Wideman v. State of Colorado , 242 F. App'x 611 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    October 1, 2007
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    TENTH CIRCUIT            Clerk of Court
    EUGENE WIDEMAN, JR.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                           No. 07-1152
    STATE OF COLORADO, FAMILY                       (D.C. No. 06-cv-01423-WDM-CBS)
    ENFORCEMENT SERVICES, and                                   (D. Colo.)
    PUEBLO COUNTY, COLORADO,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    EUGENE WIDEMAN, JR.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                           No. 07-1154
    AMELIA GARCIA, PUEBLO COUNTY,                    (D.C. No. 06-cv-2363-WDM-MEH)
    COLORADO, and CESAR CHAVEZ                                   (D. Colo.)
    ACADEMY,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
    law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
    persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of these
    appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are, therefore,
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Plaintiff Eugene Wideman, Jr., appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s
    dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of two § 1983 actions that he filed. We
    exercise jurisdiction over these appeals pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . In Appeal No. 07-
    1152, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the action, but remand with directions to
    modify the judgment to indicate the dismissal is without prejudice. In Appeal No. 07-
    1154, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
    I.
    Wideman and defendant Amelia Garcia are the parents of a minor child, referred to
    by Wideman in his pleadings as “CG-W.” According to the allegations in Wideman’s
    two complaints, he and Garcia have had a long-running battle in Colorado state court over
    the care and custody of CG-W. In his two § 1983 complaints, Wideman asserted a host
    of complaints regarding the Colorado state courts’ resolution of this dispute. For
    example, Wideman alleged that the state trial court lacked jurisdiction over he and Garcia
    because they had never been married, altered his parental rights on the basis of
    insufficient and/or false evidence, and was biased against him because of his gender and
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    race. Wideman further complained that he had attempted to bring these matters to the
    attention of the Colorado Court of Appeals (CCA), but that the CCA rejected his claims
    and “treated him with the same disrespect that [the] lower court did.” ROA, No. 07-1152,
    Vol. I, Doc. 1 at 5. Wideman’s two § 1983 complaints sought damages against the
    various defendants named therein, and also requested relief in the form of an order
    restoring his parental rights and directing that all child support payments he had made to
    Garcia be returned to him.
    The district court, ruling on motions filed by defendants and at the
    recommendation of the magistrate judge, dismissed both actions for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction. In the first action (Appeal No. 07-1152; District Court Case No. 06-cv-
    01423-WDM-CBS), the district court dismissed the action with prejudice. In the second
    action (Appeal No. 07-1154; District Court Case No. 06-cv-2363-WDM-MEH), the
    district court dismissed the action without prejudice. Wideman now appeals those
    rulings.
    II.
    We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction. Guttman v. Khalsa, 
    446 F.3d 1027
    , 1031 (10th Cir. 2006). “We may affirm
    the district court’s dismissal on any basis supported by the record and the law.” Weaver
    v. United States, 
    98 F.3d 518
    , 519 (10th Cir. 1996).
    After reviewing the records on appeal, we conclude that most of the claims
    asserted in Wideman’s two complaints are subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter
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    jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v.
    Feldman, 
    460 U.S. 462
     (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
     (1923). That
    doctrine “prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases
    brought by state-court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered before the
    district court proceedings commenced.” Lance v. Dennis, 
    546 U.S. 459
    , 460 (2006) (per
    curiam; internal quotations omitted). It also bars any “action in federal court that alleges
    an injury ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court decision, such that success in the
    federal court would require overturning the state court decision . . . .” Epps v. Creditnet,
    Inc., 
    320 F.3d 756
    , 758-59 (7th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). In this case, it is apparent
    that the majority of Wideman’s claims are little more than thinly disguised efforts to
    overturn, or at least call into question the validity of, the rulings entered against him by
    the Colorado state courts. Therefore, those claims are subject to dismissal for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
    We further conclude that, to the extent Wideman’s complaints assert claims that
    involve matters still pending in Colorado state court, those claims are subject to dismissal
    pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine.1 See Younger v. Harris, 
    401 U.S. 37
     (1971).
    That doctrine “requires a federal court to abstain from hearing a case where . . . (1) state
    1
    For example, Wideman alleges that the Colorado state courts have, to date, failed
    to require paternity testing to be performed, and, in his second claim for relief in the
    complaint that underlies Appeal No. 07-1152, asks “[t]hat any Paternity test required at
    this point be under the supervision of the Federal Courts because of the parties involved
    in this matter on the State level cannot be trusted with any testing.” ROA, Appeal No.
    07-1152, Vol. I, Doc. 1 at 7.
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    judicial proceedings are ongoing; (2) [that] implicate an important state interest; and (3)
    the state proceedings offer an adequate opportunity to litigate federal constitutional
    issues.” Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Stovall, 
    341 F.3d 1202
    , 1204 (10th Cir. 2003).
    Those requirements are clearly satisfied here. To begin with, Wideman asserts that the
    custody proceedings in Colorado state court remain ongoing. Further, it is beyond
    dispute that such proceedings implicate important state interests. See Hunt v. Lamb, 
    427 F.3d 725
    , 727 (10th Cir. 2005) (“It is well-established that federal courts lack jurisdiction
    over the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, and parent and
    child.”). Lastly, it is clear that the Colorado state court proceedings offer Wideman an
    adequate opportunity to litigate any federal constitutional issues that may arise; indeed,
    Wideman concedes in his pleadings that he has previously raised such issues in the
    Colorado state proceedings.
    The only claim in either complaint that does not readily fall into one of the two
    categories discussed above is Wideman’s claim, asserted in Appeal No. 07-1154 (District
    Court Case No. 06-cv-2363-WDM-MEH) that defendant Cesar Chavez Academy, a
    public charter school in Pueblo, Colorado, violated his constitutional rights by denying
    him equal access to CG-W’s school records. ROA, Appeal No. 07-1154, Vol. I, Doc. 1 at
    5. There is no indication in the record that this claim is part of the underlying state court
    proceedings and, on its face, this claim appears to involve a matter of federal law that the
    district court is empowered to review under the federal question statute, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    . Thus, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of this claim and remand to the
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    district court for further proceedings on this claim.2
    As a final matter, we conclude it is necessary to remand Appeal No. 07-1152
    (District Court Case No. 06-cv-01423-WDM-CBS) in order to allow the district court to
    modify the dismissal to be without prejudice. Because dismissals based upon the Rooker-
    Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines are jurisdictional, they should be entered
    without prejudice. Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 
    434 F.3d 1213
    , 1214 (10th Cir.
    2006) (“A longstanding line of cases from this circuit holds that where the district court
    dismisses an action for lack of jurisdiction, as it did here, the dismissal must be without
    prejudice.”).
    In Appeal No. 07-1152 (District Court Case No. 06-cv-01423-WDM-CBS), we
    AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the action, but REMAND the case to the district
    court with directions to modify the judgment to indicate the dismissal is without
    prejudice. In Appeal No. 07-1154 (District Court Case No. 06-cv-2363-WDM-MEH), we
    2
    The magistrate judge and district court, in addressing the Academy’s motion to
    dismiss, noted that Wideman had failed to effect proper service of his complaint on
    Academy. Although the magistrate judge noted that “courts [generally] allow a plaintiff
    the opportunity to cure defects in service of process, rather than dismissing the
    complaint,” he concluded that such relief was not appropriate here because, in his view,
    the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the entire action. ROA, Appeal
    No. 07-1154, Vol. I, Doc. 13 at 4. In turn, the district court likewise dismissed the entire
    action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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    AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings.
    Entered for the Court
    Mary Beck Briscoe
    Circuit Judge
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