Montgomery v. City of Ardmore , 198 F. App'x 741 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 5, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TH EO D ORE M O N TG O ME RY ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 05-7133
v. (D.C. No. 99-CV -374-P)
(E.D. Okla.)
THE CITY O F ARD M OR E,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, A ND ER SO N, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Theodore M ontgomery appeals from an order of the district court
granting defendant The City of A rdmore’s (the City) motion for sum mary
judgment on his claim for denial of pre-termination due process in connection
with the loss of his job as police officer. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §1291 and affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Background
The facts surrounding the termination of M r. M ontgomery’s employment
as a police officer for the City are set forth in detail in M ontgomery v. City of
Ardmore, 365 F.3d 926, 930-33 (10th Cir. 2004). W e restate them here briefly.
In the spring of 1997, M r. M ontgomery claims that he found himself at
odds with his co-workers concerning a criminal investigation of the City’s police
chief. On June 26, 1997, the same day he learned that the district attorney was
accusing him of interfering with the investigation, he began suffering from
intense headaches and blurred vision. After being sent home by the interim police
chief as a result of his ailments, he sought treatment for stress and high blood
pressure.
A few days later, the district attorney’s statements concerning
M r. M ontgomery’s alleged interference with the criminal investigation were
published in the local newspaper. Shortly thereafter, the Fraternal Order of Police
(FOP) published a response urging him to cooperate in the investigation. On July
1, 1997, still suffering from his ailments, he began an extended medical leave.
In August 1997, M r. M ontgomery learned that he would not be paid while
absent from work because the City disputed his eligibility for long term disability
benefits. Thereafter, he received short term disability benefits through the police
pension system. Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 11, § 50-116.1 (1994).
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It was not until M ay 1998, that M r. M ontgomery first approached the police
department about returning to work, at w hich time the interim police chief told
him that he could not come back to work until he had a doctor’s release. On
August 24, 1998, he telephoned the former interim chief (now the deputy chief)
and asked about returning to work in September 1998, when he anticipated
receiving the necessary release. The deputy chief told him that the City would
not allow him to return to work and that he should call the new police chief.
During a call with the chief, he was told that his job had been eliminated and
“[he] w as not going to be able to return to work.” Aplt. A pp. at 91.
On September 28, 1998, the C ity formally terminated M r. M ontgomery’s
employment (effective August 15, 1998), pursuant to Section 116.9 of its
Employee Handbook, which provides that “[a]n employee shall be removed from
[long term disability] leave, forfeit all privileges that go with such leave and have
employment terminated if . . . [t]he employee has been on [long term disability]
leave for more than 365 days.” Id. at 234.
The District Court and Tenth Circuit Proceedings
In M arch 1999, M r. M ontgomery filed a suit against the City, the FOP, and
the district attorney, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights, and state law tort
claims for negligence, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional
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distress, and defamation. The district court granted defendants’ motions for
summary judgment, and he appealed to this court.
In M ontgomery, 365 F.3d at 944, we affirmed summary judgment except as
to M r. M ontgomery’s pre-termination due process claim against the City, holding
that the August 24, 1998, telephone conversations with police officials did not
constitute a pre-termination hearing. As to possible damages on remand, we
explained that
[g]enerally, damages for procedural due process violations may
include damages arising out of the termination of employment if
there is a causal connection between the termination and the failure
to provide a hearing. However, if [the C ity] can establish that [M r.
M ontgomery] would have been terminated even if a proper hearing
had been given, [he] cannot receive damages stemming from the
termination in an action for a procedural due process violation.
Id. at 937 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Noting that the record
suggested that the City would have terminated M r. M ontgomery even if it had
provided him with a pre-termination hearing, we nonetheless remanded the case
to the district court for further proceedings. Id.In ruling on the C ity’s motion for summary judgment, the district court
found that: (1) M r. M ontgomery began an extended medical leave on July 1,
1997; (2) as of August 14, 1998, (the day before his termination became
effective) he had not received a medical release to return to work; and (3) he had
been on medical leave for more than 365 days when his employment was
terminated. As to whether a pre-termination hearing would have changed the
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outcome, the district held that the “grounds for [his] termination were clearly set
forth” in the Employee Handbook, and that “[the City’s] termination of [his
employment] was justified and inevitable.” Id. at 318-19. The court granted the
City’s motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed. 1
Analysis
W e review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the evidence and drawing the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Stover v. M artinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1070
(10th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.M r. M ontgomery advances two arguments on appeal. First, he claims that
the City can terminate his employment only for just cause pursuant to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) betw een the City and the FOP.
A lternatively, he argues that if the Employee Handbook controls, it only allows
the City to terminate his employment if he is on long term disability leave.
The City, on the other hand, argues that the district court correctly found
that the Employee Handbook controls, and that it requires the termination of any
employee whose medical leave extends beyond 365 days. Thus, the City claims
1
Although the district court denied compensatory damages, it awarded
M r. M ontgomery $1 in nominal damages for the procedural due process violation.
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that it met its burden of proving that M r. M ontgomery’s employment would have
been terminated even if he had been given a proper pre-termination hearing.
W e acknowledge that certain conditions of M r. M ontgomery’s employment
are governed by the CBA. This is not the end of the inquiry, however. Section
4.1 of CBA provides that it is
the prerogative of the City to operate and manage its affairs in all
respects and in accordance with its responsibilities, and power or
authority which the City has not officially abridged, delegated,
granted or modified by [the CBA] are retained by the City, and
remain exclusively, without limitation, within the rights of the City.
Aplt. App. at 249. Admittedly, Section 4.3(a) provides that the City has the right
to “hire, demote, suspend or discharge for just cause,” Id., but that is not the only
right retained by the City. Instead, Section 4.3(h) provides that the City has the
right to “establish, modify and enforce personnel policies and procedures adopted
by the City.” Id. And although Section 4.6 provides that the CBA shall
supercede the City’s personnel policies that conflict with its terms, there are no
conflicts here. In fact, as to sick leave (the only section of the CBA that arguably
applies), Section 12.1 states that “sick leave shall be accrued and used pursuant to
the terms of the [City’s] Personnel Rules.” Id. at 260. 2
As to w hether the City’s personnel policy was properly enforced against
M r. M ontgomery, we agree with the district court’s result, but for a different
2
The CBA’s section on sick leave does contain rules concerning donated
leave, which are irrelevant in this case.
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reason. W hile it is true that the City opposed his request for long term disability,
this does not mean that he was not deemed to be on long term disability leave at
the time his employment was terminated. Section 115.1 of the Employee
Handbook provides that
[f]or the purposes of these rules, temporary disability shall be
defined as any non-job related injury, illness, or other medically
related situation which prevents an employee from working for a
period of at least 2 weeks but not more than 180 calendar days. Any
period of disability in excess of 180 days will be considered long
term disability.
Id. at 233 (emphasis added). In turn, as noted, Section 116.9 provides that “[a]n
employee shall be removed from [long term disability] leave, forfeit all privileges
that go with such leave and have employment terminated if any of the following
occurs: [t]he employee has been on [long term disability] leave for more than 365
days.” Id. at 234 (emphasis added). Therefore, the City was required to
terminate his employment and no pre-termination hearing would have changed the
outcome.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRM ED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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