United States v. Martinez ( 2022 )

Appellate Case: 21-2100 Document: 010110724297 Date Filed: 08/15/2022 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 15, 2022
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 21-2100
(D.C. No. 2:18-CR-02315-KG-1)
FRANCISCO ARMANDO MARTINEZ, (D. N.M.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, KELLY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Francisco Armando Martinez appeals from his conviction for transporting
illegal aliens, arguing that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
According to the testimony at trial, in April 2018, a group of noncitizens, with
a guide, crossed the border illegally and walked miles into the United States. When
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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they reached New Mexico Highway 9, the guide told them that cars would come to
pick them up. The group waited, hiding behind the berm beside the road, for more
than two days. Then Mr. Martinez pulled up in a Chevrolet Monte Carlo, a two-door
sedan. The guide said that the noncitizens should get ready to leave, stating, “[l]ook,
your ride’s here.” R. at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted). The noncitizens
emerged from hiding and crossed over a barbed-wire fence. While they were
approaching, Mr. Martinez opened the door and told them in Spanish something to
the effect of, “[g]et in, be quiet, . . . and we’ll go.” Id. at 128 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The car held five noncitizens, one in the front passenger seat and
four in the rear seat.
Rather than asking his passengers where they wanted to go, Mr. Martinez told
them they were going to meet another car in Phoenix. He turned north on
New Mexico Highway 113, a twenty-mile, two-lane road connecting Highway 9 and
Interstate 10. About halfway along Highway 113, the car crossed paths with a
marked Border Patrol truck driving south. Mr. Martinez told his passengers, again in
Spanish, “[d]on’t worry, don’t be afraid, nothing’s going to happen.” Id. at 130(internal quotation marks omitted).
Seeing that Mr. Martinez’s car was unusually crowded, the Border Patrol
agents made a U-turn and started following it north. They kept the car in sight while
Mr. Martinez was on Highway 113 and then while he drove west on Interstate 10 for
about ten miles until he stopped at a gas station with a convenience store.
Mr. Martinez parked at a gas pump, told his passengers to wait in the car while he got
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some gas, and walked a few steps toward the store. He turned back when the Border
Patrol agents pulled in behind his car.
One agent asked Mr. Martinez if he was a United States citizen, and he
responded affirmatively. The agent then asked if the passengers were Mr. Martinez’s
family. He said, “no, that he didn’t know them,” id. at 233, that “he was just giving
them a ride, “ id. at 235, and “that they flagged him down,” id. at 242. The other
agent asked Mr. Martinez if he could speak to the passengers, so Mr. Martinez
opened his door and rolled down the passenger-side window. After the agent
ascertained that the passengers were noncitizens, without papers to be in the United
States legally, the agents arrested Mr. Martinez and the passengers.
The government charged Mr. Martinez with one count of conspiracy to
transport illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), and one count
of transporting illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii),
(a)(1)(B)(ii), and (a)(1)(A)(v)(II). Mr. Martinez went to trial before a jury. As
relevant to this appeal, he requested that the district court give certain jury
instructions regarding the burden of proof and inferences from circumstantial
evidence. But the court refused the requested instructions.
The jury found Mr. Martinez guilty of transporting illegal aliens but not guilty
of conspiracy. The district court sentenced him to the lesser of 24 days of
imprisonment or time served and one year of supervised release. Mr. Martinez now
appeals.
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DISCUSSION
Mr. Martinez challenges the district court’s refusal to give his requested
instructions regarding the burden of proof and inferences to be drawn from
circumstantial evidence. “We review the District Court’s refusal to give requested
instructions for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1146
(10th Cir. 2007). “To assess whether the court properly exercised its discretion, we
review the jury instructions de novo to determine whether, as a whole, they
accurately state the governing law and provide the jury with an accurate
understanding of the relevant legal standards and factual issues in the case.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). “We reverse only if prejudice results from a
court’s refusal to give a requested instruction.” United States v. Faust, 795 F.3d
1243, 1251 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I. Burden of Proof
First, Mr. Martinez challenges Instruction 2, regarding the burden of proof.
He argues that the district court erred in declining to define “reasonable doubt” as
“the ‘kind of doubt that would make a person hesitate to act.’” Aplt. Opening Br.
at 8 (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)).
“[T]he Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable
doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S.
1, 5 (1994). “[S]o long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the
defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not
require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the
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government’s burden of proof.” Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v.
