Clark v. Fallin ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 28, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
HERMAN TRACY CLARK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
No. 16-6109
MARY FALLIN, Governor for the State of (D.C. No. 5:15-CV-00908-C)
Oklahoma; ROBERT BRETT MACY, (W.D. Oklahoma)
Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board;
PATRICIA HIGH, Pardon and Parole
Board; VANESSA PRICE, Pardon and
Parole Board; TOM GILLERT, Pardon and
Parole Board,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before GORSUCH, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Herman Tracy Clark, a prisoner currently in state custody and proceeding pro se,
appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, in which he
alleges Oklahoma’s parole system violates the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause and
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
infringes on his due process and First Amendment rights. A magistrate judge screened
Mr. Clark’s complaint pursuant to § 1915A of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
and entered a recommendation of dismissal for failure to state a claim, which the district
court adopted in full. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Clark’s § 1983 complaint arises from the State of Oklahoma’s denial of his
application for parole in March 2015.1 In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Clark named
Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin and Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board Members
Robert Macy, Patricia High, Vanessa Price, and Tom Gillert, claiming Oklahoma’s 1997
Truth in Sentencing Act violates the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause because it
decreases the frequency of parole reconsideration hearings for certain inmates from one
year to three years. Mr. Clark also claimed the defendants summarily considered his
application and denied an in-person hearing in violation of his due-process and First
Amendment rights. He later supplemented these arguments in a motion titled “Memo
Under PLRA Requiring Magistrate Judge to Determine Merits of Complaint.”
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the district court referred the matter to a
magistrate judge, who screened Mr. Clark’s complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915 and 1915A.2 In reviewing the complaint, the magistrate judge distilled four
1
Mr. Clark served twenty-five years in federal prison for crimes stemming
from a robbery and homicide. He was then transferred to state custody, where he is
currently serving a life sentence in connection with state charges arising from the
same incidents.
2
Under § 1915, which provides procedures for proceedings in forma pauperis,
“the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action
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separate claims, noting Mr. Clark asserted (1) an Ex Post Facto Clause violation, (2) a
due- process violation, (3) a First Amendment violation, and (4) a conspiracy claim.
Ultimately, the magistrate judge concluded Mr. Clark failed to state an underlying
constitutional claim and, accordingly, his conspiracy claim also failed. The judge
therefore recommended dismissal with prejudice, noting that amendment of the
complaint would be futile.
Mr. Clark filed an objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, raising
largely the same arguments he did in his Amended Complaint. He also requested that the
court permit him to amend his complaint “to meet the propositions expounded in [his]
objection.” Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the district court conducted a de novo
review of the issues raised by Mr. Clark and concluded Mr. Clark merely “restate[d] the
legal conclusions contained in his Amended Complaint.” Accordingly, the district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety. Mr. Clark
then filed a motion to amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), again requesting leave to
amend his complaint. The district court denied that motion, noting it had already
dismissed Mr. Clark’s Amended Complaint with prejudice and found that amendment
would be futile. Mr. Clark timely appealed.
or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Under § 1915A, the court is required to screen inmates’ § 1983
complaints and “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
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On appeal, Mr. Clark challenges only the district court’s dismissal of his Ex Post
Facto Clause and due-process claims.3 He also argues the district court failed to liberally
construe his complaint and that its denial of his request for leave to amend was made in
error. Mr. Clark also requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal, as the
district court concluded his appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied the
motion below. We affirm each of the district court’s rulings in full and deny Mr. Clark’s
request to proceed IFP.
A. Mr. Clark’s Ex Post Facto Clause and Due-Process Claims
We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss an IFP complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. See Kay v. Bemis, 500
F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). And although we construe Mr. Clark’s pro se
pleadings liberally, “our role is not to act as his advocate.” Gallagher v. Shelton, 587
F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009). “[P]ro se parties [must] follow the same rules of
procedure that govern other litigants.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (internal quotation
marks omitted).4 “We apply the same standard of review for dismissals under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that we employ for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Id. at 1217. That is, to determine
3
Mr. Clark does cite to the First Amendment in his briefing, but he fails to
make even a cursory argument that the district court erroneously dismissed his First
Amendment claim. Accordingly, we do not consider this claim. See United States v.
Fisher, 805 F.3d 982, 991 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e routinely have declined to
consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an
appellant’s opening brief.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4
As noted above, Mr. Clark contends the district court failed to liberally
construe his pleadings. We disagree. The district court generously distilled several
claims from Mr. Clark’s pleadings that were less than artfully articulated.
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whether Mr. Clark has sufficiently stated his claims, we accept as true the well-
pleaded factual allegations and consider whether he has provided “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d
1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547
(2007)).
Because Mr. Clark is bringing his claims pursuant to § 1983, his Amended
Complaint “must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). It must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). And courts “will not supply additional factual allegations to round
out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney
v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 1997).
