Corrigan v. LeClair , 206 F. App'x 771 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    November 22, 2006
    UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT                      Clerk of Court
    ED W A RD MA R V IN CO RR IG AN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                    No. 06-8046
    (D.C. No. 06-CV-62-D)
    SH ELLY LEC LA IR ; WILLIA M                           (D . W yo.)
    C HA M BER S; WILLIA M LU BEN;
    THOM AS FO RSLAND, City of
    C asper employees; N A TR ON A
    C OU N TY , WY O M IN G ,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
    Before KELLY, L UC ER O, and HA RTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Edward M arvin Corrigan appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
    complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
    not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
    and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
    judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
    conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
    defendants below, City of Casper employees and Natrona County, have filed a
    motion for sanctions, requesting attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending
    this appeal. Because Corrigan advanced no non-frivolous bases for federal
    jurisdiction, we A FFIR M the district court’s dismissal and GRANT the
    defendants’ motion for sanctions.
    On M arch 10, 2006, Corrigan sued the defendants in federal district court
    after the City of Casper, W yoming cleared his property of garbage and filed a lien
    for the costs of the cleanup. Citing “Article III, § 2 Clause 1 and 2,” presumably
    of the United States Constitution, as a basis for federal jurisdiction, Corrigan
    asserts that a “Land Patent stands as absolute ownership of the land in question,”
    and that the City of Casper had “no jurisdiction or venue to assail any land
    patent.” Corrigan’s only alleged basis for federal jurisdiction appears to be his
    ownership of property obtained via a federal land patent.
    The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that it
    lacked jurisdiction over Corrigan’s claims. It also found that the complaint, even
    liberally construed, failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Corrigan now
    appeals. 1
    1
    Corrigan’s appellate brief advances a host of unintelligible arguments but fails
    to address jurisdiction. Rather than dismiss his appeal for failing to comply with
    Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(4), however, w e opt to decide this appeal on the merits.
    (continued...)
    -2-
    W e review both Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo. Tsosie v.
    United States, 
    452 F.3d 1161
    , 1163 (10th Cir. 2006). A federal land patent does
    not confer federal jurisdiction over any legal dispute that touches the land. In
    Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 
    414 U.S. 661
     (1974), the Supreme
    Court distinguished between claims concerning possessory rights arising under
    federal law and those brought by garden variety land patent ow ners. As the court
    explained:
    Once patent issues, the incidents of ownership are, for the most part,
    matters of local property law to be vindicated in local courts, and in
    such situations it is normally insufficient for “arising under”
    jurisdiction merely to allege that ownership or possession is claimed
    under a United States patent.
    
    Id. at 676-77
    . Indeed, then-Justice Rehnquist wrote separately in that case solely
    to emphasize that “the grant of a land patent to a private party carries with it no
    guarantee of continuing federal interest and certainly carries with it no
    indefinitely redeemable passport into federal court.” 
    Id. at 683
     (Rehnquist, J.,
    concurring).
    Because Corrigan’s complaint asserts no basis for federal jurisdiction other
    than the fact his land was obtained via a federal land patent, the district court
    1
    (...continued)
    See Bailey v. Big Sky M otors, Ltd. (In re Ogden), 
    314 F.3d 1190
    , 1197 n.4 (10th
    Cir. 2002) (“[W]e proceed with the discussion of this issue only to avoid any
    appearance that we are sacrificing substantive justice on the altar of
    administrative convenience.”) (quotation omitted).
    -3-
    clearly lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his claims and properly dismissed
    his complaint under Rule 12(b)(1). See also Virgin v. County of San Luis
    Obispo, 
    201 F.3d 1141
    , 1145 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that federal land patents do
    not confer federal subject matter jurisdiction). Accordingly, we need not address
    its alternative basis for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
    W e now turn to the defendants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs
    pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38. Under Rule 38, “[i]f a court of appeals
    determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion . . .
    and reasonable opportunity to respond, aw ard just damages and single or double
    costs to the appellee.” An appellant’s pro se status is not a bar to the imposition
    of such sanctions. Haworth v. Royal (In re Haworth), 
    347 F.3d 1189
    , 1192 (10th
    Cir. 2003).
    Because Corrigan’s appeal is frivolous, sanctions are appropriate.
    Defendants laudibly refrained from seeking sanctions at the district court level
    due to Corrigan’s pro se status. However, after the district court’s clear
    explanation of the law any reasonable person would have ceased pounding on the
    door of the federal courthouse. Instead, Corrigan pressed his claims, advanced
    indecipherable appellate arguments, and forced the defendants to needlessly brief
    the jurisdictional issue in this court. W e grant the defendants’ motion and, having
    received no objection to the reasonableness of the amount requested, order
    Corrigan to pay sanctions in the amount of $1,798.13.
    -4-
    For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRM ED and the defendants’ motion for Rule 38 sanctions is GR ANTED .
    Entered for the Court
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
    -5-