Gonzales v. Tapia , 383 F. App'x 774 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                        FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    June 22, 2010
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    MARTIN GONZALES,
    Petitioner - Appellant,                    No. 09-2252
    v.                                             (D. New Mexico)
    GEORGE TAPIA, Warden; GARY K.              (D.C. No. 1:09-CV-00590-JCH-LFG)
    KING, Attorney General of the State
    of New Mexico,
    Respondents - Appellees.
    ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
    Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
    Martin Gonzales, a New Mexico state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
    certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial of his application under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     for habeas relief. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c) (requiring COA to
    appeal denial of application). Because Mr. Gonzales has failed to make a
    substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, as required by
    § 2253(c)(2), we deny his request for a COA and dismiss the appeal.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Gonzales was convicted by a jury in New Mexico state court of 36
    counts of first-degree criminal sexual penetration, 25 counts of second-degree
    criminal sexual penetration, 61 counts of third-degree criminal sexual contact of a
    minor, and 61 counts of second-degree kidnapping. On March 23, 2005, he was
    sentenced to 873 years’ imprisonment, and two years’ parole. He appealed, and
    the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed. The New Mexico Supreme Court
    denied his petition for a writ of certiorari on March 14, 2008.
    On June 12, 2009, Mr. Gonzales filed his § 2254 application in the United
    States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The assigned magistrate
    judge issued a recommendation that Mr. Gonzales’s claims be denied and his
    application dismissed with prejudice. Mr. Gonzales did not object to the
    magistrate judge’s recommendation, and the district court adopted it on
    September 14, 2009.
    He now seeks a COA on the grounds (1) that he was denied his right to a
    speedy trial, (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) that his
    punishment was cruel and unusual because his sentence was too long and his bond
    was set too high. With the exception of the bond-related claim, these are the
    same claims raised in his § 2254 application to the district court and his appeal to
    the New Mexico Court of Appeals.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
    the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires “a
    demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate
    whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in
    -2-
    a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
    encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the applicant must show that
    the district court’s resolution of the constitutional claim was either “debatable or
    wrong.” 
    Id.
    The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
    provides that when a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in a state court, a
    federal court can grant habeas relief only if the applicant establishes that the
    state-court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
    clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
    United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
    light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1), (2). As we have explained:
    Under the “contrary to” clause, we grant relief only if the state court
    arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court
    on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently
    than the Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.
    Gipson v. Jordan, 
    376 F.3d 1193
    , 1196 (10th Cir. 2004) (brackets and internal
    quotation marks omitted). Relief is provided under the “unreasonable
    application” clause “only if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
    principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that
    principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” 
    Id.
     (brackets and internal quotation
    -3-
    marks omitted). Thus, a federal court may not issue a habeas writ simply because
    it concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision
    applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. See 
    id.
     Rather,
    that application must have been unreasonable. Therefore, for those of
    Mr. Gonzales’s claims that the New Mexico Court of Appeals adjudicated on the
    merits, “AEDPA’s deferential treatment of state court decisions must be
    incorporated into our consideration of [his] request for [a] COA.” Dockins v.
    Hines, 
    374 F.3d 935
    , 938 (10th Cir. 2004).
    In this case the New Mexico Court of Appeals carefully and thoroughly
    addressed the issues raised by Mr. Gonzales in this court except for his claim of
    excessive bail. We do not consider the bail issue, however, because it was not
    raised in federal district court. See Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, 
    542 F.3d 802
    ,
    817 (10th Cir. 2008). And as for the remaining issues, no reasonable jurist could
    debate the correctness of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,
    which granted appropriate AEDPA deference to the state appellate decision.
    There was no need for an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Gonzales’s claims.
    We add two comments on procedural matters in this case. First,
    Mr. Gonzales timely filed his notice of appeal and application for a COA with
    respect to the district court’s judgment of September 14, 2009. The record shows
    that Mr. Gonzales’s notice of appeal was received by the district court on
    October 14, 2009, within 30 days of the district court’s judgment. See Fed. R.
    -4-
    App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days). The district
    court, however, filed the pleadings on October 15. As a result, it appeared that
    the appeal was untimely, leading to unnecessary confusion and delay. We assume
    that the court clerk will be taking steps to prevent the recurrence of such errors.
    Second, we note that Mr. Gonzales probably waived his right to appeal the
    district court’s judgment by not objecting to the magistrate judge’s
    recommendations. See Gardner v. Galetka, 
    568 F.3d 862
    , 871 (10th Cir. 2009).
    But we need not resolve that question because we have determined on the merits
    that Mr. Gonzales is not entitled to relief.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We DENY Ms. Gonzales’s request for a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Harris L Hartz
    Circuit Judge
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-2252

Citation Numbers: 383 F. App'x 774

Judges: Hartz, Anderson, Tymkovich

Filed Date: 6/22/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024