Douglas v. International Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers, District Lodge 141 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 28, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JOE DOUGLAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-1481
(D.C. No. 1:08-CV-01052-REB-MJW)
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION (D. Colo.)
OF MACHINISTS AND
AEROSPACE WORKERS, DISTRICT
LODGE 141, a/k/a IAMAW Rocky
Mountain Aircraft Lodge 1886,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Joe Douglas appears in this court pro se. He appeals from the
district court’s orders: (1) that adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations
to dismiss his amended complaint for failing to state a claim for race
discrimination and to deny his motion for leave to file a second amended
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
complaint, and (2) that denied his two motions for appointment of counsel.
Concluding that the appeal is frivolous and not taken in good faith, we affirm the
district court’s rulings in all respects and deny plaintiff’s motion for leave to
proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees. See Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962).
I.
Plaintiff, a black male, was hired by United Airlines in October 2000 and
worked as a customer service representative. He was represented by the Union,
defendant International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
District Lodge 141. In June 2004, plaintiff failed an on-the-job alcohol test.
Rather than face immediate discharge, plaintiff agreed to a “return to work”
agreement which required him to remain drug- and alcohol-free for five years and
which, if violated, called for discharge with no mitigating factors considered and
no opportunity for reinstatement. He subsequently tested positive for marijuana
in November 2006 and was terminated on January 26, 2007. The Union
represented him, unsuccessfully, under the collective bargaining agreement’s
grievance process—but the Union did not proceed to arbitration, having
determined that further appeal would also be unsuccessful.
Plaintiff asserts a claim for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. In his amended complaint,
he asserts that white Union members have violated the same return-to-work
-2-
agreement but were returned to active service. R. at 55, ¶ 12. He also contends
that the Union put forth an inadequate defense on his behalf and failed in its duty
to fairly represent him because of his “race, black[.]” Id. ¶ 14. He seeks
reinstatement without loss of seniority or pay, reimbursement of lost retirement
benefits, as well as other remedies. See id. at 58. He filed two motions for
appointment of counsel, id. at 136, 261, which the district court denied, id. at 187,
277.
The Union filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. R. at 79. We have previously set out the elements of “a
prima facie Title VII claim against a union for breach of its duty of fair
representation[.]” York v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 948, 955-56 (10th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff
is required to “show that (1) the employer violated the collective bargaining
agreement with respect to the plaintiff, (2) the union permitted the violation to go
unrepaired, thereby breaching the union’s duty of fair representation, and
(3) there was some indication that the union’s actions were motivated by
discriminatory animus.” Id. In a report and recommendation, the magistrate
judge concluded that plaintiff’s amended complaint failed to allege any of the
required elements set forth in York v. AT&T and, as a result, failed to state a
claim. Plaintiff then tendered a second amended complaint, which the magistrate
judge concluded would not cure the deficiencies of plaintiff’s amended complaint.
-3-
Therefore, the magistrate judge issued a recommendation that plaintiff’s motion
for leave to file the second amended complaint be denied.
The district court reviewed the magistrate judge’s recommendations
de novo and concluded that plaintiff’s allegations did “not state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” R. at 418. The court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendations, granted the Union’s motion to dismiss, and awarded the Union
its costs. Id. at 418-19.
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s denial of his request for appointment of
counsel, the denial of his motion to amend his complaint, and the dismissal of his
case.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072,
1078 (10th Cir. 2007). “In reviewing a motion to dismiss, this court must look
for plausibility in the complaint.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Under this standard,
a complaint must include ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of
[plaintiff’s] motion[] to amend his complaint.” Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary,
511 F.3d 1109, 1113 (10th Cir. 2007). We also review the denial of a motion for
appointment of counsel for an abuse of discretion. Hill v. SmithKline Beecham
-4-
Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2004). “Only in those extreme cases where
the lack of counsel results in fundamental unfairness will the district court’s
decision be overturned.” McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir.
1985).
We have thoroughly reviewed the parties’ arguments in light of the record
on appeal and the governing law. We are unpersuaded by plaintiff’s claims of
error and note that the argument in his reply brief that he was a safe employee is
irrelevant to his claims against the Union. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s rulings in all respects for substantially the reasons set forth in the
magistrate judge’s thorough and well-written recommendations, as adopted by the
district court, and for the reasons set forth in the district court’s orders denying
appointment of counsel.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff’s motion for
leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees is denied, and he
is directed to immediately pay the full amount of the filing fee.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
-5-