Beard v. Colvin ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 2, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MARY D. BEARD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-1105
(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-00741-MEH-1)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting (D. Colo.)
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Mary D. Beard appeals a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security
denying her application for benefits. We reverse and remand.
I. Background
Ms. Beard applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income, claiming that physical and mental disabilities left her unable to work. An
administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Ms. Beard’s claim at the fifth step in the
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
disability-determination process. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir.
2009) (summarizing the five-step process). At step two the ALJ found that Ms.
Beard had a severe impairment: depressive disorder. At step four she found that Ms.
Beard had the residual functional capacity (RFC) “to perform medium work . . . with
an SVP [specific-vocational-preparation level] of three or less, that does not require
more than occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, or the general public,”
Admin. R. Vol. I at 15, which meant Ms. Beard was unable to perform her past
relevant work. And at step five the ALJ found that Ms. Beard was not disabled
despite her limitations because she could do other work existing in significant
numbers in the national economy. The appeals council denied review and the district
court affirmed.
On appeal Ms. Beard argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination was flawed
because the ALJ improperly rejected the November 2010 opinion of Dr. Carlos
Rodriguez, a psychologist who examined Ms. Beard twice and concluded that her
depression significantly impaired her ability to work.
II. Standard of Review
It is a social security claimant’s burden to prove she is disabled. Maes v.
Astrue, 522 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 2008). We review the district court’s ruling
de novo, but independently determine whether the ALJ correctly applied the law and
whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings. See Wall, 561 F.3d
at 1052.
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III. ALJ Rejection of Dr. Rodriguez’s Opinion
Dr. Rodriguez examined Ms. Beard for the second time in November 2010.
After conducting a diagnostic interview and administering the Folstein Mini-Mental
Status Examination, he diagnosed Ms. Beard with major depression, grief reaction,
anxiety disorder, and alcohol abuse, and gave her a global assessment of functioning
(GAF) score of 40.1 He concluded that Ms. Beard’s “ability to engage in basic work
related activities including understanding, memory, sustained concentration,
persistence and pace, social interaction, and adaptation [was] significantly
impaired.” Admin. R. Vol. II at 311. Dr. Rodriguez also completed a mental RFC
form indicating that Ms. Beard had marked or extreme limitations in all 20 areas of
work-related functioning.
Nevertheless, the ALJ gave “no weight to Dr. Rodriguez’s opinion” in
determining Ms. Beard’s RFC. Admin. R. Vol. I at 19. The ALJ explained:
[A] GAF of 40 would indicate[] that the claimant had some
impairment in reality testing or communication, or major
impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family
relations, judgment, or mood. This opinion is not supported by
Dr. Rodriguez’s findings during his evaluation. For example,
Dr. Rodriguez noted that the claimant presented an appropriate
attitude towards the evaluation procedure. She presented with no
obvious expressive speech deficits or obvious sensory visual
difficulties. Rapport was established and she talked to
Dr. Rodriguez freely. She did not display any bizarre behaviors
during this evaluation procedure.
1
A GAF score is a clinician’s determination on a scale of 1 to 100 of an
individual’s overall level of functioning. See Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116,
1122 n.3 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (Text Revision 4th ed. 2000)).
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Id.
Ms. Beard argues that even if some of Dr. Rodriguez’s observations were
inconsistent with the GAF score, the ALJ erred by discussing only the inconsistent
observations and ignoring Dr. Rodriguez’s findings that supported his opinion. We
agree that the ALJ did not provide sufficient explanation for rejecting his opinion.
Although an ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence, she must discuss “any
uncontroverted evidence [s]he chooses not to rely on, as well as significantly
probative evidence [s]he rejects.” Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir.
1996). At the least, Dr. Rodriguez’s opinion was significantly probative.
Yet the ALJ discussed only a fraction of Dr. Rodriguez’s report before
rejecting his opinion entirely. She ignored Dr. Rodriguez’s findings that Ms. Beard’s
ability to engage in basic work-related activities was significantly impaired and that
she had marked or extreme limitations in all areas of work-related functioning. In
particular, she ignored his Folstein assessment. Having found Ms. Beard not
credible, the ALJ could discount Dr. Rodriguez’s findings to the extent that they
relied on what Ms. Beard had told him; but the ALJ gave no reason for rejecting the
objective assessment.
Also, the ALJ appears to have incorporated at least some of Dr. Rodriguez’s
findings in her RFC determination. She found that Ms. Beard should have no “more
than occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, or the general public.”
Admin. R. Vol. I at 15. Yet the only source in the record that sets out this limitation
appears to be Dr. Rodriguez’s report. An ALJ may not accept part of a medical
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opinion and discount the rest without explaining “why one part of [the] opinion
was creditable and the rest was not.” Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1292
(10th Cir. 2012).
We therefore must remand for either adoption of Dr. Rodriguez’s opinions or
an explanation of why they are rejected.2 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c); 404.1520a;
416.927(c); 416.920a.
IV. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded with
directions to remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this
order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
2
Because we reverse and remand on this ground, we do not address Ms.
Beard’s other arguments.
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