Garcia v. Adams County ( 2022 )

Appellate Case: 22-1063 Document: 010110776183 Date Filed: 12/01/2022 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 1, 2022
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
ALEXANDER NOEL GARCIA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 22-1063
(D.C. No. 1:21-CV-01120-CMA-KLM)
ADAMS COUNTY; ADAMS COUNTY (D. Colo.)
SHERRIFF’S DEPT.; J. SPILLIS,
Sergeant; WELLPATH; D.
WEATHERWAX; MAY, Nurse;
MATTHEW GILLESPIE; ADAMS
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; ADAMS
COUNTY DETENTION FACILITY;
LAWS, Chief, Adams County Deputy,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before McHUGH, MORITZ, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Alexander Noel Garcia, a pretrial detainee in the Adams County Detention
Facility, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sued various entities and
individuals, alleging deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. His claim
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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rested on allegations that he suffers from sleep apnea and that staff at the detention
facility did not treat it with a continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) machine.
The district court dismissed his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Mr. Garcia appeals, and we affirm.
I. Background
Mr. Garcia’s operative complaint alleged the following facts. He suffers from
sleep apnea, a disorder that causes him to stop breathing 103 times per hour and to
wake up choking and coughing. He also experiences pain, daily migraine headaches,
and “mild [periodic] blackouts.” R. at 28.
He received a sleep-apnea diagnosis in 2017 and had been prescribed a CPAP
machine. He arrived at the Adams County Detention Facility in 2021, having used a
CPAP machine during a prior term of incarceration at the facility. Although staff
approved him to use a CPAP machine again if he could provide one, they refused to
provide a machine themselves. Mr. Garcia did not have his own CPAP machine,
however, because it had been “lost.” R. at 28. Medical staff prescribed oxygen and
gave him an oxygen concentrator for his sleep apnea, and prescribed Tylenol for his
headaches. Despite this treatment, his symptoms persisted.
Based on these allegations, Mr. Garcia filed a complaint alleging deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need, a claim available to pretrial detainees under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 989 (10th Cir. 2020).
A deliberate-indifference claim has both an objective component and a subjective
one. Id. To satisfy the objective component, a plaintiff must show “that the
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deprivation at issue was in fact sufficiently serious.” Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751
(10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). A “medical need is sufficiently
serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or
one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The subjective
component is satisfied if an “official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and she must
also draw the inference.” Strain, 977 F.3d at 990 (brackets and internal quotation
marks omitted).
The district court concluded Mr. Garcia failed to allege facts that could
establish either component of a deliberate-indifference claim. It further concluded
that allowing Mr. Garcia to amend his complaint would be futile, and it dismissed the
complaint with prejudice.
II. Discussion
A. Standards of Review
Because Mr. Garcia represents himself, we construe his filings liberally. See
Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). But
we cannot assume the role of his advocate by constructing arguments for him. See id.We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. Strain, 977 F.3d at 989. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
a “complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief plausible on its
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face.” Id. We accept as true all well-pleaded facts in Mr. Garcia’s complaint, view
them in the light most favorable to him, and draw all reasonable inferences in his
favor. See Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 985 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 477 (2021).
Although we generally review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for an
abuse of discretion, when the “denial is based on a determination that amendment
would be futile, our review for abuse of discretion includes de novo review of the
legal basis for the finding of futility.” Barnes v. Harris, 783 F.3d 1185, 1197
(10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. The complaint failed to state a claim.
We will assume Mr. Garcia alleged facts that could establish the objective
component of his deliberate-indifference claim.1 But he failed to allege facts that
could satisfy the subjective component. After all, the “negligent failure to provide
adequate medical care, even one constituting medical malpractice, does not give rise
to a constitutional violation.” Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 811
(10th Cir. 1999). And “a prisoner who merely disagrees with a diagnosis or a
prescribed course of treatment does not state a constitutional violation.” Id.That is the case here. Mr. Garcia merely disagrees with the treatment he
received for his sleep apnea. Although he underscores that he had been prescribed a
CPAP machine in the past, that fact does not support a claim that medical staff acted
1
We therefore need not consider Mr. Garcia’s arguments targeting the district
court’s analysis of the objective component.
