity. As we have
previously noted, disparate sentencing is permissible “where the disparity is
explicable by the facts on the record.” United States v. Garza, 1 F.3d 1098, 1101
(10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Goddard, 929 F.2d 546, 550 (10th Cir.
1991). In this case, no other defendant was subject to the same sentencing
enhancements as M endez-Zamora and most received sentencing reductions as
well as downward departures for cooperating with the government. M endez-
Zamora portrays downward departures for pleading guilty and cooperating with
the government as punishment for taking his chances w ith a jury trial, but in fact,
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these departures were rew ards offered for accepting culpability. M endez-Zamora
was not punished for exercising his right to a jury trial. He was punished because
a jury found him guilty. M oreover, M endez-Zamora was sentenced within the
United States Sentencing Guidelines range and he raised no argument that the
district court improperly applied 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Next, M endez-Zamora contends aggravating facts found by the judge
enhanced his sentence in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury as
recognized in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). He argues the
district court ignored this Sixth Amendment claim.
To the contrary, the district court addressed it directly. It properly noted
that the statutory maximum sentence for the conspiracy charge involving one
kilogram of methamphetamine, as found by the jury, was life imprisonment per 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). The enhancements did not exceed this statutory
maximum as required to trigger Apprendi, but rather merely equaled the statutory
maximum; thus no constitutional violation occurred. United States v. Holyfield,
No. 05-1318, 2007 W L______ (10th Cir. M arch __, 2007).
Finally, M endez-Zamora argues that he was denied an evidentiary hearing
on his § 2255 petition, which he contends he was owed due to alleged issues of
material fact. But when a § 2255 petition can be resolved on the record, as the
district court was able to do here, no evidentiary hearing is necessary. See United
States v. M arr, 856 F.2d 1471, 1472 (10th Cir. 1988). M oreover, M endez-Zamora
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claim s issues of material fact exist on his ineffective counsel claim but, as we
noted, he presented no such issues of fact — rather he presented only a
conclusory statement. W ithout more, we do not even have sufficient guidance as
to what factual inquiry an evidentiary hearing might address if granted. W e
construe petitioner’s claims liberally, but he still must provide some basis for his
claims beyond mere legally conclusory statements.
II. Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, we agree with the district court and DEN Y
petitioner’s request for a COA.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M . Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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