Randall v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. , 201 F. App'x 603 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 19, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CO NN IE RA ND ALL,
Plaintiff-Counter-
Defendant-Appellant,
v. No. 04-5031
(D.C. No. CV-02-742-K(M ))
TR AV ELER S C ASU A LTY & (N.D. Okla.)
SURETY COM PANY, formerly
known as A etna Life and Casualty
Company,
Defendant-Counterclaimant-
Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TH E ESTA TE O F R IC HA RD D.
RANDALL, SR.,
Third-Party Defendant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before L UC ER O, A ND ER SO N, and BROR BY, Circuit Judges.
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant
to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
This case is before us following our certification of a dispositive but novel
issue of state law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Connie Randall appealed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Travelers Casualty &
Surety Company (“Travelers”) on her breach of contract and bad faith claims.
W e VAC ATE the grant of summary judgment on the breach of contract claim,
A FFIR M on the bad faith claim, and REM AND for further proceedings.
In settlement of claims arising from an automobile accident, Richard D.
Randall, Sr. agreed to a lump sum followed by 300 monthly payments of $1,250,
with any remainder to be paid to his estate. Two days before his death, M r.
Randall executed an assignment conveying his interest in the settlement to his
wife. Travelers refused M rs. Randall’s request for the remaining payments,
asserting that its contractual obligation was to make such payments to M r.
Randall’s estate. M rs. Randall then filed suit in Oklahoma state court claiming
breach of contract and bad faith. Travelers removed the case to federal court and
moved for a declaratory judgment specifying the proper recipient of the payments.
The district granted summary judgment in favor of Travelers, declaring payment
was due to the estate. M rs. Randall now appeals.
I
Under Oklahoma law, the assignment of a life insurance policy gives the
assignee a right to insurance proceeds even if the insured’s estate is the named
beneficiary. Alkire v. King, 80 P.2d 309 (O kla. 1938). M rs. Randall points to
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language in Alkire suggesting a unity of interests between living persons and their
estates to support her position that the assignment transferred M r. Randall’s entire
interest in the settlement:
[T]he insured had all rights under the policy as it was issued. . . . No
third person had any interest in this policy. It was payable to the
estate of the insured. . . . Under such a policy all rights normally
held by a beneficiary belonged to the insured. . . . The insured and
his own estate during his life do not constitute two separate and
distinct entities: they are a single unit of ownership.
Id. at 310-11 (quoting Chartrand v. Chartrand, 3 N.E.2d 828, 830 (M ass. 1936))
(third omission in original). To determine whether Alkire’s analysis applies to
contracts in general, we certified the question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
The question was reformulated by that court as:
Does the principle articulated in Alkire v. King, 1938 OK 282, 80
P.2d 309, that the assignment of a life insurance policy conveys to
the assignee a right to policy proceeds although the insured’s estate
is the named beneficiary, apply to contracts generally?
Randall v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., ___ P.3d ___, 2006 W L 2673279, at *1
(Okla. Sept. 19, 2006); see also Randall v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 450 F.3d
1115, 1115 (10th Cir. 2006). 1
1
W e certified a second question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court:
M ay an insurer alter the right to assign rights under a settlement
agreement by funding the contract through the purchase of an annuity
where the settlement agreement does not anticipate such a purchase
and where neither the settlement agreement nor the annuity contains
anti-assignment provisions?
(continued...)
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This question was answered in the affirmative by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, which noted that “assignments of life insurance policies are nothing more
than ordinary contracts to be determined under general contract principles,”
Randall, 2006 W L 2673279, at *3, and that “there can be no vested right of
inheritance in the estate of a living person.” Id. Accordingly, M r. Randall had
the power to assign his remainder payment. See id. at *4 (“W here, as here, there
is no provision either in the settlement agreement or in the annuity prohibiting
assignment, the contract is subject to assignment.”).
In light of this conclusive determination of state law, the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on M rs. Randall’s contract claim cannot stand. W e
therefore VAC ATE the entry of summary judgment on the contract claim (and
Travelers’ corresponding claim for a declaratory judgment), and REM AND for
further proceedings. 2
1
(...continued)
Randall, 2006 W L 2673279, at *1. Even though the court answered this question
“no,” id., we need not consider the issue further because the court’s response to
the first question is dispositive.
2
The district court expressly did not reach other issues raised in Travelers’
motion for summary judgment, in particular challenges to the legal validity of the
operative assignment, see District Court Order of Feb. 5, 2004, at 3.
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II
The district court provided two rationales for its grant of summary
judgment against M rs. Randall on her bad faith claim. First, the court held that
Travelers could not be liable for bad faith because it had a valid reason to refuse
payment. Second, the court noted that Oklahoma has not extended bad faith
claims beyond the insurance context to contracts generally.
Although the first holding is undercut somewhat by our vacatur of the
court’s disposition of the contract claim, we nonetheless hold Travelers had a
legitimate, albeit unsuccessful, basis for refusing to make the remaining payments
under the settlement agreement to M rs. Randall. See Newport v. USA A, 11 P.3d
190, 195 (Okla. 2000) (“The tort of bad faith does not foreclose the insurer’s right
to deny a claim, resist payment, or litigate any claim to w hich the insurer has a
legitimate defense.”) (quotation omitted).
W hen there is “no conclusive precedential legal authority on an issue,
withholding payment is not unreasonable or in bad faith.” Bailey v. Farmers Ins.
Co., 137 P.3d 1260, 1264 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006) (citing Skinner v. John Deere
Ins. Co., 998 P.2d 1219 (Okla. 2000)). Travelers faced no conclusive authority
contrary to their defense in this case before our certification of the question to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court. Rejection of the bad faith claim by the district court
was proper on this basis, thus we do not reach its alternative rationale.
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Grant of summary judgment on M rs. Randall’s bad faith claim is
AFFIRM ED, and the judgment of the district court is VACATED in all other
respects. The case is R EM A N D ED for further proceedings consistent with this
order and judgment for application of the newly stated Oklahoma law.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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