1. Ex Post Facto Clause
Mr. Clark’s first claim, liberally construed, is that the changes to Oklahoma’s
parole system effected through the 1997 Truth in Sentencing Act violate the
Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. Because Mr. Clark fails to demonstrate how
these changes led to a risk of increased punishment in light of his specific sentence
and crimes, the district court properly dismissed his claim. “[T]he controlling
inquiry” in evaluating an inmate’s Ex Post Facto Clause claim “is not whether the
law is retroactive, but ‘whether it produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure
of punishment attached to the covered crimes.’” Henderson v. Scott, 260 F.3d 1213,
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1216 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509
(1995)). This risk may be apparent facially, or the inmate may demonstrate the
increased risk as applied to his particular circumstances. Id. at 1216–18.
Because our Henderson decision forecloses Mr. Clark’s facial challenge, see
id. at 1216–17, Mr. Clark “must demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the rule’s
practical implementation, that its retroactive application will result in a longer period
of incarceration than under the earlier rule.” Id. at 1216 (citation, internal quotation
marks, and alterations omitted). In his Amended Complaint and other supplemental
filings, Mr. Clark fails to shoulder this burden. As the magistrate judge noted, “aside
from a conclusory reference to his age, [Mr. Clark] fails to offer any reasonable
argument he faces a significant risk of longer incarceration.” In adopting the
magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court therefore properly dismissed
Mr. Clark’s Ex Post Facto Clause claim.
2. Due Process
Mr. Clark repeats in various forms throughout his briefing that the Board’s and
Governor Fallin’s denial of parole, as well as the process by which they denied him
parole, violated his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
But as the magistrate judge’s recommendation correctly recognized, “[t]here is no
constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released
before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal &
Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). “A state may . . . establish a parole system, but
it has no duty to do so.” Id. If a state does establish a parole system, it is possible for
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the state’s statutes to create a liberty interest that would be protected by the
Constitution’s guarantee of due process. See id. at 12. Oklahoma has not, however,
created such a system, and we have repeatedly concluded that a state does not create
a liberty interest in parole protectable by due process when its parole system is
discretionary. See, e.g., Boutwell v. Keating, 399 F.3d 1203, 1213–15 (10th Cir.
2005).
Mr. Clark’s contention that Oklahoma’s parole system creates such an interest
is misguided, and the cases to which he cites have either been overruled or stand for
the opposite position than the one he asserts. The district court therefore properly
concluded Mr. Clark failed to state a due process claim.
B. Motion to Amend, Motion to Proceed IFP on Appeal, Payment of Fees,
and PLRA Strike
We also conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr.
Clark leave to amend his complaint. “[T]he grant of leave to amend the pleadings
pursuant to Rule 15(a) is within the discretion of the trial court.” Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971). And “we will not reverse the court’s
decision absent an abuse of discretion.” Minter v. Prime Equip. Co., 451 F.3d 1196, 1204
(10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the additional allegations in
Mr. Clark’s supplemental memorandum and other motions fail to cure the deficiencies in
his Amended Complaint, amendment would have been futile, and dismissal was
warranted. Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 1999) (“A proposed
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amendment is futile if the complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal.”). We
therefore affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to amend.
We also deny Mr. Clark’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal. To qualify for IFP
status, a petitioner must demonstrate the appeal is taken in good faith—meaning there
exists a “reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues
raised on appeal.” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997);
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). The district court determined Mr. Clark’s appeal was not taken in
good faith and denied his request to proceed IFP on appeal. We also deny his renewed
request to proceed IFP on appeal because, as our analysis above demonstrates, Mr. Clark
failed to raise a “reasoned, nonfrivolous argument” in support of his claims. And having
denied his request, we remind Mr. Clark that he remains obligated to pay the full filing
fee, as previously advised by the district court in its order dated May 6, 2016.
Because Mr. Clark’s complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), we impose one “strike” against Mr. Clark under the PLRA, id.
§ 1915(g), and it is counted as such immediately. Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759,
1763 (2015) (“A prior dismissal on a statutorily enumerated ground counts as a strike
even if the dismissal is the subject of an appeal.”). And we impose a second strike against
Mr. Clark because of the frivolity of his appeal. Jennings v. Natrona Cty. Det. Ctr., 175
F.3d 775, 780–81 (10th Cir.1999), overruled on other grounds by Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at
1763.
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III. CONCLUSION
Because Mr. Clark fails to state an Ex Post Facto Clause or due-process claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal. We
also AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Mr. Clark’s motion to amend and impose two
strikes against Mr. Clark pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Mr. Clark’s request to proceed
IFP on appeal is also DENIED, and Mr. Clark is accordingly reminded of his obligation
to pay the filing fee in full, pursuant to the district court’s order.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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