Rocha v. CCCF Administration , 408 F. App'x 141 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 20, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
MARCO A. ROCHA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-1158
(D.C. No. 1:09-CV-01432-CMA-MEH)
CCCF ADMINISTRATION; (D. Colo.)
CCCF WARDEN D. SMELSER;
CCCF PERSONNEL R. GARCIA;
C. ANDERSON; B. BONNER;
J. MORA; J. SANCHEZ,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, ANDERSON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
In this pro se civil rights appeal, Marco A. Rocha, a Colorado inmate,
contends the district court erroneously dismissed his conspiracy and Eighth
Amendment claims. He also contends the court failed to compel discovery,
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
prematurely ruled on his motion to amend the judgment, and improperly entered
dismissal with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we reject Mr. Rocha’s
contentions and affirm the judgment of the district court.
I
This case was triggered by an incident that occurred when Mr. Rocha was
transferred to the Crowley County Correctional Facility (CCCF). As he arrived at
the prison, Mr. Rocha was instructed to sign a property inventory form that he
believed was inaccurate. He thought the form commingled his assets with
property that was the subject of a state replevin action he was then prosecuting,
and thus he refused to sign the form. His refusal prompted defendants Garcia,
Anderson, Mora, and Sanchez to confine Mr. Rocha in the “unbearabl[y] cold”
segregation unit. R. Vol. 1 at 16. Apparently the air conditioning had been
turned up to create an “extremely cold environment,” but Mr. Rocha was given
only a prison jumpsuit to wear. Id. Sanchez told Mr. Rocha he could come out of
segregation if he signed the inventory form, but Mr. Rocha insisted the form was
inaccurate, and he therefore refused to sign it. Consequently, he remained in
those conditions for more than thirty hours, until he reported to medical staff an
“[acute] nervous disorder” and “sharp back pain” resulting from the cold. Id. At
that point, he was given bed linens and two blankets.
Following this incident, Mr. Rocha filed a complaint in state court, alleging
defendants had conspired to force him to abandon his replevin action. He also
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alleged, among other federal constitutional claims, that defendants had exposed
him to a potential risk of serious harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 1
Defendants removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A magistrate judge
recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted, and over Mr. Rocha’s
objections, the district court adopted that recommendation. Later, the court
issued an amended order to comport with CCCF’s status as a privately run
facility, and afterwards, Mr. Rocha appealed to this court.
As we distill his appellate materials, Mr. Rocha challenges the district
court’s decision on five grounds. He first contends it was error to dismiss his
conspiracy claim because the magistrate judge recognized that his allegations
could show a predicate agreement among the defendants. Next, Mr. Rocha
maintains that the “inhumane and sadistic” conditions of his confinement violated
the Eighth Amendment. Aplt. Br. at 3. Third, Mr. Rocha claims the district court
failed to compel defendants to produce discoverable evidence. Fourth, he argues
that the court prematurely ruled on his motion to amend the judgment without
considering his reply brief. And lastly, Mr. Rocha says it was error to dismiss his
claims with prejudice because it barred him from amending his complaint.
1
Mr. Rocha also alleged First Amendment, equal protection, and due process
violations, but these claims are not the subject of this appeal. See Bronson v.
Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that issues omitted
from an appellant’s opening brief are deemed forfeited).
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II
We review dismissals for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
de novo. Gee v. Pacheco, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 4909644, at *2 (10th Cir. Oct.
26, 2010). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gallagher v.
Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1068 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). Conclusory
allegations will not survive a motion to dismiss. Id. Nevertheless, we are
mindful that Mr. Rocha’s pro se status obliges us to afford his materials a
“solicitous construction.” See Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1
(10th Cir. 2007).
A. Conspiracy
We begin with the dismissal of Mr. Rocha’s conspiracy claim, which the
district court determined was deficient under state law. 2 As best we can discern
from Mr. Rocha’s opening brief, he contends the district court failed to credit the
2
The magistrate judge determined the conspiracy allegations were also
deficient under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Finding that Mr. Rocha did not object to this
determination, the district court reviewed the ruling only for clear error and found
none. We do not consider the issue. See Morales-Fernandez v. I.N.S., 418 F.3d
1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining firm waiver rule).
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magistrate judge’s finding that the allegations could show a meeting of the minds
between defendants. See Nelson v. Elway, 908 P.2d 102, 106 (Colo. 1995) (“To
establish a civil conspiracy in Colorado, a plaintiff must show: (1) two or more
persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the
object or course of action; (4) an unlawful overt act; and (5) damages as to the
proximate result.”). Notwithstanding the magistrate judge’s observation,
however, both the magistrate judge and district court explained that Mr. Rocha
also had to show the supposed agreement entailed an unlawful act or means. See
id. (“[T]he purpose of the conspiracy must involve an unlawful act or unlawful
means.”). Because Mr. Rocha failed to make that showing, dismissal was proper.
To the extent Mr. Rocha asserts other errors regarding this claim, we affirm for
substantially the same reasons provided by the district court in its amended order
dated April 2, 2010.
B. Eighth Amendment
Mr. Rocha next contends the district court wrongly dismissed his Eighth
Amendment claim, which was based on the cold conditions of his confinement.
