Garcia v. Berkshire Life Insurance , 389 F. App'x 870 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 3, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
TINA GARCIA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 09-1109
v. (D. Colorado)
BERKSHIRE LIFE INSURANCE (D.C. No. 04-CV-01619-LTB-BNB)
COMPANY, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of The Guardian Life
Insurance Company of America; THE
GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA, a foreign
insurance company,
Defendants - Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Defendant and appellant Berkshire Life Insurance Company (“Berkshire”)
appeals the denial of its motion for attorneys’ fees and a set-off of the cost
judgment it had been awarded against disability payments it owed to the plaintiff
and appellee, Tina Garcia. Ms. Garcia’s attorney withdrew as counsel during the
pendency of this appeal, and Ms. Garcia therefore proceeds pro se. She has not
filed an appellate brief. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
In 1991, Ms. Garcia purchased a disability policy from Berkshire, under
which she would receive benefits if “due to injury or sickness [she was] unable to
perform the material and substantial duties of [her own] occupation,” and she was
“not engaged in any occupation in which [she] might reasonably be expected to
engage with due regard for [her] education, training, experience, and prior
economic status.” Garcia v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 569 F.3d 1174 (2009)
(“Garcia I”) (quoting the record in that case). 1 In 1998, Ms. Garcia filed for
benefits under the policy, and Berkshire eventually paid full benefits through
August 6, 2003. At that date, Berkshire suspended payment of benefits, claiming
that Ms. Garcia had failed to comply with certain provisions of her policy.
1
This matter was before our court previously, when we affirmed the
dismissal of Ms. Garcia’s underlying lawsuit claiming Berkshire denied her
benefits in bad faith, as a sanction for Ms. Garcia’s abusive litigation practices.
We discuss the procedural history further, infra.
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Berkshire eventually approved Ms. Garcia’s claim for total disability benefits as
of February 1, 2007. It refused, however, to pay benefits for the period between
August 2003 and February 2007, “primarily because of Ms. Garcia’s alleged
failure to comply with critical policy provisions.” Id. at 1177. 2
During this period of dispute, Ms. Garcia filed an action against Berkshire,
claiming it was denying her benefits in bad faith and in violation of the Colorado
Consumer Protection Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-101 et. seq. Both sides
eventually filed motions for summary judgment, and Berkshire filed an additional
motion for sanctions, claiming that Ms. Garcia had falsified or fabricated at least
four discovery documents. The magistrate judge to whom the matter was referred
concluded that Ms. Garcia had, indeed, prepared fabricated evidence, and
recommended that Berkshire’s motion for sanctions be granted and that
Ms. Garcia’s claims be dismissed with prejudice. The district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation in full, and granted Berkshire’s motion for
sanctions. Separately, “the district court granted Berkshire’s motion for summary
judgment on the merits, largely premised on the conclusion that Ms. Garcia did
not comply with the proof of loss requirements in her policy, and that therefore
Berkshire did not breach the insurance policy as a matter of law.” Garcia I, 569
F.3d at 1179.
2
Further details concerning this initial litigation between Ms. Garcia and
Berkshire may be obtained from our prior opinion. We only cite those facts
relevant to the precise issue before our court in this appeal.
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Ms. Garcia appealed those rulings to our court, which affirmed the sanction
of dismissal and did not reach the merits of the summary judgment issues. See
Garcia I. We remanded the case for the limited purpose of determining whether
Ms. Garcia falsified additional documents during the appeal, and, if so,
determining the amount of a reasonable attorneys’ fee award. We retained
jurisdiction over that appeal, however, “for the purpose of determining whether to
impose sanctions on appeal.” Garcia I, 569 F.3d at 1183.
Meanwhile, while that prior appeal was ongoing, Berkshire filed a motion
in the district court seeking attorneys’ fees and a set-off of the cost judgment it
had been awarded against Ms. Garcia’s disability payments. The district court
summarily denied the motion, without explanation. Berkshire now appeals that
denial.
DISCUSSION
At the time this appeal was filed, Berkshire was paying Ms. Garcia $5530
per month. 3 The district court entered a cost judgment against Ms. Garcia for
$15,986.23. Berkshire claims that “[s]ubject to maximum limits for statutory
exemptions, Berkshire is entitled to offset from any future obligations for Garcia
the amount of the cost judgment and any subsequent attorneys’ fees or appellate
3
In its motion before the district court, Berkshire opined that those
disability payments were “upon information and belief” Ms. Garcia’s primary
asset.
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costs awarded by the Court in the present appeal or in Case No 08-1022 [the other
appeal still pending in our court].” Appellant’s Br. at 4-5.
