Hynoski v. Harmston , 409 F. App'x 231 ( 2011 )


Menu:
  •                                                                       FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    January 10, 2011
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    MARY PATRICIA HYNOSKI,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                 No. 10-2181
    (D.C. No. 6:09-CV-00812-MV-KBM)
    JOHN HARMSTON; LEA                                  (D. N.M.)
    REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER;
    JUDGE JAMES HALL; JUDGE
    MICHAEL VIGIL; HONORABLE
    EDWARD L. CHAVEZ; JUSTICE
    PATRICIO M SERNA; JUSTICE
    PETRA JIMENEZ MAES; JUSTICE
    RICHARD C. BOSSON; JUSTICE
    CHARLES W. DANIELS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before KELLY and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
    not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
    and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
    consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    Plaintiff Mary Patricia Hynoski, appearing pro se, appeals the dismissal of
    her claims arising from injuries to her wrists, medical treatment, legal advice, and
    subsequent lawsuits. Although we recognize that Ms. Hynoski has faced
    significant medical and financial problems, we nevertheless must affirm the
    judgment of the district court.
    I.
    Ms. Hynoski formerly earned her living as a massage therapist in New
    Mexico. Over a decade ago she injured her right wrist when she slipped and fell
    at a retail food store. Defendant John Harmston, an orthopedic surgeon on staff at
    the Lea Regional Medical Center, performed surgery to repair the wrist.
    Ms. Hynoski filed a personal injury suit against the food store and, in 1997, a jury
    found in her favor. Her attorney did not ask Dr. Harmston to testify at the trial or
    argue for compensation for future medical damages.
    In 2004, the right-wrist problem resurfaced and Dr. Harmston performed a
    second surgery. Ms. Hynoski initially recovered from the procedure, though she
    continued to experience right-wrist pain. The same year, she began complaining
    about an injury to her left wrist. Dr. Harmston recommended conservative care
    rather than surgery. Ms. Hynoski sent him a letter accusing him of lying and
    falsifying his medical records and filed a medical-board proceeding against him in
    2005. Yet in 2006 she again sought his care for her left wrist. In light of the
    -2-
    circumstances, Dr. Harmston declined to continue a physician-patient
    relationship.
    Ms. Hynoski initiated a pro se malpractice lawsuit in state court in October
    2007 against Dr. Harmston and the medical center, alleging negligence and
    falsification of documents. The state trial judge granted summary judgment in
    favor of defendants in February 2009, a judgment that was upheld on appeal.
    Unbowed by this adverse result, Ms. Hynoski repackaged her malpractice
    claims as federal constitutional and statutory violations, then filed the instant
    case. In various iterations of her complaint, she named as defendants
    Dr. Harmston, the medical center, the state-court judge, and all the justices of the
    New Mexico Supreme Court. She also sought sanctions against non-party
    attorneys.
    The case was assigned to a magistrate judge who, because Ms. Hynoski
    asked to proceed in forma pauperis, reviewed the complaint pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2). Discerning several flaws in the complaint, the magistrate judge
    issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed sua sponte.
    After receiving a response to the order, the magistrate judge concluded that:
    (1) The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Ms. Hynoski’s challenge to the
    state-court judgment, see Mann v. Boatright, 
    477 F.3d 1140
    , 1147
    (10th Cir. 2007) (Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the “district court
    cannot entertain constitutional claims attacking a state-court judgment,
    -3-
    even if the state court did not pass directly on those claims, when the
    constitutional attack is inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
    judgment.”) (quotation marks and alterations omitted);
    (2) the defendant judges were entitled to absolute immunity from suit for
    performance of judicial acts, see Hunt v. Bennett, 
    17 F.3d 1263
    , 1266
    (10th Cir. 1994) (“[A] state judge is absolutely immune from § 1983
    liability except when the judge acts in the clear absence of all
    jurisdiction.”) (quotation marks omitted); and
    (3) Dr. Harmston, the medical center, and the private attorneys are not state
    actors for § 1983 purposes, see Scott v. Hern, 
    216 F.3d 897
    , 906 (10th Cir.
    2000) (“[A] § 1983 claim . . . based on the conduct of a private individual”
    is appropriate only if that conduct “is fairly attributable to the state.”
    (quotation marks omitted).
    The magistrate judge therefore recommended that Ms. Hynoski’s motion to
    proceed in forma pauperis be denied and the matter be dismissed.
    Upon Ms. Hynoski’s objections, the district judge conducted a de novo
    review and adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations. Accordingly, the
    court dismissed the case pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B) for failure to state
    a cognizable federal claim and as legally frivolous. The district court later denied
    Ms. Hynoski’s several post-judgment motions for lack of merit and denied her
    -4-
    request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal for lack of a reasoned,
    nonfrivolous argument.
    II.
    If a plaintiff requests in-forma-pauperis status and the district court
    dismisses the case under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B), we review a dismissal for
    failure to state a claim de novo, Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 
    165 F.3d 803
    , 806
    (10th Cir. 1999), and a dismissal based on frivolousness for abuse of discretion,
    Denton v. Hernandez, 
    504 U.S. 25
    , 33 (1992). Although we liberally construe
    pro-se filings, Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 
    600 F.3d 1301
    , 1311 (10th Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 469
     (2010), “only a complaint that states a plausible claim
    for relief survives” dismissal proceedings, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    129 S. Ct. 1937
    ,
    1950 (2009). Further, a suit “is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either
    in law or fact” or is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke v.
    Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
    , 325, 327 (1989).
    On appeal, Ms. Hynoski does not confront the legal reasons for the
    dismissal of her case. Instead, she renews her claims of alleged constitutional
    violations, insisting that the state court should have allowed her malpractice case
    to proceed to trial so that Dr. Harmston and the medical center are held
    accountable for her medical injuries and complications. She also emphasizes that
    some defendants engaged in fraudulent misconduct.
    -5-
    The district court’s dismissal is based on well-established principles,
    applied after a careful analysis of Ms. Hynoski’s filings. In essence, the lawsuit
    attempted to attack a state-court judgment, impose liability on state-court judges
    entitled to absolute immunity, and bring 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claims against private
    parties. For the reasons stated in district court proceedings, the relief
    Ms. Hynoski seeks is legally unavailable.
    We see no error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s disposition of
    this matter and therefore AFFIRM. Further, we DENY Ms. Hynoski’s motion to
    proceed in forma pauperis because her appeal has no arguable basis. See Neitzke,
    
    490 U.S. at 325
    . We also DENY her motion to reconsider, amend, or alter the
    judgment; and DENY her request to submit evidence not provided to the district
    court.
    Entered for the Court
    Wade Brorby
    Senior Circuit Judge
    -6-