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with deliberate indifference when they prescribed alternative treatment. See Strain,
977 F.3d at 995 (recognizing that a plaintiff’s challenge to the adequacy of prescribed
treatment “goes to the efficacy of treatment, not deliberate indifference”). Because
Mr. Garcia did not allege facts that could show he suffered a constitutional violation,
the district court correctly dismissed his claim against all defendants.2 See Crowson
v. Washington Cnty., 983 F.3d 1166, 1186 (10th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that “a claim
under § 1983 against either an individual actor or a municipality cannot survive a
determination that there has been no constitutional violation”), cert. denied,
142 S. Ct. 224 (2021).
Mr. Garcia seems to assert that because his complaint survived an initial
screening, res judicata and the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6). Yet he does not support this assertion with analysis or authority. In
short, he has not adequately briefed this argument, and we deem it waived. See
Garrett, 425 F.3d at 841. Even if Mr. Garcia had adequately briefed this argument,
however, it would fail. The initial screening is not a final judgment, and district
courts remain free to reconsider prior interlocutory orders before entry of final
judgment. See Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2011).
2
Mr. Garcia argues that the court should have considered the factors in
Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992), before dismissing his
complaint with prejudice. But Ehrenhaus does not address dismissals under Rule
12(b)(6).
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C. Amending the complaint would be futile.
The district court correctly concluded it would be futile to allow Mr. Garcia to
amend his complaint. Arguing otherwise, Mr. Garcia focuses on medical records that
he filed separately from his complaint showing a past sleep-apnea diagnosis and a
past prescription for a CPAP machine.3 But Mr. Garcia alleged the past diagnosis
and prescription in his complaint, so his medical records add nothing to the
complaint’s allegations.4
Mr. Garcia also says that, by amending his complaint, he could have named
previously unidentified medical staff and added allegations that his symptoms grew
worse after he contracted COVID-19. But he fails to explain how this new
information would remedy his complaint’s fundamental shortcoming—its failure to
allege facts showing more than his mere disagreement with the treatment he
received.5
3
Mr. Garcia’s medical records were filed (and shall remain) under seal. Even
so, we have determined that the public’s right to access the information mentioned in
this decision outweighs any privacy interest. See Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross
Blue Shield of N.J., 663 F.3d 1124, 1135–36 (10th Cir. 2011). We have mentioned
only those parts of the records relevant to our decision. And Mr. Garcia himself has
discussed this same information in public filings.
4
Because Mr. Garcia’s medical records do not affect the merits of his claim,
we need not consider his argument that the district court should have taken judicial
notice of them.
5
Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court unfairly denied leave to amend his
complaint as a matter of course. A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of
course, as relevant here, within 21 days after service of a Rule 12(b) motion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). During that time frame, however, Mr. Garcia did not
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We reject Mr. Garcia’s argument that he should now prevail because the
defendants have admitted liability by ultimately offering and providing him a CPAP
machine. Mr. Garcia claims to have received the machine after the district court
entered judgment, and we “generally limit our review on appeal to the record that
was before the district court when it made its decision.” Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen
Co., 526 F.3d 641, 648 (10th Cir. 2008). In any event, the defendants have not
admitted liability.
Because allowing Mr. Garcia to amend his complaint would be futile, the
district court did not err when it dismissed the complaint without granting leave to
amend. See Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2007).
D. Mr. Garcia’s allegations of judicial bias are unfounded.
Mr. Garcia appears to seek reversal based on an allegation the district court
was biased. But he supports this argument by citing adverse rulings, which “alone do
not demonstrate judicial bias.” Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 762 (10th Cir. 2010).
III. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s judgment. We grant Mr. Garcia’s motion to
proceed without prepaying costs and fees. We deny all other pending motions.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
actually attempt to amend his complaint; he instead sought leave to amend his
complaint at an unspecified “date in the future.” Second Suppl. R. at 22.
7