Berkshire essentially relies upon one Colorado case, as well as two
particular Colorado statutes, to resolve this matter of Colorado law. Berkshire
cites Finance Acceptance Co. v. Breaux, 419 P.2d 955 (Colo. 1966), for the
proposition that “the state Supreme Court has ruled that an employer may set off
amounts owed under a promissory note given by its former employee, from the
amount of wages still to be paid, up to the statutory exemption limit.”
Appellant’s Br. at 5.
It also relies upon two Colorado statues relating to exempt property and
exemption from garnishment. The first statute, Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-54-102(1)(v), exempts “[a]ny claim for public or private disability benefits
due, or any proceeds thereof, not otherwise provided for under law, up to three
thousand dollars per month. Any claim or proceeds in excess of this amount shall
be subject to garnishment in accordance with section 13-54-104.” Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 13-54-104, in turn, states that the maximum amount of “earnings” of an
individual that may be subject to garnishment or levy are “[t]wenty-five percent
of the individual’s disposable earnings for that week; or . . . [t]he amount by
which the individual’s disposable earnings . . . exceed thirty times the federal
minimum hourly wage. . .; or . . . the amount by which the individual’s disposable
earnings . . . exceed thirty times the state minimum hourly wage . . .” Id.
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(2)(a)(I)(A), (B), (C). “Earnings” includes “[f]unds held in or payable from any
. . . disability insurance.” Id. (1)(b)(I)(B). Thus, Berkshire argues that after
deducting $3000 from the monthly payment stipulated in the disability policy, the
remaining $2530 would be subject to garnishment. But, Berkshire would only be
entitled to withhold up to twenty-five percent of $2530 from each payment made,
until all judgments are repaid. While Berkshire argues that Ms. Garcia conceded
this point in her response brief filed before the district court, in fact she did no
such thing. She argued “Berkshire’s attempt to offset monthly disability benefits
should be denied as a matter of law.” Plaintiff’s Reply to Def.’s Mot. for Award
of Attorneys’ Fees and Mot. for Setoff Against Disability Payments at 43,
Appellant’s App. at 223.
Because Berkshire relies upon Finance Acceptance Co., we consider
whether it stands for the proposition Berkshire claims it does. In that case,
Joseph Breaux had been a long-time employee of Finance Acceptance Co. When
his employment was terminated in November 1962, Mr. Breaux owed Finance
Acceptance nearly $10,000, evidenced by two promissory notes. Finance
Acceptance, in turn, owed Mr. Breaux $617.91 as wages due for overtime work,
as well as $437.04, which represented Mr. Breaux’s interest in a retirement plan
operated by Finance Acceptance for its employees. Thus, the trial court found
that Mr. Breaux owed Finance Acceptance $9,652.36, and Finance Acceptance
owed him $617.91 in unpaid wages.
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Mr. Breaux “claimed that 70% of his wage claim was exempt from levy
under C.R.S. 77-2-4 [the predecessor to § 13-54-102] and that, being exempt from
levy, it was by the same token also exempt from being in any matter set-off
against his indebtedness to plaintiff.” Finance Acceptance Co., 419 P.2d at 956.
The trial court agreed and set-off only 30% of the total claim for unpaid wages.
The trial court held that none of the money owed Mr. Breaux from his payments
into the retirement fund could be set-off.
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that there were no Colorado
cases directly on point on the question of “whether property which by statute is
exempt from levy under execution, attachment or garnishment is also exempt
from the law of set-off.” Id. at 957. The Court observed that “[t]he decided
weight of authority . . . from other jurisdictions is that such exempt property is
not subject to being set-off against any indebtedness on the part of the employee
to his employer.” Thus, the Court concluded that “the trial court did not err in
refusing to set-off against the defendants’ admitted indebtedness to the plaintiff
70% of Joseph Breaux’s claim against plaintiff for unpaid wages.” Id. at 958.
On the other hand, the Court held that the entire amount of Mr. Breaux’s
claim for the return of pension funds paid into the retirement plan was subject to
set-off. These monies were not considered “earnings,” but, rather, were paid
pursuant to a contract and therefore, because they were not statutorily exempt,
they were subject to being set-off.
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In sum, this case supports Berkshire’s argument that Ms. Garcia’s disability
payments (“earnings” under the relevant statutes) can be set-off up to the
statutory exemption levels. We thus agree that Berkshire is entitled to withhold
up to twenty-five percent of $2530 (i.e., approximately $600) from each payment
it makes, until the entire judgment owed by Ms. Garcia to Berkshire is fully paid.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s decision and
remand this case for further proceedings consistent herewith.
CONCLUSION
The district court’s decision is REVERSED and we REMAND this matter
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with our decision.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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