Clifton, 406 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2005) (“A district court . . . retains
considerable latitude in instructing juries on reasonable doubt, and fulfills its
constitutional duty if the charge as a whole correctly conveys the concept of
reasonable doubt.” (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Mr. Martinez’s
requested instruction. Instruction 2 stated:
The United States has the burden of proving the Defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. The law does not require a defendant to prove
his innocence or produce any evidence at all. A defendant has an absolute
right not to testify and may not be compelled to testify. No inference of
any kind should be drawn from the election of a defendant not to testify,
and that fact should not be considered by you in any way or even discussed
in your deliberation. The United States has the burden of proving the
Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if it fails to do so, you
must find the Defendant not guilty.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly
convinced of the Defendant’s guilt. There are few things in this world that
we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not
require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. It is only required that
the United States’ proof exclude any “reasonable doubt” concerning the
Defendant’s guilt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and
common sense after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence
in the case. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly
convinced that the Defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find
him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he
is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not
guilty.
R. at 43. The instruction both adequately directed the jury that it was required to
apply the reasonable-doubt standard and adequately defined the concept of
reasonable doubt.
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In reviewing an instruction containing similar language, we stated, “[t]he
court’s instruction correctly described the persuasion by which the prosecution must
convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.” Clifton, 406 F.3d at 1178(internal quotation marks omitted). We further stated, “the instruction correctly
explained that the Government need not prove Defendant’s guilt beyond all possible
doubt,” and that it “then, again correctly, defined reasonable doubt as a doubt based
upon reason and common sense after careful and impartial consideration of all the
evidence in the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The district court’s
instruction, therefore, correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the
jury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The same is true here.
Further, in United States v. Petty, we held that “the ‘firmly convinced’
language, juxtaposed with the insistence that a jury must acquit in the presence of ‘a
real possibility’ that the defendant is not guilty, is a correct and comprehensible
statement of the reasonable doubt standard.” 856 F.3d 1306, 1310 (10th Cir. 2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted). And in United States v. Barrera-Gonzales, we
upheld a reasonable-doubt instruction that did not include the “hesitate to act”
formulation. 952 F.2d 1269, 1270-73 (10th Cir. 1992).
Because Instruction 2 adequately instructed the jury regarding reasonable
doubt, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give
Mr. Martinez’s requested burden of proof instruction.
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II. Inferences from Circumstantial Evidence
Mr. Martinez also challenges Instruction 9, which discussed direct and
circumstantial evidence and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
In his opening brief, Mr. Martinez argues that the Supreme Court has
“endorsed the view that when the government’s case rests on circumstantial evidence,
that evidence ‘must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that
of guilt.’” Aplt. Opening Br. at 8 (quoting Holland, 348 U.S. at 139). He therefore
asserts that “the district court was required to instruct the jury sufficiently to instill in
their minds that a guilty verdict can be rendered only if there are no reasonable
alternative explanations for the conduct.” Id. at 9. In his reply brief, however, he
disclaims any intent to argue “that the district court was required to give an
instruction that circumstantial evidence must be such as to exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than guilt.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 4. And understandably so, as
Holland rejected that proposition. See Holland, 348 U.S. at 139-40 (“[T]he better
rule is that where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable
doubt, such an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and
incorrect.”). Instead, he clarifies that “he contends that in light of the Court’s refusal
to give the preferred reasonable-doubt language, the Supreme Court’s precedent
suggests that additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is warranted and
indeed necessary.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 4-5. He faults the district court for not
including in Instruction 9 a directive to avoid speculation and a reference to the
reasonable-doubt standard.
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Mr. Martinez asserts that “[t]he jury should have been instructed, as [he]
requested, that the jury’s inferences must be more than speculation and conjecture—
that they instead must flow from logical and probabilistic reasoning.” Aplt. Opening
Br. at 9. But Instruction 9 adequately conveyed these concepts to the jury. It
instructed that “you are permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the testimony
and exhibits, inferences you feel are justified in the light of common experience.”
R. at 52. It continued, “[a]n inference is a conclusion that reason and common sense
may lead you to draw from facts which have been proved.” Id. And then it reiterated
that inferences must be reasonable and the jury must reach conclusions based on
“reason and common sense.” Id. These instructions sufficiently indicated to the jury
that it should not employ speculation. See United States v. Flonnory, 630 F.3d 1280,
1285 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that a speculation instruction was unnecessary where
the jury was instructed it must view the evidence reasonably).
Further, Mr. Martinez asserts that Instruction 9 should have referred to the
reasonable-doubt standard. But in more than one-third of the instructions (eight out
of a total of twenty-one instructions), the district court referred to the
reasonable-doubt standard. One of those references came at the beginning of
Instruction 10, immediately following Instruction 9. Because the instructions as a
whole adequately conveyed the requirement that the government satisfy the
reasonable-doubt standard, Mr. Martinez has not demonstrated the district court erred
in declining to include another reference to reasonable doubt in Instruction 9. See id.8
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(“It is not error to refuse to give a requested instruction if the same subject matter is
adequately covered in the general instructions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
give Mr. Martinez’s requested inferences instruction.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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