Lynch v. Nelson ( 2019 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 19, 2019
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SHERMAN ALEXANDER LYNCH,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 18-4174
v. (D.C. No. 2:17-CV-00477-DS)
(D. Utah)
SHANE NELSON,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE
OF APPEALABILITY
Before CARSON, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on Sherman Alexander Lynch’s pro se
request for a certificate of appealability (“COA”). Lynch seeks a COA so he can
appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. See
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing no appeal may be taken from “a final order
in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of
process issued by a State court” without first obtaining a COA). Because Lynch
has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” id.§ 2253(c)(2), this court denies his request for a COA and dismisses this appeal.
Following a jury trial in Utah state court, Lynch was convicted of
murdering his wife, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203, and obstruction of justice,
see id. § 76-8-306. State v. Lynch, 246 P.3d 525, 525 (Utah Ct. App. 2011). The
Utah Court of Appeals affirmed Lynch’s convictions on direct review. Id. at 530.
Lynch did not seek review in the Utah Supreme Court. Instead, he filed a petition
for relief under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See Lynch v. State, 400
P.3d 1047, 1050 (Utah Ct. App. 2017). That state court petition raised twenty-
eight claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim of newly
discovered evidence. See id. at 1052. The trial court denied Lynch’s motion,
concluding some of the claims of ineffective assistance were procedurally barred
and the remaining claims failed on the merits. In a lengthy opinion, the Utah
Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 1053-65. The Utah Court of Appeals likewise
affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Lynch’s claim of newly discovered
evidence failed because the new evidence was insufficient to demonstrate no
reasonable jury could have found him guilty of the charged offenses. Id. at 1065-
69. The Utah Supreme Court denied certiorari review. While these proceedings
were ongoing, Lynch filed a second petition under Utah’s Post-Conviction
Remedies Act. This petition raised eighteen claims centered around allegations of
police and prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court concluded all the claims
raised in this second petition were procedurally barred; the Utah Court of Appeals
summarily affirmed in an unpublished order.
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Lynch then filed the instant § 2254 habeas petition raising multiple claims
of police/prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. In a
thorough order, the district court concluded several of Lynch’s claims were
subject to a procedural default; it also concluded Lynch’s default was not excused
by cause and prejudice or by new, reliable evidence of actual innocence. As to
Lynch’s properly exhausted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
district court concluded the Utah courts’ rejection of these claims was neither
“contrary to,” nor did it involve “an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Lynch seeks a COA so he can appeal the district court’s dismissal of his
habeas petition. The granting of a COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an
appeal from the dismissal of his § 2254 petition. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 336 (2003). To be entitled to a COA, Lynch must make “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To
make the requisite showing, he must demonstrate “reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in
a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (quotations
omitted). When a district court dismisses a § 2254 motion on procedural grounds,
a petitioner is entitled to a COA only if he shows both that reasonable jurists
would find it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and
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debatable whether the district court’s procedural ruling was correct. Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). In evaluating whether Lynch has
satisfied his burden, this court undertakes “a preliminary, though not definitive,
consideration of the [legal] framework” applicable to each of his claims. Miller-
El, 537 U.S. at 338. Although Lynch need not demonstrate his appeal will
succeed to be entitled to a COA, he must “prove something more than the absence
of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith.” Id.Having undertaken a review of Lynch’s appellate filings, the district court’s
thorough order, and the entire record before this court pursuant to the framework
set out by the Supreme Court in Miller-El and Slack, we conclude Lynch is not
entitled to a COA. The district court’s resolution of Lynch’s § 2254 petition is
not reasonably subject to debate and the issues he seeks to raise on appeal are not
adequate to deserve further proceedings. Furthermore, it cannot be reasonably
argued the district court abused its discretion when it denied Lynch’s requests for
appointed counsel, provision of a law library, ability to purchase a computer, and
the ability to block his transfer to another facility. In so ruling, this court
concludes it is unnecessary to recapitulate the district court’s careful analysis. Cf.
Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773 (2017) (holding that the straight-forward
process of deciding whether a petitioner is entitled to a COA should not be treated
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by the Courts of Appeals as tantamount to a merits determination). Accordingly,
this court DENIES Lynch’s request for a COA and DISMISSES this appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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