United States v. Gomez , 208 F. App'x 643 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                       F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
    December 12, 2006
    TENTH CIRCUIT                    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                      No. 05-2151
    v.                                      District of New M exico
    GA BRIEL DA VID G OM EZ,                          (D.C. No. 03-568 W J)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
    Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant-appellant Gabriel David G omez appeals from the district court’s
    sentence of 360 months imposed for one count of conspiracy to distribute more
    than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
     and
    841(b)(1)(A) and fifty-three counts of money laundering in violation of U.S.C. 18
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
    of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is
    therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not
    binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and
    collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
    with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (eff. Dec. 1, 2006) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (eff. Jan. 1,
    2007).
    §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1957. M r. Gomez pleaded guilty to all counts without the
    benefit of a plea agreement. W e have reviewed the issues presented on appeal
    and find no error. Therefore we affirm.
    I. Discussion
    M r. Gomez appeals on three grounds. First, he claims that the district court
    treated the sentencing guidelines as mandatory in violation of the Supreme
    Court’s ruling in United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), and erroneously
    enhanced his sentence based on facts found by the judge using a preponderance of
    the evidence standard. Second, he claims that the district court considered
    evidence from his co-conspirator’s court proceedings to determine the drug
    quantity involved in the conspiracy count. Third, he claims that the judge
    improperly shifted the burden of proof by requiring him to disprove the
    calculation of drug quantity estimated by the probation officer rather than
    requiring the government to prove it.
    A. Application of the Sentencing G uidelines
    At the evidentiary hearing prior to sentencing, the government introduced
    evidence that under M r. Gomez’s direction, approximately 40,000 pounds of
    marijuana had been transported from M exico and distributed throughout the
    United States. The government also presented evidence that M r. Gomez
    possessed a firearm, obstructed justice by intimidating a witness, and lead a
    criminal enterprise that involved more than five persons. The district court found
    -2-
    that the government proved these facts by the preponderance of the evidence.
    Calculation of a Guidelines sentence can include enhancements based on facts
    proved by a preponderance of the evidence so long as the judge treats the
    calculation as advisory rather than mandatory. United States v. M agallanez, 
    408 F.3d 672
    , 685 (10th Cir. 2005).
    M r. Gomez argues that the sentencing court could not enhance his sentence
    using facts found by a preponderance of the evidence because it treated the
    Guidelines as mandatory. But the district court’s conduct, as well as its words,
    demonstrates that the court did not treat the G uidelines as mandatory. The court
    began the sentencing proceeding by explaining that it would calculate the
    sentence using the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and then determine whether the
    sentence was reasonable using the sentencing factors found in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). The facts found at sentencing combined with M r. Gomez’s criminal
    history resulted in an offense level of 44, which mandates life in prison under the
    Guidelines. After considering the § 3553(a) factors, the sentencing court
    determined that a life sentence would be unfair because it was the same sentence
    imposed on M r. Gomez’s co-defendant who did not plead guilty, showed no
    remorse, and denied his involvement in the criminal enterprise. By adjusting the
    sentence according to the § 3553(a) factors, the court plainly treated the
    Guidelines as advisory.
    -3-
    B. Reliance on O utside Proceedings
    M r. Gomez argues that the sentencing court abused its discretion by using
    evidence presented in another proceeding to determine the amount of drugs
    involved in the conspiracy. He points to the following statement by the district
    judge at the sentencing hearing:
    Now, I’ll find, based on my involvement as the presiding judge in
    this case, on what’s been presented today, as w ell as w hat I’ve heard
    throughout the other defendants’ matters in this conspiracy case, that
    Gabriel Gomez was involved in trafficking of marijuana by laundering
    illegal proceeds by providing stash houses and providing instructions to
    other conspirators to further the trafficking and the distribution of
    marijuana. As a result of his conduct, he is accountable for the underlying
    marijuana offense levels pursuant to Guideline 2D1.1.
    Appellant’s A pp. 0438-39. W e agree that it would be error for a district court to
    base a factual finding of drug quantities on evidence presented in another case, to
    which the defendant was not a party. W hen facts pertinent to sentencing are
    disputed, the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
    evidence, and the defendant has the right not only to know the evidence presented
    against him but also to rebut or explain that evidence. U.S. Sentencing
    Guidelines M anual § 6A1.3; see United States v. Keifer, 
    198 F.3d 798
    , 800 (10th
    Cir. 1999); United States v. Peterman, 
    841 F.2d 1474
    , 1484 (10th Cir. 1988);
    United States v. Shepherd, 
    739 F.2d 510
    , 515 (10th Cir. 1984). That is not
    possible when the judge refers generally to evidence heard in another proceeding.
    -4-
    W e do not interpret the district court’s drug quantity finding in this case as
    having been based on evidence at the co-conspirators’ trial. The judge referred to
    that evidence in one sentence, in general reference to the nature of the
    defendant’s conduct. The court then analyzed drug quantity, referring exclusively
    to evidence presented in this case through testimony by FBI case agent M argaret
    Russin. Based on documents introduced into evidence and interviews with co-
    conspirators, the agent calculated that M r. Gomez was responsible for 40,024
    pounds, or 18,155 kilograms, of marijuana, which is 8,155 kilograms more than
    the G uideline required. The district court explicitly found that Agent Russin’s
    methodology was reasonable and adopted her calculation of drug quantity in
    determining the sentence. W e therefore reject M r. Gomez’s argument that the
    drug quantity finding was based on improper consideration of extra-record
    information.
    M r. Gomez makes a similar argument with respect to the district court’s
    role adjustment finding, under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). The district court found that
    M r. Gomez was one of two “kingpins” in the organization, and that he was
    responsible for the “distribution end of the drug trafficking organization.”
    Appellant’s App. 0440. Although the court did not specify the evidence on which
    it based this finding, the record of the sentencing hearing is replete with
    testimony regarding M r. Gomez’s role in the drug distribution operation. The
    -5-
    court’s brief reference to the evidence in the co-conspirator’s trial is not sufficient
    to demonstrate that the factual finding was improper.
    C. Burden Shifting
    M r. Gomez also argues that the sentencing court improperly shifted the
    burden of proof of drug quantity from the government to him. In finding a base
    offense level of 36, the sentencing court commented that to find a lower base
    offense level the court would have to conclude that “Agent Russin’s calculations
    were off by 8,155 kilograms, and there’s simply no evidence to suggest that.”
    The sentencing court was not here requiring Gomez to prove that he conspired to
    distribute less than the amount calculated by the government. Rather, it was
    informing him that the government met its burden to prove the drug quantity
    absent any further evidence introduced by the defendant.
    The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New
    M exico is AFFIRM ED.
    Entered for the Court,
    M ichael W . M cConnell
    Circuit Judge
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-2151

Citation Numbers: 208 F. App'x 643

Judges: Murphy, Seymour, McConnell

Filed Date: 12/12/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024