Wilkins v. Midtown Chevron , 370 F. App'x 919 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                        FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    March 30, 2010
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    JORDAN M. WILKINS,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,                    No. 09-4142
    v.                                               (D. Utah)
    MIDTOWN CHEVRON, K&H                           (D.C. No. 2:08-CV-01000-DS)
    ENTERPRISES, CHARLES
    HUNSAKER, SUSAN KETCHUM,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before MURPHY, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this court has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Jordan M. Wilkins, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal
    of the civil rights complaint he brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 1291, 1 this court affirms.
    In his complaint, Wilkins alleged the discriminatory acts which were the
    basis of his suit were as follows: “I’ve got a file full of things about this.” As the
    factual basis supporting his claim of discrimination, Wilkins simply alleged he
    “wasn’t treated right while under employment, it’s all in the report to the Labor
    Commission.” In light of these exceedingly Spartan allegations, the district court
    concluded that even liberally construed, Wilkins Title VII complaint failed to
    state a valid claim of discrimination. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 
    519 F.3d 1242
    ,
    1247-48 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that allegations in a complaint “must be
    enough that, if assumed to be true, the plaintiff plausibly (not just speculatively)
    has a claim for relief”); E.E.O.C. v. PVNF, L.L.C., 
    487 F.3d 790
    , 800 (10th Cir.
    2007) (noting generally that to state a valid Title VII claim of disparate treatment,
    a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to demonstrate (1) he is a member of a
    protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse
    1
    Midtown Chevron’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal is hereby DENIED.
    Although the district court granted Midtown Chevron’s motion to Dismiss
    Wilkins’s complaint on June 10, 2009, that judgment was not set out in a separate
    document. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). Thus, the judgment did not become final until
    150 days after the entry on the docket of the district court’s order granting
    Midtown Chevron’s motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B). Accordingly,
    Wilkins’s July 20, 2009, notice of appeal was timely filed. Fed R. App. P.
    4(a)(1), (2), (7).
    -2-
    employment action took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
    discrimination).
    This court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of a Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 
    555 F.3d 1188
    , 1192 (10th Cir. 2009). Here, even assuming the truth of each
    allegation in Wilkins complaint, the complaint does not state a valid Title VII
    claim. 2 Thus, we AFFIRM the district court’s order of dismissal for substantially
    those reasons set out in the order of dismissal dated June 10, 2009.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Michael R. Murphy
    Circuit Judge
    2
    After Midtown Chevron filed its Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Wilkins
    filed an amended complaint. The district court struck the amended complaint
    pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) because Wilkins had not previously obtained
    leave of court or consent of Midtown Chevron. This court need not determine
    whether the district court’s decision to strike Wilkins’s proposed amended
    complaint amounts to an abuse of discretion, Hertz v. Luzenac Group, 
    576 F.3d 1103
    , 1117 (10th Cir. 2009), because the proposed amended complaint does not
    rectify the deficiencies that justified dismissal of the original complaint. In
    particular, even construed liberally, the proposed amended complaint does not
    allege any action that could amount to an adverse employment action and the
    three isolated instances of alleged improper conduct on the part of Midtown
    Chevron employees are simply not sufficient, under any standard, to state a claim
    of hostile work environment.
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-4142

Citation Numbers: 370 F. App'x 919

Judges: Murphy, Gorsuch, Holmes

Filed Date: 3/30/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024