“The Eighth Amendment does not mandate comfortable prisons, and conditions
imposed may be restrictive and even harsh.” Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299,
1311 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted). To plead a valid conditions-of-
confinement claim, Mr. Rocha was required to make two showings. First, he was
required to make an objective showing that the deprivation was “sufficiently
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serious,” that is, that he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)
(quotations omitted). Second, he was required to make a subjective showing that
defendants had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which in this context “is
one of deliberate indifference.” Id. (quotations omitted). In assessing
Mr. Rocha’s claim, we evaluate such factors as “the severity of the cold, its
duration; whether [he had] alternative means to protect himself from the cold;
[and] the adequacy of such alternatives.” See Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640,
644 (7th Cir. 1997); see also DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir.
2001) (noting the “circumstances, nature, and duration of the challenged
conditions must be carefully considered” (quotations omitted)).
Here, Mr. Rocha alleged that in August 2008, the prison air conditioning
had been turned up, exposing him to “unbearable cold” and an “extremely cold
environment.” R. Vol. 1 at 16. He claimed he was subjected to these conditions
for more than thirty hours with only a jumpsuit to wear, until staff gave him bed
linens and two blankets. He also alleged other inmates complained of the cold.
These allegations are deficient because there is no objective indication that the
cold was so severe as to pose a substantial risk of serious harm. Instead,
Mr. Rocha has provided only conclusory allegations and subjective impressions of
the cold, which tells us nothing about its actual severity. Cf. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (concluding that allegations of denied medical treatment
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for life threatening disease satisfied Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Moreover, without
knowing the severity of the cold, we cannot evaluate whether the duration of
Mr. Rocha’s exposure—more than thirty hours—was sufficiently serious to
implicate constitutional protections. Cf. Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1442
(10th Cir. 1996) (finding viable claim where deprivations “lasted for a period of
days, weeks and months”). Under these circumstances, Mr. Rocha has failed to
plead enough factual matter to state a plausible claim to relief. 3 See Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1949.
C. Motion to Compel
Mr. Rocha also contends the district court erred in failing to compel
defendants to produce discoverable evidence, apparently a list of other inmates
who entered segregation in August of 2008. This argument is meritless, however,
because where, as here, a defendant moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the
district court “test[s] the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of
the complaint after taking those allegations as true.” Issa v. Comp USA, 354 F.3d
1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). At this stage of the proceedings,
3
Mr. Rocha asserts the district court showed bias in favor of defendants by
applying White v. Whetsel, 17 F. App’x 839, 841 (10th Cir. 2001). In Whetsel,
this court affirmed in an unpublished decision the dismissal of a claim alleging
that prison air conditioning was too cold and caused inmates to develop head
colds. Id. at 840-41. Given the similar factual allegations, we perceive neither
bias nor error in the district court’s reference to Whetsel.
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the district court was under no obligation to compel discovery and consider
potential evidence. 4
D. Amended Judgment
Next, Mr. Rocha claims it was error for the district court to rule on his
motion to amend the judgment without considering his reply brief. He contends
doing so enabled defendants to “abscond[]” without disclosing the identities of
other inmates confined under allegedly similar conditions. Aplt. Br. at 6. As
defendants correctly observe, however, the district court’s local rules authorize
the court to rule on a motion “any time after it is filed.” See D.C. COLO. L Civ.
R 7.1(c). There was no error.
E. Nature of Dismissal
Finally, Mr. Rocha claims the nature of the district court’s dismissal—with
prejudice—was inappropriate. He seems to suggest the court should have
4
In his “fifth issue” for review, Mr. Rocha contends that discoverable
evidence precluded the court’s dismissal. This contention confuses the legal
standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions with the standard applicable to
summary judgment motions. The correct standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6)
motions, again, is whether the complaint alone contains sufficient factual
allegations to state a plausible claim for relief, not, as Mr. Rocha contends,
whether there are genuine issues of material fact. If he means to suggest the
district court should have converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for
summary judgment, his argument fails because the court considered nothing
outside the pleadings and thus was not obligated to convert the motion to one for
summary judgment. See David v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1352
(10th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be converted to
summary judgment motion when the court considers matters outside the
pleadings).
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afforded him an opportunity to amend the complaint if it found the allegations
deficient. Under our precedent, “[a] dismissal with prejudice is appropriate where
a complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and granting leave to amend
would be futile.” Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219
(10th Cir. 2006). As we have explained, “dismissal of a pro se complaint for
failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff could
not prevail on the facts alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity
to amend.” Gee, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 4909644, at *14 (quotation omitted).
Here, Mr. Rocha did not allege sufficient facts to state a facially plausible
claim to relief. Nor did he attempt to cure his deficient allegations by amending
his complaint, despite repeated alerts by the district court and magistrate judge
that he could amend once as a matter of course. And, nothing in the facts he did
allege suggests he would have satisfied our standards, even if he had amended his
complaint. Thus, the district court properly dismissed this action with prejudice.
III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Mr. Rocha’s motion to
proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is GRANTED, and he is reminded to
continue making partial payments until his entire filing fee is paid in full.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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